Mariana Mazzucato Thinks We Need More Moonshots | Odd Lots
Bloomberg Podcasts
0:00 The investments that went into what
0:01 we call today artificial intelligence, including,
0:03 you know, lab models and think which models,
0:06 speech recognition dates, you know, decades.
0:09 And like so many other areas that was led by government.
0:13 So if you look at even DARPA, which,
0:14 as you know, was the lead, investor in the internet,
0:19 it came from problems mainly
0:21 in the military industrial complex that then required,
0:25 ultimately what we're calling artificial intelligence today.
0:27 But again, in the entrepreneurial state,
0:29 I talked about how everything in our smartphones that make them smarter,
0:32 not stupid internet, GPS, touchscreens, Siri,
0:34 and so on, where government finance was very scary today,
0:37 what's what makes today different with AI is that that's
0:41 not really necessarily going to be true much longer.
0:45 Why?
0:46 Because these massive economic rents and I call them rents, not profits.
0:49 So excess profits in excess of what these companies actually did,
0:53 because we privatized all the rewards from this massive
0:57 social and collectively created value in this area.
1:01 They have so much money, right?
1:03 Trillions.
1:04 Not billions, trillions.
1:05 The salaries they are paying to the top researchers in universities,
1:09 both public and private universities,
1:12 and to people who used to work in the NASA's, the DARPA's,
1:16 the force in China, they are going now to work in these companies.
1:20 And that hemorrhaging of talent, of top research expertise.
1:24 I don't think people are talking about this enough.
1:25 It it literally is the biggest change.
1:34 Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
1:38 I'm Joe Weisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.
1:40 We're still here in Madrid.
1:42 Tracy.
1:42 Still here.
1:42 You have a good time?
1:43 I am, I've eaten a lot of ham and cheese and that's pretty much all I can say.
1:48 Yeah, I'm going to turn into a ham on by the time I leave.
1:51 I'm certain of that.
1:53 You know, so we are at the out of the Bloomberg City lab conference.
1:56 You know, it's funny, like the mayoral level of politics is not
2:00 something we spend a ton of time typically on.
2:03 But I would say, like it definitely.
2:05 You know, when I think about it,
2:06 when I'm like here and like listening to a lot of conversations,
2:09 it's just so obviously like connected to a lot of the themes we talk about
2:13 because so much of our discussions have
2:15 to do with something related to, you know,
2:18 innovation or technology or implementation of policy and how
2:22 it spans both the public and private sectors.
2:25 Yeah.
2:25 I mean, also when I think about a lot
2:28 of lot of topics like AI or housing affordability or inequality,
2:31 like cities, I think City Lab actually use this phrase at one point.
2:35 But cities are really at the frontline of all of those challenges, right?
2:39 And trying to implement policy in that local level in a way
2:42 that's like very easy to see and observe and also to judge.
2:46 Totally.
2:47 Yeah.
2:47 No, it's exactly right.
2:49 And I think maybe there's something like, you know,
2:52 I don't it feels like to some extent the mayoral level of any
2:56 governance is sort of maybe the least ideological and the most like, you know,
3:01 we talked to the Baltimore mayor, for example,
3:03 and so much of his theme was just like talking to other mayors,
3:06 like, what's working in your time of working
3:08 in your city and what's not working and so forth.
3:10 They all have such similar challenges.
3:12 So many things have been like repeated.
3:14 You know, one time after another that, like,
3:17 they all can sort of speak the same language and all have the same issues.
3:20 Yeah, it's funny, you kind of get that local idea swapping
3:23 at a major level that I
3:25 cannot imagine necessarily happening in national politics.
3:28 Like, can you imagine Trump and XI Jinping getting together and be like,
3:31 oh, we implemented this really cool, like national transportation program.
3:35 Have you tried it?
3:36 Yeah.
3:36 You know, you hear like these stories, right, of a governor,
3:39 a governor sometimes or a mayor will go to like another country is like,
3:43 oh, we can learn from what the city did on transit or whatever,
3:46 but now you don't really hear that the same way.
3:50 At the at the real national level,
3:51 which is where a lot of our discussions tend to sit.
3:54 Absolutely.
3:55 And I'm really excited about today's episode.
3:57 We're going to be speaking with a guest who I would say, like,
3:59 since we've been doing Odd Lives is
4:02 actually one of the more frequently requested,
4:04 long requested, and so it's sort of a failure on our part that, like,
4:08 we just, like, never made it happen before.
4:12 But yeah, someone who like, really like,
4:14 who's whole career is like, dedicated to a lot of odd.
4:17 Lots of things.
4:18 Well, we waited until we could do it at Madrid.
4:20 That's a perfect.
4:21 Just like, do it at any other random venue.
4:23 Yes, it was all very strategically designed.
4:25 So we really do have the perfect guest,
4:27 someone that a lot of guests have wanted to listen,
4:29 to hear from for a long time.
4:30 We're going to be speaking with Mariana Mustacato,
4:33 professor at University College London and founder
4:35 of the Institute for Public Purpose,
4:37 author of several books sort of touching on these themes of technology,
4:41 public sector, private sector, the roots of innovation,
4:44 how these things actually get deployed.
4:46 So Professor Ricardo, thank you so much for coming on Adelaide.
4:50 Thrilled to finally have you on finally,
4:52 finally our completely our fault for not having made it happen sooner.
4:57 But, what do you do?
4:58 Start it.
4:58 What are you doing here?
4:59 What, what brings you to this particular conference?
5:02 What, what attracts you here?
5:04 Well, first of all, I'm here also because the the government of Spain is,
5:08 really kind of leading the way in many
5:11 areas that I'm very interested in, especially the kind of new economic thinking
5:15 that needs to underpin how we rethink government.
5:17 And so I was meeting with both
5:20 the Prime Minister and the, Minister for the economy,
5:23 Carlos Cuerpo, who I'm on a panel on today
5:25 with, about a council that we've just set up.
5:28 It's called the Global Council for a Common Good Economy.
5:31 Anyway, and besides that, I'm also here to speak at the Bloomberg,
5:35 City Labs event about this new public sector capability
5:38 index that we've been developing with them as a partner,
5:41 which is really about, you know, reinvesting inside the civil service so
5:46 that they can really tackle those wicked, complex problems instead of, you know,
5:50 hiring Deloitte during Covid and giving them 1.5
5:52 million a day to do test and trace, which they failed at in the UK.
5:56 I definitely want to get you to go off on consultants.
6:00 But before we do, like when you meet
6:01 with someone like the Prime Minister of Spain,
6:03 what is it that they want to know from you?
6:05 Like what information or expertise are they seeking?
6:08 Right.
6:08 Well, I'm actually quite lucky that my books
6:11 actually get read by the Prime Minister.
6:13 So usually what happens is that they've,
6:15 especially the entrepreneurial state, which I, you know,
6:17 wrote in 2013 that had quite a bit a bit of an effect here.
6:20 They even wrote a report called, Les Vallon in Espana.
6:24 And they really want to ask me, you know, what does that mean?
6:28 What does it mean for actually even being able to fail, for example.
6:31 Right.
6:31 So venture capitalists are always bragging about all the failures
6:34 that they had in order to get a success, you know,
6:37 whereas as soon as a civil servant or a minister
6:39 fails or prime minister fails front page of the papers.
6:41 So they're very interested in the kind of narrative change,
6:44 but also what the cultural change,
6:47 but especially the theoretical underpinning within, say,
6:50 a finance ministry or an economics ministry
6:53 that needs to then accompany rethinking government.
6:55 Because otherwise, if you continue to have the old economic models
6:58 where we judge things by cost benefit analysis and that present value,
7:01 all these really static metrics,
7:03 we would have never even bother going to the moon.
7:05 Okay, first of all, in the 1960s,
7:07 had we thought of it as a cost benefit, calculation.
7:11 And so what should replace that?
7:13 Right.
7:13 So you mentioned the entrepreneurial state being published in 2013.
7:17 And I feel like I need to emphasize this because like,
7:19 there has been this mind shift since the 2020 pandemic on industrial policy.
7:24 And we kind of take it almost as a given, especially on this show,
7:27 that there is a role for governments to play
7:29 when it comes to innovation and entrepreneurial ism.
7:32 But you were there very early.
7:35 Did you feel vindicated by the 2020 shift?
7:39 Well, I think there's a bit of a misunderstanding
7:41 that just because government spending a lot of money, investing a lot of money,
7:44 whether it's the IRA or the next gen EU 2 trillion recovery, plan in Europe,
7:50 that that means that industrial strategy is back or that, you know,
7:53 government is being really strategic.
7:55 It depends.
7:56 And I mean, that's the whole point, right?
7:57 You know, how are we actually framing it?
7:59 Is it just a lot of tax incentives?
8:00 Are we focus too much on sectors.
8:02 To what degree, is industrial strategy
8:05 actually helping to create a more inclusive,
8:09 sustainable, innovation driven economy?
8:11 Or is it just another way of of handouts and subsidies to particular sectors?
8:16 And then we end up socializing risks and privatizing rewards.
8:19 And also, I mean, I used to joke
8:21 that, the US government has always had an industrial strategy,
8:24 but, you know, pretending not to and they've always,
8:26 you know, talked, the Jefferson talked but acted
8:28 the Hamilton talk or the Hamiltonian kind of, more,
8:33 you know, proactive government strategy.
8:35 But by pretending that wasn't there, they kept a lot of things under the radar.
8:40 And the joke bit is just that finally,
8:42 people understood what the hell it was talking about because
8:44 of the because of the musical before the musical came out.
8:48 Anyway.
8:48 So I think that's really important to recognize
8:51 that industrial strategy has always been there.
8:53 Yeah, except that in certain phases, including now in some countries,
8:57 it's not really strategy in terms of being
9:00 driven by public purpose, which, as you said,
9:02 is the title in this Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose,
9:05 I direct it's been just kind of vertical strategies,
9:08 focus on sectors, technologies, types of firms.
9:11 Right.
9:12 The whole focus on small medium enterprises.
9:14 So what I've been trying to do is to say stop focusing on sectors,
9:17 technologies and firms focus on big problems.
9:20 Right?
9:20 As bold as going to the moon and back in a short amount of time.
9:23 The mission idea, the missions that then require sectoral support.
9:27 But you're not getting support because you are a particular sector.
9:30 Yeah, you're getting support if you're willing.
9:31 So moving away from picking winners to picking the willing,
9:34 if you're willing to work
9:35 with government around these very difficult challenges,
9:37 which could be as I don't want I say simple,
9:40 but as, concrete as making sure that every child in the country has healthy,
9:45 tasty, sustainable school lunch.
9:47 Right?
9:47 Not just school lunch.
9:48 That was the Reagan thing where he said,
9:49 ketchup is a vegetable so we can reduce the cost.
9:51 We all had t shirts of Reagan and ketchup,
9:54 which was the vegetable is what the t shirt said.
9:57 So having moonshots, even on something as simple as a cafeteria,
10:01 that then requires innovation across many different areas.
10:05 It requires government to wake up and not just have that be done.
10:09 For example, from the Department of Education,
10:11 you know, Department of Agriculture, health,
10:13 education, finance would work together on a moonshot of healthy,
10:17 tasty, sustainable school lunch.
10:18 So that inter-ministerial coordination, which we saw during Covid.
10:22 Yeah, right.
10:22 So we had the war room, the Situation room, you know, the military,
10:26 education, health and so on together
10:28 because we had these really difficult challenges.
10:31 But as soon as Covid stops, we go back to very siloed ways of thinking.
10:35 As someone with two kids in the New York City public schools,
10:38 I can absolutely confirm that the degree to which they associate,
10:45 the mayor with school lunch policy is extremely real.
10:49 And they'll talk about like, oh,
10:51 we used to have these, like, really nice waffles or something.
10:53 And then Eric Adams got rid of them or so,
10:55 like they're really like key to single issue voters.
10:58 Like single issue.
10:59 They're like really pay attention to the degree
11:02 to which school lunch policy shifts with administration.
11:04 And just like they're really yeah.
11:06 They really think what is state capacity?
11:08 Well, we we've been using this term for years on the podcast.
11:12 And we were like during Covid, we're like,
11:13 you know, you took a it took, you know,
11:15 a long time to stand up testing facilities
11:17 for censoring people like our lack state capacity.
11:20 But what is it?
11:21 What's the difference.
11:22 So we actually distinguish between the word capacity.
11:24 Okay.
11:25 Routines kind of administrative routines and then capabilities okay.
11:29 So what States are often what governments are
11:32 often lacking are those kind of dynamic capabilities.
11:34 So capacity partly is like literally do even have fiscal space.
11:38 Do you have a budget okay.
11:39 But also, you know, how are you thinking about that budget
11:42 in terms of do you well, put it this way.
11:46 Capacity is, you know, number of people working in your administration,
11:50 the budget that's been allocated, perhaps also the training,
11:53 you know, that the civil service actually has
11:56 but capabilities or what you actually then do with it.
11:59 Are you agile?
11:59 Are you flexible?
12:00 Are you able to pivot during Covid and actually
12:03 start working in this more again inter-ministerial way?
12:06 Do you know how to work with others?
12:08 Right.
12:08 You know, do you set up good partnerships or are they problematic partnerships.
12:12 And and also you were talking before about what you're learning here,
12:15 which is fantastic about how mayors can learn from each other.
12:18 Right.
12:19 Have you invested in your ability to learn, to adapt.
12:22 And so I think that latter, you know,
12:25 this this concept of dynamic capabilities is,
12:27 is a much more complex area to be investing in.
12:30 And the only reason you would do it is if you actually have
12:33 a theory about government that is more
12:34 than what traditional economists think about government,
12:37 which is at best, well, at worst, get out of the way at best.
12:40 Fix the market failure.
12:41 So as soon as you say actually,
12:43 it's about shaping and co-creating a different type
12:46 of economy and society that works for people and planet.
12:49 Then the question is, what does that mean for the capabilities that you need?
12:52 If you're just fixing, then you just need a lot of bandages.
12:54 And that's in fact what we get.
12:55 We get very reactive, kind of filling the gap kind of policies.
12:59 Pendulum constantly swinging.
13:01 Exactly, exactly.
13:02 But I mean capacity of course is essential without,
13:04 you know, a budget and fiscal space, you can do nothing.
13:07 That third category that I mentioned quickly,
13:09 administrative routines, that's, you know, are you also,
13:11 you know, do you have a stable environment where you can learn by doing?
13:15 Because if you're constantly changing what you're doing,
13:17 it's going to be hard to have a learning by doing dynamic.
13:20 So those kind of administrative routines,
13:21 I even see this on my university where as soon as you get a lot of turnover,
13:25 even those kind of basic routines aren't there, but capability.
13:28 So these three areas capacity,
13:30 routines and capabilities, you know, are equally important.
13:33 But the capabilities are really what I find are lacking.
13:37 And it goes back, as I was mentioning before,
13:39 to the underlying economic dogma that has underpinned,
13:42 the way that we think about policy.
13:45 Government at different levels that by design, not by coincidence, is reactive.
13:50 Have consultants become a substitute
13:52 for state capacity routine administrative ability.
13:57 Right.
13:57 I always wonder how we got to the point where consultants are so big anyway,
14:00 because it feels like every time you hire a consultant,
14:03 it's almost an admission of failure on your part
14:06 to be able to do something right.
14:07 And nevertheless, it's a widely accepted practice across governments.
14:12 So my last book actually was called The Big
14:14 Con so con Free Consulting and and the subtitle was,
14:20 how we've weakened businesses infantilized
14:22 our governments and Warped our economies,
14:24 basically due to this consult ification.
14:27 I wouldn't blame the consultants.
14:28 I mean, I actually blame governments, right?
14:30 Like, why are you opening the door so wide right to consultants?
14:34 And it's fine to have advisers and some consultants.
14:37 The problem is when they are actually
14:39 doing the core tasks that government should do.
14:41 Again, test and trace during Covid was a core task.
14:45 And so I think it really stems from, I'd say, the 80s when we, you know,
14:51 the kind of Reagan Thatcher years, if you want it always goes back to Reagan.
14:55 Yeah.
14:55 But actually in the UK, for example,
14:58 it even increased more during the labor government.
15:00 So it's not it's not, you know, one party.
15:03 But it did begin, I'd say in the 80s
15:06 with this kind of downsizing of, of governments,
15:08 which then ironically cost them more because as soon as you start
15:13 downsizing without really strategically thinking what
15:15 you need and what you don't need, of course you should trim the fat.
15:17 There's no reason to have a, you know, a bloated, a government structure.
15:21 But when it's done for ideological reasons and not strategic,
15:25 reasons, then, you know, ironically,
15:26 then you end up not having those capabilities
15:29 that you need as soon as you have a flood, or, you know, Brexit or Covid and so
15:35 I think then what happens with the consultants is,
15:38 you know, it's not their fault that they're invited in.
15:40 I do think it's very problematic what they end up doing once they're in.
15:43 So there's huge conflicts of interest.
15:45 Well, the biggest conflict of interest being that they have no incentive
15:48 really to make government better later because they would have no contracts.
15:52 It'd be like having a therapist your whole life that therapist is not very good.
15:55 Which is.
15:56 Which is just how the therapy model.
15:58 Yeah.
15:59 Well, do you remember this came up in that episode we
16:01 did about construction in New York and this idea that, like,
16:04 one of the reasons it's so expensive and take so long for like,
16:08 public funded projects is because consultants have
16:10 no incentive to actually get the project done.
16:13 Yes.
16:13 But also they're often working on both sides of the street.
16:15 Right.
16:16 So they'll be, for example, consulting for, I don't know,
16:18 a state owned enterprise like Eskom in South Africa,
16:20 as well as the Treasury, which should be regulating Eskom or in Australia.
16:25 There was a famous case with PwC
16:27 where they were consulting for a medical device,
16:30 company, as well as the regulators of the medical device company.
16:33 Like, come on.
16:33 So that should just be illegal, right?
16:36 And again, you know, getting the right kind of regulation that makes
16:39 sure that we don't have these kind of scams.
16:41 So what we also argued was, you know,
16:43 the first thing is start investing back inside.
16:46 Government.
16:46 So you, you know, don't need so much consulting,
16:49 but also when you do bring in the consultants,
16:51 make sure the contracts actually embed learning within them,
16:54 and that you are also bringing in the right people.
16:56 You know, if you have an oncology strategy, of course,
16:58 you should get the top doctors and consultants and cancer to advise.
17:02 So the other huge problem is that these consultants,
17:05 when they're coming in, they often actually don't know very much and they
17:08 end up really bothering the poor public servants that they end up emailing.
17:12 Oh, would you mind telling me what you think about or sending me your, you know,
17:16 plan that we can study?
17:17 It's like, why are we even working
17:19 with government if you don't have within the consulting.
17:21 Sure.
17:21 That deep expertise which you know and I'm,
17:24 I'm not saying this just because I'm an academic,
17:26 but I don't think academics are used enough.
17:28 You know, if you have a research center that's been
17:30 thinking about climate change for the last 40 years, use them.
17:34 Don't ask McKinsey, as Australia did, to design your climate strategy,
17:38 which ended up, by the way, being terrible.
17:40 So there is a bit of why is it that governments don't invest
17:44 in their own capacity and capabilities and be when they do go out there
17:48 and look for the advisors and consultants are kind of getting the ones
17:51 that simply kind of provide a, how do you call it, rubber over time?
17:55 Right.
17:55 That makes them feel more secure.
17:57 They haven't even done the homework to make sure they are getting
17:59 the top people in the world to help advise them on doing,
18:03 you know, just tasks just to take the other side of the coin.
18:06 So recently in New York City, it was, you know, there was,
18:11 I don't know, I think scandal is too strong a word,
18:13 but there are a lot of headlines about how
18:15 much the city had paid consultants for working on redesigning,
18:18 the trash collection system in the city.
18:22 And on the one hand, it's a trash collection core city function.
18:25 Why do you have to bring in a consultant?
18:27 On the other hand, like reimagining the trash collection system,
18:30 it's like, that's a one time thing.
18:32 So maintaining it, implementing it, servicing it.
18:36 Okay.
18:36 That's like a permanent government function,
18:38 but the actual like but the actual like, okay, we have to do a redesign.
18:42 Yeah.
18:42 That is that necessarily something that like we
18:44 need to have in-house in government the capacity.
18:47 Because do you want to permanently have that muscle.
18:51 Because that's a one shot thing.
18:53 Doesn't it like to me that makes sense is
18:56 the time where people also argue for something like that.
18:58 There's a value to having an external viewpoint, right?
19:01 So there's like the redesign that a one time job like to me,
19:05 I was like, all right,
19:06 that that doesn't seem crazy to bring in a third party to like,
19:09 help figure out what that plan is.
19:11 Exactly.
19:11 So that's that's the myth, right?
19:13 That somehow we're talking about either government does everything.
19:16 Yeah, right.
19:17 Or even nationalize everything,
19:18 or it does nothing and it privatize and brings in the consultant.
19:21 So the truth is obviously somewhere in the middle.
19:24 So of course, you're absolutely right.
19:25 Government doesn't have to have all those skills.
19:28 It definitely needs the skills to know who to work with outside of government.
19:33 But it also needs to even understand that kind
19:36 of outside landscape to even think about what might we need?
19:40 How might we start developing a strategy that reimagine,
19:43 say, the trash collection process?
19:45 So, you know, that's why you talk about missions.
19:48 So when you know, NASA wanted to go
19:50 to the moon and back in a short amount of time,
19:52 they didn't say, we're going to do it all by ourselves.
19:54 And they also didn't say we're just going to do it with the aerospace sector.
19:57 Right.
19:57 They said, we're going to have to work
19:58 with so many different private sector people.
20:00 They ended up working with something like 400,000 people in the private sector.
20:04 They said we have a lot of problems, but we don't know the solutions.
20:07 But we're going to set very clearly a direction
20:10 for working with the private sector in a problem oriented way.
20:14 So the first thing they did was change procurement.
20:16 Procurement.
20:17 You know, government purchasing is often like 30% of a government's budget.
20:20 It's a very important part of their budget, whether it's Barbados,
20:23 a small island state, or the US, a very large, government procurement is there.
20:28 How are we using it?
20:29 So they realized they had the wrong type of procurement.
20:31 It was just again, minimizing costs.
20:33 It was cost plus procurement.
20:35 They changed it to outcomes oriented procurement.
20:37 And they started to ask themselves, what are the outcomes that we need?
20:40 We need to figure out how are the astronauts going to go to the bathroom, right.
20:43 Which, by the way, was just a problem.
20:45 Again, with Artemus, the toilet.
20:46 Oh, is oh is a problem up in space.
20:48 What are they going to eat?
20:49 What are they going to wear?
20:50 How will we communicate with them?
20:52 And it was the solutions to those problems
20:55 that happened within mainly not only private sector institutions,
20:59 with NASA's also kind of leading investment,
21:01 but especially leading kind of thought process of what the problems were.
21:05 Okay, that ended up getting us camera phones,
21:07 foil blankets, home insulation software.
21:09 Yeah.
21:09 So many different innovations across many different sectors aerospace,
21:14 nutrition, materials, electronics.
21:15 That itself is what we're talking about.
21:17 Right?
21:18 So whether it's going to the moon,
21:19 whether it's trash collection, whether it's school meals, whether it's,
21:22 you know, getting prepared for the next pandemic,
21:24 which unfortunately, the science tells us will happen.
21:27 How are we even thinking within government
21:29 in a problem oriented way of solutions oriented way?
21:32 In this, by the way, is why the City lab,
21:35 conference is so wonderful and Bloomberg's,
21:37 government innovation team is so, you know, how do you say,
21:41 important for so many cities is because
21:43 they then share their experiences of solving problems,
21:46 and then they ask, and we're trying to help
21:49 them do this with this public sector capability index.
21:51 What did we learn along the way that we were missing?
21:53 Where were the bottlenecks?
21:54 What can we do better?
21:55 But especially in terms of that flexibility,
21:58 adaptability, willingness to experiment.
22:00 Right.
22:01 Remember what Kennedy said.
22:02 We're doing it because it's hard, not because it's easy.
22:04 Yeah.
22:05 All the words and policy papers are about making things easier, facilitating.
22:09 I'm Italian faster or in Spain, fast.
22:12 Right.
22:12 So if you're facilitating someone it's not going to be a good contract.
22:16 If you're de-risking someone, it's not going to be a good contract.
22:18 If you're simply enabling, facilitating, fixing,
22:20 it's going to be a very bad public private relationship.
22:24 Just going back to consultants for a second,
22:26 and I think this is actually relevant
22:28 to the discussion of having cooperation among,
22:30 like different parts of the government on big projects.
22:33 But how much of the consultancy fetish
22:35 just has to do with, diffusing responsibilities?
22:39 So I always think back to the point, the old,
22:43 saying about the purchasing manager thing,
22:45 you'll never get fired for buying IBM, right?
22:48 Like how much of it is just like, well, you know, I did my best,
22:51 I hired McKinsey, what more can I do if it goes wrong?
22:53 It's McKinsey accountability thing.
22:55 Yeah, absolutely.
22:56 So that's a really important point because, you know,
22:59 one problem is when government doesn't have
23:01 those capabilities for the reasons that we said before,
23:03 another is even when they have it, why are they not using it?
23:06 Australia, again is an interesting example because they had
23:09 really interesting capability within government with their innovation agency,
23:14 CSIRO, and yet they gave this massive
23:16 contract to McKinsey to do their climate strategy.
23:19 And it's absolutely about defuzing that responsibility,
23:22 but also because of the culture we have again,
23:24 within government where if they do make mistakes,
23:26 unlike in the entrepreneurial ecosystems and know
23:28 VC and so on, we don't accept that.
23:32 But it's also in the private sector.
23:34 Right.
23:34 So we also talk in the book about the consult ification of management basically,
23:38 and there as well, you know, if you're going to be doing a merger
23:41 or downsizing or a massive share buyback scheme,
23:43 isn't it great if you have, you know, McKinsey told us to do it.
23:47 Yeah.
23:47 So also just not taking on I mean, it's kind of cowardly, right?
23:50 Like you're not kind of owning your decisions.
23:52 I do think it's different in government.
23:54 I think that, you know, changing that culture,
23:56 having more govt labs like they have in Chile,
23:58 laboratorio del Gobierno, I think sounds better in Spanish.
24:00 Yeah, right.
24:01 You could say it's very true and it's true.
24:04 Sounds like I don't I always say that in Italian.
24:07 Every time we have a reform strategy
24:09 on it's public sector reform, it's just cuts.
24:11 But it sounds nice.
24:12 It's just not a form of public discussion.
24:16 It's literally just cuts.
24:17 And so that idea that what we need is kind of a laboratory within government,
24:23 but also between governments, I think is really important.
24:25 By the way, the head of procurement in NASA,
24:27 Ernest Brackett, in the 60s with the Apollo program,
24:30 not only did he help change the procurement policy of NASA,
24:33 but he also said, we got to watch out.
24:36 There's too many consultants in these corridors.
24:38 And his exact quote was, if this continues,
24:40 we will get captured by bro showmanship,
24:43 which is kind of endearing because they don't have PowerPoints at the time.
24:46 Right?
24:46 So now the idea that you're ruling by PowerPoint
24:48 and that's basically all they know how to do.
24:50 At the time it was kind of shiny brochures,
24:53 and, but but he didn't say we don't want to work with the private sector.
24:56 Right.
24:57 He said, we won't know how to work with the private sector.
24:59 We won't know how to write the terms of reference if our own brains are,
25:03 you know, becoming weak.
25:05 So investing within in order to work also outside with others.
25:09 So it's not you're not working with others, it's working smartly with them.
25:12 So this gets to the sort of one of the big questions of the day obviously.
25:17 And that is AI.
25:18 Right.
25:19 And so you mentioned okay, school lunches.
25:21 You said a mission.
25:22 It doesn't mean like the private sector isn't going
25:24 to play a role in providing food or whatever.
25:26 But first you establish what the mission is.
25:29 Then you talk about the moon.
25:30 It doesn't mean that the private sector isn't going to play a role
25:32 of the private sector played a significant
25:34 role through various technologies and procurement.
25:36 But there is an overall mission.
25:38 How are you thinking about I should government first decide like,
25:43 what is our mission for this?
25:46 What what missions could it theoretically enable?
25:49 Like, does this feel different than other endeavors?
25:51 We obviously know a lot of public sector money
25:53 is going to wind its way up in AI, and already has a lot of benefit.
25:58 It already has.
25:59 But how are you?
25:59 Does this fit?
26:00 Is this different?
26:01 Talk to us about how to think about
26:03 this particular moment of extreme sort of technological ambition, right?
26:08 I mean, there's so much to say.
26:09 So first, the investments that went into what we call today,
26:13 artificial intelligence, including, you know, LM models and think which models,
26:17 speech recognition dates, you know, decades.
26:20 And like so many other areas that was led by government.
26:23 So if you look at even DARPA, which,
26:25 as you know, was the lead, investor in the internet,
26:29 it came from problems mainly
26:31 in the military industrial complex that then required,
26:36 ultimately what we're calling artificial intelligence today.
26:38 But again, in the entrepreneurial state,
26:39 I talked about how everything in our smartphones that make them smarter,
26:43 not stupid internet, GPS, touchscreen,
26:44 Siri and so on, where government finance was very scary today.
26:47 What's what makes today different with AI is that that's
26:52 not really necessarily going to be true much longer.
26:55 Why?
26:56 Because these massive economic rents and I call them rents, not profits.
27:00 So excess profits in excess of what these companies actually did,
27:04 because we privatized all the rewards from this massive
27:07 social and collectively created value in this area.
27:11 They have so much money, right?
27:13 Trillions, not billions, trillions,
27:15 the salaries they are paying to the top researchers in universities,
27:20 both public and private universities,
27:22 and to people who used to work in the NASA's, the DARPA's, the coffers in Chile.
27:28 They are going now to work in these companies and that hemorrhaging of talent,
27:32 of top research expertise.
27:34 I don't think people are talking about this enough.
27:36 It it literally is the biggest change, right.
27:39 Because otherwise just, you know, the fact that we've had,
27:41 you know, big technological changes,
27:42 general purpose technology is completely affecting, you know, how we produce,
27:46 how we distribute and, you know, from the rise of electrification.
27:50 So on the thing, like at one point, I mean,
27:52 I don't think it actually panned out that great for them.
27:56 But didn't Uber hire the entire Carnegie Mellon robotics team?
28:00 Wouldn't surprise me.
28:01 I think they did.
28:02 I think when they when they were doing self-driving car technology,
28:06 they just wrote a check for the entire faculty of the CMU robotics team,
28:11 and it was just but not enough people are talking about this.
28:13 So it's very hard to govern a process for good,
28:16 you know, ethically and so on if you don't understand it.
28:19 So if this talent is in fact leaving these publicly financed institutions,
28:23 even private universities,
28:25 most of the research, as you know, has been funded by NSF and so on.
28:30 Once they leave and the the, the knowledge
28:34 is so concentrated in these few AI companies,
28:37 I don't think we've thought about that enough.
28:39 But so just the other thing is, I mean,
28:41 just coming back to your question, which I don't think I answer properly,
28:43 yes, of course, governments should be thinking because
28:46 of its at least a democratically elected government.
28:48 Right?
28:49 This is different for dictatorships.
28:50 What we would expect from them,
28:52 but we would expect governments to make sure that any big change,
28:56 large kind of opportunities around technological
28:58 change are done in ways that are, again, good for people and planet.
29:01 Right.
29:01 But that requires not only that capacity that, as I mentioned,
29:05 is being decimated, but also, a certain type of regulation which is making
29:11 sure we even understand the process of, for example,
29:15 how algorithms are currently being designed and whether we
29:17 have a situation like Shoshana Zuboff in her great book,
29:20 Surveillance Capitalism, she says, you think you're searching Google for free.
29:23 They're searching you for free.
29:24 You know, that could have been avoided
29:26 right through the design of the algorithms.
29:28 And given that the algorithms initially at least, were publicly financed,
29:31 there is this issue of how do we, in a pre distributive way,
29:35 instead of kind of exposed with redistribution or regulation or market fixing,
29:39 think about innovation collaborations that have some
29:42 of these really important ethical concerns thought about upfront.
29:46 And an example of this would be during Covid,
29:49 where, you know, the vaccines were not the mission.
29:51 The mission was to allow these vaccines to be produced and available globally.
29:57 Given it was a global health pandemic,
29:58 we were all better off if the world was, you know, vaccinated.
30:02 And yet only one of the vaccines,
30:04 the one that was a collaboration between Oxford University and AstraZeneca,
30:08 had that kind of conditionality about what good looks
30:11 like at the start in terms of how they collaborated.
30:14 So it was a publicly financed researchers.
30:16 Oxford is a state school,
30:18 that put that as a condition with their relationship with AstraZeneca,
30:21 that they would share the, knowledge of it.
30:24 They would join the patent pool, keep costs in price as well.
30:27 So more of that every time I hear, you know, Tracy,
30:30 like someone talk about studying AI in college and like their professors,
30:34 I'm like, that's great,
30:35 but why are those professors not in the private sector making 100?
30:38 I mean, many of them are that.
30:40 But I'm always like,
30:40 amazed that given how much money people leave money on the table,
30:44 what are you doing at a university?
30:45 You're probably making ten times where that money come from.
30:48 This is the issue, right?
30:49 So this money that's being used to pay these very
30:52 large salaries that you're talking about, it's, you know,
30:55 it's very important to recognize that that didn't
30:58 come about because of, you know, early on this amazing kind of entrepreneurship.
31:02 And all the knowledge was in these companies.
31:04 They gathered that knowledge.
31:05 Now they're using it.
31:06 Of course, they're pushing the frontier.
31:08 Of course they're doing research.
31:09 But that idea of also making sure
31:11 that, companies are not earning in excess, right.
31:14 So why did the public purse not benefit in those early days?
31:18 Why are they evading so much tax?
31:20 I mean, literally in so many countries paying almost no tax.
31:24 You know, also labor exploitation, in the case of Amazon,
31:27 you know, you don't hear it from me.
31:29 You hear it from all sorts of different investigations, even during Covid,
31:32 by the way, that they wouldn't even put the ambulances apparently,
31:35 outside the warehouse.
31:35 I don't know, I read that, I'm not sure if it's true.
31:37 But anyway, the point is that there,
31:38 you know, what does a good company look like?
31:41 And how does that then affect the returns that they're earning?
31:44 And what is a just return versus these excess returns
31:47 that now are being used to, you know, higher end?
31:50 You know, you mentioned the black box of the algorithms,
31:54 which I think is a really interesting point.
31:56 And we did an episode with, the CTO of Goldman Sachs recently and we asked him,
32:02 like, you know, Goldman Sachs is a highly regulated bank.
32:05 When you have bank supervisors who go in and want to understand your AI system,
32:10 what are they actually understanding?
32:12 Do they, like, understand the underlying code
32:15 that's driving the algorithm and the answer was, well, no, not really.
32:18 You can't expect them to understand all that stuff.
32:20 It's more about having the right controls
32:23 in place that prevent the algo from running amuck.
32:26 And so my question is with AI, where we have a lot of experts,
32:31 highly paid experts and engineers in the private sector developing
32:34 all this new stuff versus a shrinking body of government officials,
32:38 like, what should our expectation be
32:40 about how much they understand this technology?
32:43 Right.
32:43 Well, it actually comes back also to that previous point.
32:46 Do you need all that expertise inside?
32:48 Yeah.
32:48 So how do you regulate this in such a way that also stimulates more innovation,
32:52 because you don't want to put a cap
32:54 on the innovation just by over regulating it.
32:55 This is where, by the way, I disagree with the abundance, theorem,
32:59 which makes it sound like, you know, there's all these opportunities out there,
33:01 and it was regulation and too much planning
33:03 and too many conditions that, kind of hurt that which
33:06 I think actually corporate governance and shareholder value maximization
33:09 has really actually stifled the opportunities that we have today.
33:14 So they don't have to, of course, understand the algorithms,
33:16 but they do need to do exactly as you said, like we do with climate, right?
33:20 Where there's climate disclosures.
33:21 We need to know what it is that we want to be disclosed.
33:26 In fact, we have a project that we just did,
33:28 that we just finished with, you know, to Marilyn.
33:31 Yeah.
33:32 So it was Tim and myself, with a grant from the Omidyar Foundation.
33:37 The project we called algorithmic grants, and how to reduce these rents
33:42 and how we're designing algorithms also through disclosures.
33:45 So we thought about what would be the equivalent of AI related disclosures,
33:50 that could do, exactly as you said,
33:51 be almost the equivalent of what banks now have to do,
33:54 but also companies have to do around kind of ESG kind of metrics.
33:56 Interesting.
33:57 And so, I mean, the project is still, you know, underway.
34:01 And what we want is actually to find kind of a coalition
34:04 of AI companies that would be willing to think about this with us,
34:08 but that assumes, right, that there's also enough of the science,
34:12 as there has been with climate change, which said this is an urgent problem,
34:16 and unless we fix it now,
34:18 we're going to reach a tipping point where there's no coming back.
34:20 That's really when things started to change around the climate disclosures.
34:23 We haven't, for some reason reach that yet, even though there's such a link.
34:27 Also, by the way, by the way, between AI and climate,
34:30 like in terms of these data centers guzzling,
34:32 you know, like for every, you know, ChatGPT search,
34:35 you do, apparently it's like using, a bottle of water.
34:39 I'd like the small plastic bottles of water.
34:41 Like, that's literally I'm not pressing.
34:43 And yet, you know, we're not making
34:45 that kind of systemic understanding of, you know,
34:48 AI problems and how they are connected to climate and water problems and so on.
34:52 And that requires, again,
34:53 government not just having an indicator like GDP to think about,
34:56 but a dashboard, right, when you're driving your car, if you had one number,
35:00 you know how much gas you have or how fast you're going, you would crash it.
35:02 So what does a dashboard look like?
35:05 You know, for government that would allow it to make sure it's
35:08 on track to making sure that also with the evolution of technology,
35:11 it's thinking about these kind of more systemic features
35:14 and not just thinking about it as innovation policy,
35:16 just from a pure sort of history of technology standpoint.
35:20 Does I feel different?
35:21 Yeah.
35:23 I think it definitely fits with the kind of characteristics of a general
35:27 purpose technology in the sense that it really does kind of change everything.
35:30 However, there's also a lot of, kind of myths around
35:34 that, a kind of a bubble in terms of how we're thinking,
35:37 not only in terms of the financial market bubble around it,
35:39 but, you know, just like with electricity,
35:41 it took about 30 years for it to actually really affect,
35:44 how governments are operating.
35:46 Similarly with the internet.
35:47 You'll remember when Robert Solow was saying, you know,
35:50 there's computers everywhere except in the productivity statistics.
35:52 Yeah, I think we're still very early in the phase
35:55 with AI in terms of it having a really meaningful, impact on, improving.
36:02 Again, coming back to the point about problems,
36:04 right, because ultimately should be helping us solve problems.
36:07 Which problems is I really helping us to solve in a systemic
36:11 way that can scale and that there's learning between governments.
36:14 We're definitely using AI.
36:16 Is it actually helping us, you know,
36:18 solve some of the biggest problems of our time?
36:20 Again, health problems, climate problems, surely there's some of that.
36:24 But until we manage this process,
36:26 until we govern it both ethically but also in a way
36:29 that is with government instead of kind of, you know,
36:32 sidetrack and government in order to extract these mega rents,
36:34 then we're going to have a huge problem.
36:36 Why do you think that hasn't happened yet?
36:39 Or governments haven't stepped in faster?
36:41 Because I do think AI is kind of unusual in the sense that, like, you know,
36:44 you have people like Sam Altman who
36:46 will say very publicly in interviews like, yeah,
36:49 this creates a lot of negative externalities,
36:51 and society is going to have to figure
36:53 out how to deal with this, and governments
36:55 are going to have to figure out how to actually best deploy this technology.
36:59 OpenAI published a big industrial policy document, which again,
37:04 I think is kind of unusual to previous technological developments.
37:08 And yet governments seem kind of slow.
37:12 I don't want to generalize too much,
37:13 but many governments seem kind of slow to get
37:15 in and really start shaping what they want to do with AI.
37:18 Yeah.
37:19 I mean, I think again, it seems like I'm saying the same thing,
37:21 but I really it's because I believe in it.
37:24 You, you know, this technology on its own will
37:27 not solve anything if it's accompanied by a strong,
37:30 for example, health system that with AI thinking about health problems,
37:33 then I can see that being absolutely revolutionary.
37:38 And in fact, I once heard
37:39 a really interesting discussion between Nandan Nilekani.
37:42 You know, it's an incredible, entrepreneur of computer systems of he was one
37:48 of the co-founders of Infosys and India and, Eric Schmidt,
37:52 at one of these, dialogs, we haven't built this beautiful villa
37:55 in Lake Como run by the Rockefeller Foundation.
37:58 And we had kind of Eric Schmidt on the one hand saying, you know, in the future,
38:01 all we're going to really need is an app,
38:03 a health app, and that's going to be fine.
38:04 And Nandan Nilekani,
38:05 who really is one of the biggest innovators around computing, was like, what?
38:10 Like, let me tell you, in India, without a proper health system,
38:13 no matter how many apps you have, we will continue to have misery.
38:17 And so it's not one or the other, but what you need is more people like
38:20 Nandan who think about what is the relationship between,
38:23 you know, the the power of AI and the structure of a health system.
38:28 And who's thinking about that?
38:30 And if we do have at the same time, not just austerity,
38:33 but this, you know, kind of dumbing down of what we think government is for.
38:38 So even the health systems we have are not kind of, you know, fit for purpose,
38:41 then I don't see any sort of future
38:43 of AI kind of helping us with, with health problems.
38:46 And by the way, just look at water.
38:48 I mean, like 55% of the global food system right now
38:50 is at risk because of how we're treating that global hydrological cycle.
38:54 You know, biodiversity loss also in the Amazon is affecting
38:57 droughts and and floods and other parts of the world.
38:59 That's a huge problem.
39:02 To what degree are we really using AI to, you know, fix that problem.
39:05 Yeah.
39:06 Not much.
39:07 So it's also about where we're putting kind of the emphasis.
39:10 And for that, I think we do need these moonshots,
39:12 government led working with the private sector.
39:15 And again using the power of AI well-regulated to solve very concrete problems.
39:20 Yet, Joe, I was thinking about, the specifically related to healthcare recently
39:24 because I've seen a bunch of startups
39:26 that are saying they're going to simplify the billing process for hospitals.
39:29 And then you also know that there are
39:31 a bunch of insurance companies that are also using AI.
39:35 And it's like, well,
39:36 if we're just going to have more senators debating with computers.
39:39 Yeah, exactly.
39:40 And like if the system itself doesn't change, nothing's going to improve, right?
39:43 No, I, I've totally thought about the same thing where it's just
39:46 like feels like we're going to have this arms race where it's like,
39:49 my bot will argue with your bot and then
39:52 the only entities that make any money are the bot,
39:56 the bot makers, the bot makers.
39:58 Do you know that other colau who is the mayor of Barcelona,
40:02 another city here in Spain that you know well,
40:05 she when she was mayor, she came from a housing movement.
40:08 So she was really, really concerned with housing issues.
40:11 But also, you know, public transport, public schools and so on.
40:13 And her thing was, why is it that when the citizens of Barcelona,
40:17 you know, like, click on, Uber or Citymapper,
40:20 this data that's created from that, right.
40:22 Because every time we click on something, data is created, she said,
40:25 why aren't we in the city using that data to improve
40:29 our decisions and understanding of our public
40:31 transport and public housing challenges?
40:32 Yeah.
40:33 And so she ended up hiring computer hackers into the city
40:36 government and made it a really cool place to work.
40:39 And I think that, again, kind of insourcing back in those kind of, you know,
40:43 cool hackers that currently are working in these companies,
40:46 but to come and work with the city administration that says,
40:49 we want you to come in, fail,
40:51 but help, you know, like, don't worry about failing.
40:53 Sorry, not fail, but, you know,
40:55 take risks to help us though kind of really target are big you know,
40:59 challenges around housing transport and so on inequality in terms of access.
41:04 So obviously we're talking about the public sector.
41:06 We're talking about the government's role
41:08 in facilitating or guiding various technologies.
41:12 But there's also just like politics, right?
41:14 Winning elections.
41:16 And the fact that, you know, as you mentioned, failures become a scandal.
41:20 And they're on the paper and maybe like politicians lose their jobs,
41:23 then someone comes in when you just in your own personal work,
41:27 when you like, think about this stuff,
41:29 like how much do you have to calculate the reality
41:32 that one big job of politicians is to win reelection, and that an election,
41:37 and that a loss of election has the potential to just take
41:41 the government in 90 or 180
41:43 degree turn from whatever the previous administration,
41:45 at any level in any country does?
41:47 And how much do you like think about that reality when you're thinking about,
41:52 strengthening government.
41:53 So the first time I started to work
41:55 on missions wasn't on mission oriented policy.
41:57 It was, mission oriented organizations, right?
41:59 To better understand the DARPA kind of organization.
42:02 Right.
42:02 Called for in Chile is is a similar Citra,
42:06 in Finland, mine lab in Denmark, Nova in Sweden.
42:09 These are innovation agencies that are in fact
42:12 making these big bets that are mission oriented.
42:14 But my question was, how are they organized?
42:16 You know, are they also unstable due to the electoral cycle?
42:18 Yeah.
42:19 And they had thought about this.
42:20 I mean, it's not a coincidence that DARPA, for example,
42:22 people come in for five years, so it's not the four year electoral cycle.
42:26 They're actually told, you know, come in and do take risks.
42:29 That's how you'll be, evaluated, you know,
42:31 not by just if you're succeeding all the time,
42:33 that means you're not taking those risks,
42:35 but also the impact that your successes have.
42:38 And so that kind of cultural shift,
42:40 but also the fact that people are coming in kind of on secondment,
42:43 you know, they're not there to be
42:45 a civil service civil servant their whole life.
42:47 So we just started studying.
42:48 Well, I mean, for some, for some areas,
42:52 I think that's fine, especially around innovation.
42:54 Right.
42:54 You want to coming back to the idea that we want
42:57 to bring in and crowding the top talent into government, you know,
43:00 having like a five year period that you're going
43:02 to help as a civil servant paid by the government,
43:04 not as a consultant, you know, working with not at the civil service.
43:08 I do think there's lots of kind of room for that.
43:10 But, so that idea that because we value the private sector, there has been,
43:16 for example, think of Harvard Business School,
43:18 where they have this case study methodology of businesses.
43:20 We've never really done that with government entities because we don't value,
43:26 you know, basically government as a value creators,
43:28 just seen as a distributor, a fixer,
43:30 a facilitator, an enabler of the private sector.
43:33 And that's, of course,
43:33 where then we expect creativity and value to be created, which is not right.
43:38 And so and so think so.
43:41 One of the things that we do in the institute, which is actually a department,
43:43 so we train up civil servants around the world also,
43:46 you know, through our own MPA master's in public administration,
43:49 but also through, applied learning programs,
43:51 was to start developing these cases.
43:53 You know, what do we know about the BBC?
43:55 You know, how is it different from other public broadcasters?
43:57 How do they measure what they call public value?
44:00 What is public value?
44:01 Yeah.
44:01 So even having, you know, comparison learning between, say,
44:04 a public bank, the BBC, a government digital agency,
44:07 on what it means to crowd in or crowd out the private sector,
44:10 what it means to shape markets, not fix them.
44:12 What does it mean to have a culture of experimentation
44:15 versus this huge risk aversion is that, as we said before,
44:18 is a cause for the consult application.
44:20 So I think a lot about that.
44:22 But it's not, you know, there's so much instability,
44:25 obviously, also in the private sector.
44:26 So there is a bit of a myth that it's
44:28 all unstable in the public sector because of electoral turnover.
44:31 We can't shape these bureaucracies to be creative bureaucracies,
44:34 resilient bureaucracies.
44:35 They don't have to be vertical and and so inertial.
44:38 But the other point, I think that's sort of stemming, I think in your question,
44:41 tell me if this is not related, is literally winning the election.
44:46 Yeah.
44:46 What are we learning globally?
44:48 You know, why is it that Biden,
44:50 whose economic policies were actually quite successful in the red states,
44:53 at least starting to be quite successful?
44:55 Why in those states did he not win?
44:58 And I think there's something going on in a lot of countries, definitely.
45:02 Also in Italy, in the UK, where people who have been let's just use
45:06 the concept left behind in terms of the economic benefits,
45:09 at least in the past, even when new economic policies work, that's not enough.
45:14 If people don't feel valued, if they don't have their dignity back,
45:17 if they continue to feel condescended upon.
45:19 So one of the really cool things I've been working on with city governments,
45:22 but even council, so my neighborhood in London is called Camden.
45:25 It's about 250,000 people.
45:28 I worked with the Council on Mission Oriented
45:30 Procurement for adult Social Care across ten housing estates,
45:33 what you call projects in the US.
45:36 And we brought the carers and the carries to the table to design that policy.
45:40 So working with people, really valuing their lived experience to help design
45:46 policies that are meaningful and will improve their lives.
45:50 I think it's just so important firstly to get those policies to be design right,
45:56 but also to give people, again, dignity and self-worth.
45:59 And I've seen it also, you know, because we have so much inequality,
46:02 in the UK, unfortunately, we have food banks,
46:04 which is barbaric if you think about it, in the 21st century,
46:07 food banks, like, you know, we should not have that.
46:09 People should have food, you know,
46:10 on the table, you know, enough and healthy food.
46:13 We don't have that.
46:14 So transforming food banks into food cooperatives, green food cooperatives,
46:19 where the people benefiting from the what was a food
46:22 bank are now also in the place of governing,
46:25 of having real deliberation, of thinking together.
46:27 I can tell you, the people I saw working
46:29 in the food banks who are also receiving the food,
46:32 the facial expression, the dignity,
46:33 just even how people are standing is completely different from a system where,
46:38 you know, you hear someone's expired,
46:41 like, yeah, exactly akin from last Thanksgiving.
46:44 No.
46:44 But even if it's good food, you know, having again,
46:47 you know, bring it back dignity and value it.
46:49 It's so important, I think, to fight populism.
46:53 I'm going to ask what is potentially an unfair and loaded question,
46:56 but I think it might be quite
46:58 illustrative of everything that we've been discussing.
46:59 When you look across the world, are there particular countries or cities
47:04 that you think are doing industrial policy right,
47:07 in the sense that they're taking maybe
47:09 a holistic approach with a defined strategy slash mission?
47:13 Well, so I tend to also look at like very specific things
47:17 that a government did instead of just
47:19 saying the whole government is perfect, right?
47:20 So for example, in Brazil,
47:22 something they've done that I think has been very positive is
47:24 that they've put what I call emissions at the center of government.
47:27 So the ecological transition is at the center.
47:30 And that then required the Department of Finance,
47:33 for example, to rethink its own tools.
47:36 For example, a public bank.
47:37 Right.
47:38 So Bndes, which is one of the largest public banks in the world,
47:41 it can either just again give money out to, say,
47:44 the agribusiness industry or save the steel industry when it's going bust,
47:47 or because there's an ecological transition it can think about,
47:51 how these sectors themselves need to change in order
47:54 also to access the loans that the bank is giving.
47:57 Germany, by the way, did that when they had the energy,
48:00 the policy, their public bank,
48:01 the KSW, the way they provided support to the steel sector,
48:05 which in the US and the UK.
48:06 And so many countries still is under pressure.
48:09 The loans to the steel sector were conditional,
48:12 that the sector lower the material content of production,
48:14 which they did in their own way.
48:16 Had government told them how to do it.
48:18 You kill innovation but strong direction conditional loans and they
48:23 ended up now having the greenest steel in the world.
48:26 It might not be competitive yet,
48:27 and that's a scale issue that has also to do with regulation.
48:30 But you know, repurpose, reuse,
48:33 recycle technology in steel only happened because
48:35 the public bank that was mission aligned.
48:38 So I'm very interested in procurement, public loans, state owned enterprises,
48:42 digital public infrastructure examples where they're
48:44 not just things that are there,
48:46 but they're used to really transform and and help development.
48:51 Sweden is also really interesting because they had,
48:53 a high level challenge, right?
48:55 Missions or somewhere between the challenge like
48:57 the space race and the sector like aerospace.
48:59 Right.
49:00 So the moon mission required lots of different sectors,
49:02 but it was very concrete with the challenge of, say,
49:04 climate change or all the Sustainable Development Goals.
49:07 Those are kind of very broad.
49:08 So transforming them into missions.
49:09 And their challenge was I think they
49:12 said they wanted a fossil free welfare state.
49:15 And that's why then they, they said, well,
49:16 what are the missions we were working with them on this.
49:19 And so we were kind of stimulating some
49:20 of this thought through Bono by their innovation agency.
49:22 What are the missions that will help us achieve that?
49:25 And that's where then the healthy,
49:27 tasty, sustainable school meals policy came from.
49:29 We worked with them on that.
49:31 Also in Brazil.
49:31 We just actually put out a report about this with the World Food Program.
49:34 But what was interesting, again,
49:36 was that then that required government to work in a different way.
49:39 Again, inter-ministerial, you know,
49:42 catalyzing bottom up experimentation, local manufacturing,
49:45 but through also the redesign of the tools themselves.
49:50 The UK, which I don't think is a very good example right now.
49:53 I mean, there's lots of instability.
49:54 There's also been, you know, 14 years of austerity,
49:57 some things that were really interesting.
49:59 And this is why I look more at the organizational
50:01 kind of examples was government digital services, GDS,
50:05 which basically began by government back in the early 2000 and saying,
50:10 why does everyone have to go to, say, Google to download a white paper?
50:13 Why don't we have our own kind of digital platform?
50:15 They did what most governments do, outsourced it to a company called Serco,
50:19 which is not a very innovative company at all,
50:22 gets lots of government contracts.
50:24 They failed miserably.
50:25 And then people from the iPlayer team and the BBC, said we'll do it.
50:30 So they went over to the Cabinet Office, set up Government Digital Services,
50:34 came up with this incredible digital platform called Gov.uk,
50:37 which won an international design award.
50:39 But what was interesting to me from that example was
50:41 that the first thing they did was look out the window and said,
50:45 with arrows pointing at the window, those are not clients and customers.
50:49 Let's stop talking about people as clients and customers,
50:52 their users with human rights and how they will access their driver's license,
50:57 their passport, their voter registration has to enhance their like
51:00 their souls and not make them want to die.
51:03 If you see the Ken Loach movies where,
51:04 you know people literally want to die when they're accessing
51:06 their welfare payments because of just the complications around it.
51:10 And so making, you know,
51:12 having kind of like a user friendly government digital platform that changes
51:15 the experience of a citizen with those rights that they have,
51:20 through the technology just requires a very different kind of mind shift.
51:24 And it became the coolest place to work.
51:25 So if you were a top, you know, software engineer or even, you know,
51:29 whatever these hackers that other colleagues wanted to hire,
51:32 that's where they wanted to work,
51:33 to the point that lots of private companies were having a hard
51:36 time finding the top talent because they all wanted to work in.
51:38 And so, again, those are the examples I think we need to look for, not like,
51:43 which is the government that's doing everything perfectly.
51:45 All right.
51:46 Professor Mercado, thank you so much.
51:48 Great to finally catch up with you.
51:49 It took us all like randomly being in the same location in Madrid.
51:53 But thank you so much.
51:54 Thank you so much for coming on Odd Lots.
51:56 Thank you so much for having me, Tracy.
51:58 I'm glad we finally, finally professor, but this was the place to do it.
52:02 This is definitely the place to do it.
52:04 I think it really did.
52:05 Her framing makes a lot of sense.
52:07 This idea of like, outsourcing is not per se bad that obviously any
52:13 major mission is going to have
52:16 to have significant private sector involvement and innovation,
52:19 even if it's somehow publicly led,
52:22 but that there is no chance of going anywhere if there's,
52:26 you know, if the public sector doesn't have the internal muscle,
52:29 like who to talk to, really talk to at the right, or how to judge performance,
52:33 how to judge performance seems absolutely a key question.
52:36 And that kind of gets back to the mission idea, which I do.
52:39 I really I like the idea of focusing on what you're trying to achieve,
52:43 rather than just how you're actually going about achieving
52:45 it like that makes a lot of sense to me.
52:48 If you're dealing with a vast bureaucracy with lots of different silos.
52:54 And it also, I think,
52:55 like getting back to that expertise point does mean that you
52:59 do develop that muscle internally within the organization rather than just like,
53:04 okay, we're going to hire McKinsey to figure
53:07 out how we're going to do something.
53:09 Instead.
53:10 You say, well, we want to do X,
53:12 let's all get together and figure out how to do it, you know?
53:15 And it seems like a weird thing, as a technology because right,
53:20 on the one hand you could say, like, all right,
53:22 we want to massively improve our health care system.
53:25 We want to massively improve health care outcomes.
53:27 And I think you could like, very easily say, well,
53:30 AI is going to be really a big part of that, right?
53:32 And maybe make things a lot more efficient, maybe give information,
53:36 access to a lot of people, identify experts, etc..
53:38 There's all sorts of new medicines.
53:40 That's yeah, totally.
53:41 And so great.
53:42 So maybe the mission has something to do with health.
53:44 And AI plays an important component of it.
53:47 I guess what's strange, though,
53:49 is that AI itself creates its own potential pitfalls in the industry,
53:54 as you mentioned, is obsessed with the pitfalls of its own making.
53:58 Right?
53:58 Yeah.
53:59 And so there is almost no way that I can
54:01 just be a tool in service of some other mission,
54:05 because almost everyone who knows something about
54:08 AI sees potential for extreme exacerbation of inequality.
54:14 Potentially AI robots that will be misaligned and want
54:18 to kill us all when they have sufficient capabilities.
54:21 Little things.
54:21 Yeah, right.
54:22 And so like on the one hand, like yes,
54:24 as the technology might fit into some of these other big missions.
54:28 But on the other hand, it sort of feels like it has to there
54:30 has to be some like AI specific goal of like,
54:33 where do we want this technology to go?
54:36 Or how do we how do we khirbet or whatever it is that seems very distinct?
54:41 No, totally.
54:42 And I do think the unusual part of this moment in time
54:45 and a lot of people will argue that maybe it's marketing or whatever,
54:48 but you do see the big tech CEOs like basically going on TV and and saying,
54:52 like, we as a whole society need to figure out what we want to do here.
54:57 And I don't think it is marketing or just marketing
55:00 because a there's already this very big tech backlash, right?
55:03 So like if we're like, it's not working, you know,
55:07 if the idea is, oh, we want to plump our valuations.
55:11 And so we do that by saying the Tam is all human labor and human life.
55:16 Yeah.
55:16 That is like, well, you're really upsetting a lot
55:18 of people by saying this is not that's not obviously good.
55:21 And B, you know, it's we've written about or talked about, you know,
55:26 some of these big labs like they were founded from day
55:28 one with the premise that this is not normal technology,
55:31 which is why it's like housed in a nonprofit or something like this.
55:35 So I tend to think that when the CEOs of these companies talk about this stuff,
55:40 they kind of mean what they say they too are.
55:42 They too are concerned.
55:43 I mean, I also worry without some
55:46 sort of government intervention or government strategy,
55:48 here we are going to get to that situation where we deploy AI,
55:53 and because we're not fixing the underlying system,
55:56 we're just sort of nibbling at the edges and making it worse.
56:00 Per that idea of like, okay,
56:02 the insurance bot is going to talk to the hospital bot,
56:04 and both of them are going to say
56:06 that they're streamlining the billing process for medical services.
56:10 But because we're all doing the same thing without actually fixing
56:13 how medical bills work and who pays for what in the US,
56:17 like it's just going to be bots, fighting bots.
56:19 No one's going to benefit from that.
56:21 No.
56:21 And most likely there will be sort of, you know,
56:23 just ongoing increased complexity.
56:26 It's bots all the way, bots all the way down.
56:28 Shall we leave it there?
56:29 Let's leave it there.
56:30 This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
56:32 I'm Tracy Alloway.
56:34 You can follow me @tracyalloway And I’m Joe
56:37 Weisenthal You can follow me @thestalwart Follow our guest,
56:40 Mariana Mazzucato she’s @mazzucatom Follow
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56:45 Dashiel Bennett @dashbot Cale Brooks @calebrooks and Kevin Lozano
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57:07 Thanks for watching.