How easy is it to steal $10,000 from a locked phone?

How easy is it to steal $10,000 from a locked phone?

Veritasium

0:00 I'm here with MKBHD,

0:01 and we're gonna try to steal $10,000 from his locked iPhone.

0:04 Really hope it doesn't work.

0:05 Really hope it doesn't work.

0:07 I'm gonna get you to put that phone down on top of this device.

0:10 [Marques] Okay.

0:10 Just put it down there.

0:11 Just put it on like a, all right.

0:13 I feel like I'm a bit of a magician, but I'm like-- Yeah.

0:15 I haven't changed anything, right?

0:16 Okay.

0:17 Yeah.

0:17 It's still locked.

0:18 It's locked.

0:19 Nothing else.

0:19 Yeah.

0:20 This is just a regular payment terminal.

0:21 Yeah.

0:21 Nothing weird about that.

0:22 Seen these.

0:23 And we'll start with a little, like, maybe 100.

0:25 No, maybe $5?

0:26 Let's start with something like-- Yeah, five.

0:27 Five.

0:28 Start with five.

0:28 That sounds great.

0:29 Yeah.

0:29 Five bucks.

0:30 Do you think that we can take, like,

0:31 will we be able to get this out of your phone?

0:34 I hope not, but I kinda feel like you will.

0:40 Let's see.

0:42 So, now I'm gonna charge $5 on this device.

0:44 Your phone's still locked, right?

0:46 Yep.

0:47 I haven't done anything.

0:48 It's like a David Blaine.

0:49 [Henry] It's like the nerdiest David Blaine.

0:51 Yeah.

0:51 (chuckles)- Sweet, so.

0:53 Just try to tap.

0:55 We'll go.

0:56 (phone chimes)- What just happened on my phone?

1:02 Approved?

1:02 Whoa, whoa, approved.

1:04 (coins clinking) So, okay.

1:05 I heard something happen on my phone while you tapped this on this.

1:08 Yes.

1:12 We got a little receipt for you.

1:17 Credit verified on device, $5.

1:20 So, I'm gonna check my phone.

1:24 Ah, oh, I have a new $5 charge.

1:30 And it's time stamped right now.

1:34 I don't like that at all.

1:37 So, that's concerning.

1:39 Oh, so my phone had to be on this thing?

1:42 [Henry] Yes.

1:42 Did it have to be on this thing?

1:44 Or like, near it, I guess?

1:46 So the way, well, I could explain how it works-- Yeah.

1:49 But maybe before that, $5, it's not very much.

1:53 Yeah.

1:54 Do we want to try upping it a bit?

1:57 I...

1:58 I'm gonna enter a slightly larger amount.

2:00 Careful.

2:01 Careful with that.

2:02 Careful, careful.

2:04 That's a lot of zeros.

2:05 Careful with that.

2:06 Oh my God.

2:07 Okay.

2:08 Do you even think it's possible?

2:10 Firstly, $10,000.

2:11 I mean, the credit, the limit on the card is above that.

2:15 I don't know if Apple Pay will let you do that.

2:19 The question is also are you used to spending

2:21 this amount of money on this card, you know?

2:23 Not from my phone.

2:25 It's like a big screen activity.

2:27 Yeah.

2:28 Like, $10,000 purchase, I gotta be checking everything.

2:32 So, yeah, no.

2:32 This would be unusual.

2:34 Let's see it.

2:34 Let's see if it works.

2:35 Okay, I'm gonna do it again.

2:36 Okay.

2:37 We're just, all we gotta do again.

2:38 Put your phone locked.

2:40 Phone-- On this device.

2:41 Locked on that device.

2:45 [Henry] Yes, exactly.

2:47 And okay, we're gonna start the script again.

2:53 Okay.

2:54 (suspenseful music) (phone chimes)- [Marques] Uh-uh.

3:05 (coins clinking) Uh-uh.

3:07 No.

3:09 No?

3:10 (laughs)- It's just green.

3:12 Approved.

3:13 Print that out.

3:14 Print that.

3:15 (receipt sprinting) That is crazy.

3:20 Oh my God.

3:21 So, so, yeah, I'm gonna need that back.

3:24 Yeah.

3:25 (laughs)- For sure, I'm gonna need that back.

3:28 But also, did that just?

3:29 Yeah, wow.

3:31 It worked.

3:33 $10,000.

3:33 All right.

3:34 I believe you.

3:35 I definitely believe you.

3:38 How do we get this back?

3:39 We do like a little Venmo or like PayPal?

3:42 How do we even?

3:42 You know, do we give it back though?

3:44 Reverse the transaction.

3:45 I don't even know.

3:46 Do I call my company?

3:47 Yeah, that's crazy.

3:48 Yeah, exactly.

3:49 You can keep this if you wanna-- Yeah.

3:50 Get it framed.

3:51 Yeah.

3:51 A receipt of the damage.

3:53 I never unlock my phone.

3:54 I never put in a password.

3:56 I never did what I would normally do to verify a transaction on my phone.

4:00 Yes.

4:01 It just happened to be on top of that.

4:04 So, how did we do it?

4:05 Well, we teamed up with two cybersecurity experts,

4:08 Professors Ioana Boureanu and Tom Chothia.

4:10 And we went to visit them at the University of Surrey,

4:13 where they ran us through a unique hack that they developed to bypass

4:16 the phone's lock screen and then to drain funds from inside its mobile wallet.

4:20 Without unlocking my phone is the real magic part.

4:23 That's crazy.

4:24 And the craziest thing of all is that this hack was made public back in 2021.

4:28 So, people have known that it's possible to take

4:30 money from locked phones in this way for five years.

4:33 So, what kind of amounts does this?

4:36 The only limit is how much someone has in their bank account.

4:39 (suspenseful music)- Yet the loophole still hasn't been fixed.

4:44 So, how does it work?

4:46 Well, whenever you use Tap to Pay,

4:48 your phone and the reader exchange information about the transaction.

4:52 But they send this information through the air by a shared magnetic field,

4:56 so we can intercept the communication and alter it.

4:59 All we need to do is to insert

5:01 our own devices in between the phone and the reader.

5:04 First, we tap Marques's phone against this.

5:07 It's an NFC device called the Proxmark.

5:08 To Marques's phone, the proxmark looks like a typical card reader.

5:12 So, it happily sends over its transaction data.

5:15 That proxmark then sends that data straight to our laptop,

5:18 where we run a Python script to modify it.

5:21 Next, the laptop sends the data to our burner phone,

5:24 which I tap on the actual card reader.

5:26 To the reader, my phone looks just like Marques's.

5:29 So, both Marques's phone and the card

5:31 reader think they're talking directly to each other,

5:34 when in fact all their communication goes through our series of devices.

5:38 This is a classic man-in-the-middle attack.

5:44 Now, getting in the middle to intercept the data is actually the easy part.

5:47 The hard part is what you need to do to that data

5:49 to trick the phone and the reader into authorizing the transaction.

5:53 See, to actually steal money using this attack,

5:55 you have to get past three layers of defense on both systems.

5:58 And to do that, we have to tell three lies.

6:01 Two to the phone, and one to the reader.

6:05 So, the first layer of defense is the simplest.

6:08 The phone is locked.

6:10 And in an ordinary transaction, you have to unlock your phone to pay.

6:13 But this is no ordinary transaction.

6:15 So, you know, if you ever go to the subway,

6:17 there's a feature that Apple's created where you know, when you walk through,

6:20 they don't want a bunch of people lining up and having to unlock their face.

6:23 And you know, maybe they're wearing a coat and glasses and stuff.

6:26 Oh.

6:26 Express Transit Mode.

6:27 Apple introduced express transit mode in 2019 to let

6:30 you make transit transactions without having to unlock your phone.

6:35 The way this works is that the payment terminals on the subway

6:38 or on the bus broadcast a message that identifies them as a transit terminal.

6:42 Then, when you tap your phone to pay,

6:44 it looks for whatever card is in the transit slot

6:46 of its mobile wallet and it pays without needing to unlock.

6:50 This is super convenient, but we can also abuse it.

6:53 We found out how this worked by going

6:55 to the London Underground with our laptops and our equipment,

6:59 and actually scanning the signals and seeing

7:02 what the gate was saying to the phone.

7:05 And that's how we discovered this code the gate send which unlocked the phone.

7:10 We used the proxmark to broadcast that same code,

7:13 which fools Marques's phone into thinking that it's a transit reader.

7:16 So, when we tap Marques's phone against the proxmark,

7:18 it's now expecting to receive another message

7:21 with the details about the transit transaction.

7:24 Here's what that message would typically look like in binary code.

7:27 Each of these bits carries important information about the transaction.

7:31 Now, the important part of this message for us is this bit.

7:34 An authentic transit transaction would have a 1 right here.

7:38 This tells the phone that the reader may be offline.

7:40 Like if it's underground on the subway.

7:42 In which case the phone would need to send an extra layer of authentication.

7:46 So, when Marques's phone receives the transaction request

7:49 from what it thinks is a transit reader,

7:51 it's gonna be expecting that value to be set to 1.

7:54 But in reality, the device sending the request is our retail reader,

7:58 and this reader is online, which means that that bit is currently set to zero.

8:02 Therefore, to trick the phone into accepting the transaction,

8:05 we intercept the message from the reader,

8:07 pass it through our computer, and we change that 0 to a 1.

8:10 So by the time the message gets to Marques's phone,

8:13 it looks like a transit transaction.

8:17 As this communicates through our computer,

8:20 we're convincing the phone that it is in fact talking to a transit terminal.

8:24 But now there's a second line of defense we need to break.

8:28 With this first lie, we bypassed the need to unlock the phone.

8:31 And we can now trick it into making small payments of a few dollars.

8:34 Kind you'd expect on the subway.

8:36 But if we suddenly went and asked the phone for $10,000,

8:40 well, its guard would go way back up.

8:42 After all, it's pretty unusual for a transit reader

8:45 to ask for such a large amount of money.

8:48 So, this activates a second layer of defense.

8:50 Customer verification.

8:52 On contactless payments like this, there are two categories of transaction.

8:56 We got high value and low value.

8:58 Any transaction that's classified as high

9:00 value requires additional verification from the customer.

9:03 For example, in the UK, most banks require a pin or a fingerprint

9:07 or facial recognition for any transaction over 100 pounds.

9:11 So, for us to get this $10,000 payment through without customer verification,

9:16 we need to trick the phone into thinking

9:18 that $10,000 is in fact a low value transaction.

9:23 And that's actually surprisingly simple.

9:26 That's because to determine whether the transaction is high value,

9:28 Marques's phone doesn't actually look at the numerical value of $10,000.

9:33 It just looks at another single bit of information in the transaction data.

9:37 A 1 here means high value and 0 means low.

9:40 The reason for this is that the boundary between

9:42 high and low value varies from country to country.

9:45 And of course, different countries operate in different currencies.

9:48 So, a simple label allows the flexibility to deal with these variations.

9:52 And it allows the limits to be changed

9:53 without the banks needing to issue new cards.

9:57 So, all we need to do is intercept the message from the reader,

10:00 flip that bit to a zero, and then the phone will believe that this transaction

10:04 is low value even though it's for $10,000.

10:07 Then, when the phone receives our request for a $10,000 transaction,

10:11 it doesn't ask for customer verification.

10:13 It just goes ahead and authorizes the transaction.

10:19 Now, you might be asking, why is this data so easy to tamper with?

10:22 And we'll get to that in just a minute.

10:24 But we have one final security check to overcome.

10:27 See, with these first two lies,

10:28 we bypassed unlocking the phone and then tricked it

10:31 into making a high value transaction without asking for verification.

10:35 So, the phone is fully convinced and it's ready to make the payment.

10:38 But we still need to convince the reader that the transaction's valid.

10:42 And this is where our third lie comes in.

10:45 When Marques's phone replies, it says it's approved the $10,000 transaction.

10:49 But it also says that it hasn't asked for customer verification.

10:53 No pin, no fingerprint, no facial recognition.

10:55 But if the reader sees this, it'll reject the transaction because it

10:59 knows that the $10,000 payment it originally asked for is high value.

11:03 It should therefore require customer verification.

11:06 So, now we need to trick the reader

11:07 into thinking that the customer has verified the payment.

11:12 So, we intercept the response from Marques's phone and look

11:15 for the bit of information that says customer verification hasn't been done.

11:19 Then we change it to say that the payment

11:21 has been verified by flipping this 0 to a 1.

11:25 Now, the reader's happy.

11:26 It forwards the information onto the bank, and the bank authorizes the payment.

11:31 After all, it sees a transaction that's

11:32 been verified by the customer on their device.

11:35 (upbeat lively music) (notification beeps) Green approved.

11:44 (coins clinking)- That is crazy.

11:46 Verified on device?

11:47 Yeah, verified.

11:48 You didn't, you didn't verify it.

11:50 Right.

11:51 So, why isn't all this information encrypted?

11:54 That would make it impossible to secretly tamper with.

11:56 Well, the way the phone and reader communicate

11:58 has to be compatible with thousands of different devices,

12:01 which would be impossible to update all in one go.

12:04 So for that reason, the information we've looked

12:06 at so far is just sent across unencrypted.

12:10 Even still, phones, readers and banks all have checks

12:12 in place to make sure an attack like this can't happen.

12:15 And normally, it can't.

12:17 Except if you happen to use a specific

12:19 type of phone and a specific type of card.

12:22 Because when you combine them in this particular scenario,

12:26 they create a loophole.

12:28 So, our hack relied on a specific phone and credit card combination.

12:32 And we also use a sophisticated method developed by cybersecurity experts.

12:36 But hackers or scammers online, well, they don't need to be that smart.

12:40 Often they can just buy information to target you.

12:43 When I started working at Veritasium,

12:44 I was on a work trip to go meet Derek for the first time.

12:47 And I got an email from somebody was

12:49 saying he was Derek asking for my phone number.

12:52 That made a ton of sense.

12:53 I was leaving the airport.

12:54 So, I just responded by sending my phone number.

12:56 I immediately was like, "Wait, let me look at that." I checked the email.

12:59 Not Derek.

12:59 Of course, for the next few months I was just getting scam call after scam call.

13:03 That's one way they can get you.

13:04 I felt like an idiot.

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14:12 this video about taking money from Marques Brownlee.

14:16 And now, let's get back to that thing.

14:20 So, which combination of card and phone make this hack possible?

14:23 Firstly, the phone has to be an iPhone.

14:26 As we saw earlier, when an iPhone

14:28 is deciding whether to ask for customer verification,

14:31 it doesn't look at the numerical value of the transaction.

14:34 It only looks at the high value or low value label provided by the reader.

14:38 But other phones don't work that way.

14:40 For example, when a Samsung phone goes into transit mode,

14:43 it doesn't rely on this low value label from the reader.

14:46 It looks at the actual numerical value of the transaction

14:49 and it only accepts a payment of $0.

14:52 Then it relies on the transport provider to count

14:55 up all the times you've used the subway,

14:56 and then to send you a bill at the end of the day.

14:59 So, if a Samsung phone saw a transit terminal

15:02 trying to charge you $10,000 for a single tap, it would immediately reject it.

15:07 But it's not just Apple's transit mode that makes this hack possible.

15:11 You've gotta have one specific type of card in the transit slot.

15:15 It was truly a design feature that was

15:17 introduced by the way you mixed Apple and Visa.

15:21 And the reason that this works with a Visa card, but wouldn't, with say,

15:24 a MasterCard comes down to the different

15:26 processes they use to verify transactions.

15:29 So, what is it about Visa's verification process that makes this hack possible?

15:34 In a previous video, we saw that any card transaction relies on a secret

15:38 cryptographic key shared by the card and the bank.

15:41 When you tap the card or phone onto a reader,

15:44 the reader sends across a long string of transaction details.

15:47 The card then applies its secret key to garble

15:49 that message into a unique code for the transaction.

15:52 The card sends this to the reader,

15:54 which the reader forwards onto the bank, along with the raw transaction details.

15:59 The bank then applies its own secret key to the raw data as well.

16:02 And if the output matches the one from the card,

16:04 the bank authorizes the transaction.

16:07 This is called symmetric cryptography since the card

16:10 and the bank use the same secret key.

16:13 And this step is required in all transactions.

16:15 No matter whether you have a Visa, a MasterCard, or something else.

16:19 But there's actually another layer of security

16:21 which MasterCard uses in all of its transactions.

16:24 But in this particular case, Visa doesn't.

16:26 This layer of security is not between the card and the bank,

16:29 but between the card and the reader.

16:32 And it's at this step where MasterCard thwarts our attack.

16:36 The second step relies on asymmetric cryptography.

16:40 So-called because it uses two different keys.

16:43 A private key for the card and a public key for the reader.

16:46 It starts with the reader sending across

16:48 the transaction details to the card just like before.

16:51 The card then uses its private key to garble

16:53 that message into another long string of digits.

16:57 This is the card's digital signature for the transaction.

17:00 The card sends this signature back to the reader along with the public key,

17:03 which the reader then uses to verify that the signature

17:06 came from that specific card for this specific transaction.

17:10 To illustrate how this works, let's consider a simple example.

17:14 The private key and public key both have two components.

17:17 N is a shared number.

17:19 In this case, let's say 55.

17:21 D is the card's private number.

17:23 Let's say 7.

17:24 And E is the public number.

17:26 Let's say 3.

17:27 Now, when the reader sends across the raw transaction data,

17:30 it represents it as one long number.

17:32 But for simplicity, we'll use a much smaller one.

17:34 Let's say 2.

17:36 To sign for the transaction,

17:37 the card or the phone raises the transaction number,

17:39 in this case 2, to the power of its private number, so we get 128.

17:45 And then divides this by the shared number,

17:48 128 over 55, which leaves a remainder of 18.

17:52 And this is the card signature, 18, which it sends on to the reader.

17:57 Now, the reader needs to know whether the transaction is valid.

18:00 So, it takes the card signature and raises it to the power of the public number.

18:05 Then, it takes the remainder when you divide by the shared number 55.

18:09 And you get 2.

18:10 This matches the original transaction data the reader sent to the card.

18:14 The reason this works is that the private and public numbers

18:17 are specifically chosen so that when combined with the shared number,

18:20 the public key effectively reverses the operation of the private key.

18:24 And this allows the reader to verify that the card

18:26 signature is valid without ever having seen its private number.

18:31 This is based on a type of cryptography called RSA.

18:34 In reality, the numbers involved are much larger.

18:36 But that makes it incredibly secure because that makes

18:39 it virtually impossible to reverse engineer the card's private key.

18:43 And it also means that even a one digit change in the transaction

18:46 data will produce a different result

18:48 when the reader checks the phone's signature,

18:50 in which case the reader won't approve the transaction.

18:53 This is a problem because we've modified the data.

18:55 The reader's expecting a signature for a high value retail transaction.

19:00 But we intercepted the communication.

19:01 So the phone signature is actually for low value transit transaction.

19:06 This wouldn't pass the asymmetric signature check.

19:09 But while MasterCard always requires this asymmetric verification,

19:13 which would spot our hack, Visa doesn't.

19:16 They only require this signature in certain situations.

19:19 Like, when the reader's offline.

19:21 For example, when you're underground with no signal,

19:23 there's no way for the reader to communicate

19:25 with the bank for that first layer of symmetric cryptography.

19:28 At least not until it comes back online.

19:31 So, during our attack, we make sure the reader is online the whole time.

19:34 That way, it doesn't bother using the asymmetric layer of security,

19:38 which contains the signature that would unravel our lies.

19:41 But the funny thing is we've tricked the phone

19:43 into thinking it's interacting with the transit reader.

19:45 And transit transactions are one of those times

19:47 where Visa does require the asymmetric signature,

19:50 since the reader could be underground on the subway, and therefore offline.

19:54 So, the phone actually does send across its signature to the reader,

19:58 but the reader doesn't check it.

19:59 Because in reality, the reader's online.

20:02 So, instead it just relies on that first layer of security with the bank,

20:06 even though if it did check the phone signature,

20:09 it would've all the evidence it needed to stop the hack.

20:11 (screen whooshing) So yeah, you go.

20:14 Makes sense that it's that sophisticated 'cause it shouldn't be that easy,

20:16 but that still seemed way too easy.

20:19 And Marques was not the only victim.

20:21 I thought it was only fair that I first try it out on myself.

20:24 (phone beeping)- Approved it.

20:27 Woohoohoo!

20:28 Yeah, here.

20:29 You souvenir from the UK from Tom and me.

20:32 Oh, what a lovely receipt for this theft.

20:35 (chuckles) And then I got another victim with a bit of a bigger budget.

20:39 Our channel has a CFO basically, who lives very nearby.

20:43 What we're doing is we're setting it to be your transit card.

20:45 Okay.

20:45 So that means that if you're in, London you have to use the tube-- Yeah.

20:48 It'll take money from this card.

20:50 Something just happened.

20:51 Yeah.

20:52 (everyone laughs) How you feel about that?

20:56 Oh my goodness me.

20:57 Oh my-- [Henry] There you go.

20:59 We were just gonna meet for a drink.

21:02 That's what, you know, that was the agreement.

21:04 In the real world, say you had your phone in your pocket.

21:08 Yeah.

21:09 I would walk by you-- Yeah.

21:11 Doing this.

21:11 And Tom would have this in the shop and pay.

21:14 The easiest way for this to actually be a crime would be a stolen iPhone.

21:18 [Henry] Sure.

21:19 And then someone goes and spends thousands of pounds.

21:23 So you know, you could buy a car with us.

21:25 Jesus.

21:25 Yeah, yeah.

21:26 Theoretically.

21:26 Geez.

21:27 Yeah.

21:28 Wow.

21:28 I guess from your perspective,

21:29 you've revealed all this information publicly and you're telling us.

21:31 We're walking through it in great detail.

21:34 How do we stop people from using this for- Or can we stop people?

21:39 Like, whose responsibility is it to stop this?

21:42 Oh, whose responsibility is it is an interesting question.

21:44 Yeah.

21:45 But you can stop it by turning transit mode off.

21:47 Or not turn it off, but not have a Visa card in transit mode on an Apple.

21:51 Yes.

21:51 And you do need to be careful because as soon

21:53 as you have a suitable card in your Apple wallet,

21:55 Express Transit Mode is turned on by default.

21:59 This hack was first made public way back in 2021

22:03 after the professors had informed Apple and Visa privately.

22:07 And to get to the bottom of why it's still possible,

22:09 we reached out to Apple, and they didn't agree to an interview.

22:13 But here's what they said.

22:14 "This is a concern with the Visa system,

22:16 but Visa does not believe this kind of fraud

22:18 is likely to take place in the real world.

22:20 Visa has made it clear that their cardholders

22:21 are protected by Visa's zero liability policy." This is

22:26 exactly the same as their position when

22:27 the hack was first made public back in 2021.

22:31 So, it seems like Apple are basically saying, "Well,

22:33 this is a Visa problem." So, we went and asked Visa what they thought.

22:38 I think this specific vulnerability is likely within a controlled setting.

22:42 Very unlikely from a scaled real world setting.

22:45 And then, kind of the last point is from a consumer perspective,

22:48 is that in the cases where this is successful,

22:51 they have the ability to dispute this transaction

22:54 and get their refunds returned to them.

22:57 I think that's fair.

22:57 You're saying it's not entirely scalable,

22:59 and then even if it does happen, we'll give you your money back.

23:02 Like, that's a great, that's a great stance.

23:04 I still think though, a lot of people,

23:06 and I think our audience would really wanna hear that you're

23:09 actually making the technical changes to stop this from ever happening again.

23:13 'Cause when you think about it

23:15 from a scale perspective and whether the network level

23:18 defenses that we have are effective in making

23:21 sure that this type of vulnerability is isolated, we believe it is effective.

23:26 Because if it wasn't,

23:27 you would hear a lot more data about how this is an issue, and it simply isn't.

23:32 The point that I'm making is that you're never gonna be able

23:35 to completely eradicate any specific type

23:39 of fraud 'cause it's going to exist, right?

23:42 Yes.

23:42 What I'm saying is that we have the right detections

23:45 in place to ensure that this type of fraud is not endemic.

23:51 Would it not be even better to just say this type of fraud is not possible.

23:55 Why not just say it's not probable?

23:56 Why not just totally get rid of it by implementing an actual technical change?

24:01 If you think about for every $100 of spend that occurs on card payments.

24:07 10 cents of that is lost to fraud.

24:10 So, every $100 it's 10 cents.

24:13 If you look at in-person transactions,

24:15 which is what kind of this topic is really much more related to.

24:19 That number goes down to 2 cents for every $100 of fraud that's being made.

24:27 So, I've been thinking about this hack and it reminds

24:28 me a lot about people who are afraid of flying.

24:32 Statistically, you're a lot more likely to crash on the drive

24:34 to the airport than you are in the air.

24:37 So, I do understand Visa's argument generally.

24:40 Compared to other kinds of fraud, this is just a drop in the ocean.

24:44 But airlines don't accept a small number of crashes

24:47 each year as an inevitable cost of doing business.

24:50 No.

24:50 Anytime there's a crash, they analyze it meticulously.

24:53 And then they do everything in their power

24:55 to make sure that it's never gonna happen again.

24:57 Visa says that they'll get you your money back and that's great.

25:02 But you've still gotta notice the charge, dispute it, and then wait.

25:06 Imagine waking up to see $10,000 gone from your account.

25:09 That's money for rent, insurance, car payment, or a medical bill.

25:14 Even if the refund does come, the stress before is gonna be very real.

25:18 So for me, the question is whether just saying

25:20 they're gonna refund it after the fact is good enough.

25:23 Or when a system touches the lives of so many people, should we expect better?

25:33 Okay, yeah.

25:33 That's the whole demo.

25:34 I will now give you your money back.

25:36 Yes.

25:39 [Henry] Okay, we gotta.

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