Why Iranian Revolution Happened - Kings and Generals Modern

0:11 The Islamic revolution in Iran is one

0:13 of the most consequential political upheavals of the 20th century.

0:17 It gave rise to a truly unique political system and turned

0:20 Iran into one of the biggest challengers to the Pax Americana.

0:24 Much has been written about how the revolution unfolded and how

0:28 Shia clerics came to power in one of the world's oldest countries.

0:32 The joint attack of the United States and Israel on Iran has

0:36 once again brought the Iranian revolution

0:38 and its clerical regime to the spotlight,

0:40 but we are not going to make a video on how the revolution happened.

0:44 Instead, we want to answer one question:

0:47 “Why did the Iranian Revolution Happen?”

0:56 POLITICAL CAUSES AND OPPRESSION Iran has had

1:18 its fair share of disruptive and transformational

1:35 political events in the 20th century.

1:38 Revolutions, coups, foreign occupation,

1:40 and the substitution of one royal family for another.

1:43 The truth is that Iranian society has always been politically very active,

1:48 and even during the harshest authoritarian periods,

1:50 they have found ways to express their dissent,

1:53 often putting their lives at risk in the process.

1:56 The Iran of the 1970s was one of the most oppressive regimes in the world.

2:01 Ever since the US-sponsored 1953 coup,

2:04 which toppled the democratically elected Mossadegh government,

2:07 the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,

2:10 had been curbing the political space and persecuting his opposition.

2:15 One by one, political parties had been banned.

2:18 In 1957, the Shah created SAVAK,

2:21 the secret police, to protect his regime from dissent,

2:25 which Time magazine described as “Iran’s most hated and feared institution”.

2:29 SAVAK routinely engaged in torture and execution

2:33 of people suspected of opposing the Shah.

2:36 This effectively turned Iran into an authoritarian police state,

2:40 which pushed the opposition underground.

2:42 By the mid-1970s, the Shah had become fully totalitarian.

2:47 In 1975, he created the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party,

2:51 whose sole purpose was to promote Mohammad

2:54 Reza Shah’s rule and implement his policies.

2:56 Anyone disagreeing with him was branded a traitor by the Shah,

3:00 who said: “The place of those who oppose the Constitution,

3:04 the monarchical system and the People-Shah Revolution

3:06 is either in jail or outside Iran.

3:09 Those who do not wish to enter

3:11 into this political organization (the Rastakhiz) have two alternatives:

3:15 They either belong to an illegal political party,

3:18 like the Tudeh, in which case they should be jailed”.

3:21 [second part missing here?] The Shah himself admitted that there

3:23 were 3000 political prisoners in the country in 1976.

3:27 Foreign journalists and Iranian exile groups put

3:31 the estimate from 25,000 to 100,000 political prisoners.

3:34 So, the sheer scale of political oppression in Iran was unbearable.

3:39 The Shah’s reign of terror targeted many groups,

3:42 most notably Iranians with leftist or liberal sympathies.

3:46 While repression against politically active people

3:48 was perhaps deplored by the ordinary Iranians,

3:51 it was nonetheless within the realms of what was expected.

3:55 Iranian shahs were never really known for tolerance for dissent.

3:59 But in hindsight, the Shah, increasingly blinded by arrogance,

4:02 which can be caused only by excessive wealth and unfettered power,

4:06 and seeing himself as some kind of reformist messiah of Iran,

4:10 crossed some red lines he was not supposed to.

4:14 He targeted Iran’s notoriously independent merchant class, the bazaar,

4:18 which has been the center of life and commerce of Iranian cities for centuries.

4:22 The mood of Iranian bazaars had often been a barometer of society at large,

4:26 and when that mood soured, Iranian shopkeepers and merchants were often

4:30 at the forefront of discontent and revolt.

4:33 The bazaars had protested the Shah already

4:36 twice before the revolution- once in 1954,

4:39 striking against the new oil agreement

4:41 with the West and the second time in 1963, when they took to the streets

4:46 to speak out against rigged parliamentary elections.

4:48 So, the Shah rightly saw the bazaars

4:51 as a source of threat to his increasingly totalitarian rule.

4:55 But also, the bazaars were not part of his vision of a modernized future Iran,

5:00 as he preferred big businessmen who largely depended on his goodwill.

5:04 He wanted to bulldoze old bazaars and build state-run markets,

5:08 new roads and modern restaurants in their stead.

5:11 After creating Rastakhiz,

5:12 Mohammad Reza started making moves to take control over the bazaars.

5:17 His party opened local branches in the bazaars

5:20 and replaced local merchant guilds with a Chamber of Guilds,

5:23 appointing wealthy outsiders to its presidency.

5:25 While big businessmen borrowed money from banks

5:28 at a reasonable 6 percent interest rate,

5:31 small shopkeepers had to pay exorbitant rates, often exceeding 20%.

5:35 When Iran was hit with spiralling inflation in 1975,

5:39 the regime chose to target small shopkeepers

5:42 as scapegoats and launched a major campaign against them.

5:46 “The Bazaar profiteers” were accused of artificially increasing prices.

5:50 Some 8,000 bazaar-related businessmen were jailed.

5:53 23,000 were exiled from their homes, and some 200,000 men were fined.

5:59 Simultaneously, the Shah waged war against the religious establishment.

6:02 He believed that the crucial element of his drive

6:06 for modernization was eliminating the Shia clergy's independence,

6:09 which had been a major political force in Iran for centuries.

6:13 A series of laws that contradicted the Sharia was passed.

6:17 The minimum marriage age for girls was raised to 15 under the 1967 law,

6:23 then to 18 under its 1975 amendment.

6:26 The Family Protection Law of 1967 restricted polygamy

6:29 and made the process of divorce more complicated for men.

6:33 Female students wearing chador veils

6:35 were prohibited from registering at universities.

6:38 The Islamic Hijri calendar was substituted with a new royalist calendar,

6:43 as Iranians suddenly experienced an overnight transition from 1355 to 2535.

6:50 The Religious Corps was established to ideologically challenge the traditional

6:54 Shia clergy class and promote the Shah’s version of Islam,

6:58 which was proclaimed the “spiritual guide” of Iran.

7:02 Many prominent clerical leaders,

7:04 who criticized these new policies, were imprisoned.

7:07 The future leader of the revolution,

7:10 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was sent into exile.

7:13 By destroying the liberal and leftist opposition,

7:16 while also making strong moves against the religious and merchant classes,

7:19 the Shah regime was driving the opposition deep underground.

7:23 On the surface, the Iranian police state had weakened

7:26 the opposition to the point of making it nearly invisible,

7:29 but at a deeper level,

7:31 the harshness of repressions turned the resentment against Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

7:35 into pure hatred hidden from plain sight for the time being.

7:39 But many authoritarian and totalitarian regimes engage

7:42 in brutal political repression and continue existing despite them.

7:46 So, although political repression is an important

7:49 motivator and cause of revolutionary movements,

7:51 it is almost never sufficient to be the sole factor behind mass movements.

7:56 ANTI-WESTERNISM, ANTI-MODERNIZATION Mohammad Reza Shah’s modernisation

7:59 programme was breathtaking in its ambition— he

8:02 intended to transform Iranian society beyond recognition

8:05 in an extremely short period of time.

8:08 This is never an easy task and almost

8:11 always requires an immense degree of legitimacy,

8:14 popularity and control for rulers to realize their ambitions.

8:17 Something not many leaders have ever enjoyed.

8:21 Because radical modernisation envisages taking on entrenched

8:24 order and societal forces and centuries-long societal dynamics.

8:28 The Shah’s vision of modernization

8:31 included eliminating the influence of traditional

8:33 societal forces such as the Shia clergy and the merchant class.

8:37 They were seen as remnants of the past.

8:40 There would be no opposition to his rule,

8:42 and he would surround himself with Western-educated technocrats,

8:45 specialists, and large businessmen.

8:48 Iran’s massive oil revenue was going

8:51 to fund the industrialization of the country,

8:53 rapidly building up its infrastructure, turning Iran into a military powerhouse,

8:58 improving healthcare and education and emancipating

9:00 women from the shackles of religion.

9:02 Here, the problem for the Shah was that a significant portion

9:05 of the Iranian population was conservative

9:08 and rejected such a rapid transformation.

9:10 On top of that, modernization

9:13 in Iran was closely associated with Westernization.

9:16 The United States, Britain and Israel were seen

9:20 as the staunch allies of the Shah regime.

9:22 And the religious, leftist and nationalist forces in Iran

9:25 had many reasons to be critical of the West.

9:29 An anti-Western attitude was part of the Iranian psyche to some extent,

9:33 as Iranians had long bemoaned the Western meddling in their affairs,

9:37 taking over their resources and controlling their leaders as puppets.

9:41 In 1890, the tobacco protests occurred after

9:44 the Iranian government sold the tobacco concession to Britain.

9:48 In 1953, the US and Britain orchestrated a coup

9:52 to depose the democratically elected prime minister Mossadegh,

9:55 who had previously decided to nationalize Iran’s oil industry.

9:59 Mohammed Reza Shah was friendly with Israel.

10:02 All of these were legitimate causes for resentment

10:05 against the West in large portions of Iranian society.

10:08 The former prime minister of Iran, Jamshid Amouzegar,

10:11 argued that the collapse of the Shah regime was

10:14 caused by a clash between Western modernization and traditional,

10:17 religious, economic and social structures.

10:20 Indeed, the anti-foreign sentiment is a common feature in many revolutions,

10:25 and the Iranian revolution is no exception.

10:28 URBANIZATION AND EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION One of the key

10:29 elements of the Shah’s modernization plan was rapid urbanization,

10:31 the uncontrolled manner of which became one of the causes of the revolution.

10:36 The urban population of Iran increased from 6

10:40 million to 16 million between 1956 and 1976.

10:43 At the same time, the rapid expansion of higher education,

10:47 state bureaucracy and industry increased the number of jobs in cities.

10:52 By the 1970s, there had been a fourfold increase

10:56 in the number of university graduates– roughly 300,000 people.

11:00 The number of people working as civil servants,

11:03 teachers, engineers, managers, doctors, and other typical middle-class jobs rose

11:07 from an estimated 324,000 to 630,000 by 1977.

11:12 The urban working class is estimated to have grown from around

11:18 300k in 1953 to more than 1.7 million by 1977,

11:22 with the oil industry, factories, railways,

11:25 and transportation companies as the largest employers.

11:28 On the surface, this looks impressive and indicates a rapid transformation.

11:32 But such progress also brought challenges

11:34 that the Shah regime was ill-equipped to deal with.

11:38 The oil boom caused a major construction boom in Iran.

11:41 One of the unintended consequences was a major internal migration

11:45 of the low-skilled rural population to the cities in search of jobs.

11:50 Many struggled to get permanent employment.

11:52 On top of that, the lack of adequate housing

11:55 and social services led to the emergence of new shantytowns.

12:00 Poor socio-economic conditions, lack of prospects and youthful restlessness have

12:04 always been a perfect combination for political unrest.

12:07 But it also caused the proliferation

12:10 of crime and vices like alcoholism and prostitution.

12:14 This, in turn, handed the clergy

12:16 powerful material for its anti-regime messaging.

12:19 The Shah’s modernization and westernization were blamed for immorality,

12:22 a message which found some resonance among ordinary Iranians.

12:26 Moreover, the newly urbanized people and the increasingly

12:30 young and educated population of Iran

12:32 inevitably sought communities to identify with and for opportunities

12:36 to rise in the social ladder.

12:38 But the destruction of practically all independent organizations,

12:41 such as political parties, labor unions and professional associations,

12:46 meant that finding such communities and avenues to express themselves

12:50 and convey grievances in a non-violent manner did not exist.

12:53 One of the aims of Rastakhiz was to bring

12:56 these young people into the fold, but it was belated,

12:59 and the Shah’s and his party's messages did

13:02 not really appeal to this new social stratum.

13:04 Enter the only remaining independent institution,

13:08 to which throughout history many have turned for the sense of community,

13:12 comfort and hope- the clergy.

13:14 For all the pressure the Shah was putting on institutionalized Shiism in Iran,

13:19 it was still standing.

13:20 In the absence of other options, thousands of urban migrants,

13:24 especially those who had been left behind,

13:26 sought financial and moral support from the clergy.

13:29 This gave the religious opposition a significant

13:32 young supporter base in big cities.

13:34 CORRUPTION.

13:34 SOCIAL PROBLEMS Yet, for all the progress Iran had made during the Shah’s reign,

13:39 thanks to a massive influx of oil money,

13:41 the country still faced major socio-economic problems.

13:44 On the eve of the revolution, 68% of adults were still illiterate,

13:48 while fewer than 40% of children had completed primary school.

13:53 43% of urban families lived in one-room houses,

13:56 on top of the shanty towns we mentioned earlier.

13:59 Many cities, including Tehran,

14:01 lacked proper sewage systems and public transportation.

14:04 Although the government funded the formation of farm

14:07 cooperatives and provided some machinery to farmers,

14:10 their overall agricultural strategy, as in many other spheres,

14:14 was bafflingly incomplete and inconsistent.

14:17 Most rural areas lacked electricity, and banks did not offer favourable loans

14:22 to farm cooperatives to boost their productivity.

14:25 On the opposite side of the spectrum,

14:27 businessmen and bureaucrats close to the regime were

14:30 enriching themselves thanks to preferential treatment and outright corruption.

14:35 In 1974-75 alone, the Commander of the Iranian

14:38 Navy and the Commander of the Air Force,

14:40 the latter of whom was Mohammad Reza’s brother-in-law,

14:43 were implicated in corruption.

14:44 And the public saw that the very few were

14:48 enriching themselves on their country’s wealth at their expense,

14:51 which only made their resentment worse.

14:53 Many felt like modernization,

14:55 and the Shah’s policies served the purpose of making the rich richer,

14:59 while ignoring the problems and interests of ordinary people.

15:02 And this was the majority- one whose silence would not last much longer.

15:08 THE REVOLUTION Up until now,

15:09 we have focused on pre-existing structural causes that ignited

15:12 the mass protest movement in Iran in 1978.

15:16 But similar causes had existed in many other

15:19 countries with similar contexts without revolutions toppling the incumbents.

15:23 So, what made the Iranian protest movement different?

15:27 Iran’s revolutionary history is unique in a sense.

15:30 At least, in terms of tactics used by protesters.

15:33 For instance, bast- people taking sanctuary in mosques,

15:37 other holy places and foreign embassies in large numbers as a sign of protest,

15:42 which was used in the 1906 revolution.

15:45 But arguably the most impactful,

15:47 uniquely Iranian mobilization tactic is called Chehelom,

15:50 which means the “40th” in Persian.

15:53 In the Shia tradition, the dead are mourned for 40 days,

15:56 with the final respects being given on the 40th day.

15:59 As a revolutionary tactic,

16:01 it meant gathering for the 40th day ceremony of a protester,

16:05 who had been previously killed by the regime.

16:08 Then this gathering would transform into a protest of its own.

16:11 And it became a self-sustaining wave

16:14 of protest across Iran during the 1978-79 revolution.

16:17 The revolutionary cycle began with the Qom

16:20 protests and the government’s bloody response, which killed at least 5 people.

16:25 40 days later, Tabriz rose up in Chehelom with bazaars

16:29 and mosques playing a crucial role in mobilizing the people.

16:33 The regime once again responded by killing several protesters.

16:36 Then, 40 days later, on March 29,

16:40 protests took place in dozens of Iranian cities, including the capital, Tehran.

16:44 This cycle continued through the summer and then

16:47 the shocking events like the Cinema Rex fire

16:50 and the Jaleh Square massacre turned the wave

16:53 of protests into a truly revolutionary mass movement.

16:56 Without a doubt, the Chehelom tradition was an important element of this.

17:00 Scholars of the Iranian revolution also point out

17:03 the inconsistency of the regime’s decision-making- sometimes too heavy-handed,

17:08 other times hesitant in the face

17:10 of the growing revolutionary movement and unrest.

17:12 At the initial stage of the mass movement,

17:15 the Shah cracked down very hard on the protests in Qom.

17:18 This reaction was expected for an authoritarian regime,

17:21 but the death of protesters launched the cycle of Chehelom,

17:24 growing the movement and expanding the geography of demonstrations.

17:28 The brutality of his regime peaked at the Jaleh Square massacre,

17:32 with more than 100 casualties reported on both sides,

17:36 mostly among the civilians.

17:37 This is when the situation reached the point of no return.

17:41 The only chance of saving his power for the Shah

17:43 was to continue relying on excessive violence to defeat the revolution.

17:47 Instead, Mohammad Reza suddenly changed his strategy and tried

17:51 to appease the opposition by dismissing his government,

17:54 releasing political prisoners,

17:56 easing censorship and promising free elections to the parliament in 1979.

18:00 This step could have been a viable option for maintaining his power,

18:05 while gradually moving towards a constitutional monarchy,

18:07 at the start of the protests.

18:09 After the Jaleh Square massacre,

18:11 this move was seen as a sign of weakness by the Shah,

18:15 who was quickly losing any popularity he had.

18:18 In November, Mohammad Reza Shah declared that he had “heard

18:21 the voice of revolution” and ordered the army to constrain its reaction.

18:25 But around the same time,

18:26 he appointed a military government led by General Azhari,

18:30 who tried to restore order through

18:32 curfews and strict enforcement of martial law.

18:35 However, mass strikes in the oil sector and defections from the regime

18:39 during this period demonstrated that it was likely beyond saving.

18:43 The appointment of a moderate opposition figure, Shapour Bakhtiar,

18:46 as prime minister in January 1979 was a very

18:50 late and unsuccessful attempt to appease the public.

18:53 Like many authoritarian leaders before and after,

18:56 the Shah decided to disperse protests through force.

18:59 But the army was ill-equipped to effectively contain the protests,

19:02 because they relied excessively on live ammunition,

19:05 since they did not have other means of crowd control,

19:08 nor training in this very specific task.

19:11 Shah’s contradictory orders didn’t help.

19:13 The scale of killing of the people by the regime

19:17 and standalone shocking events like the Cinema Rex fire,

19:19 which the Shia establishment very masterfully used

19:22 for its advantage by blaming the Shah, had made the revolution too powerful

19:27 and the regime absent of answers and solutions.

19:30 We will talk about Iran and the current situation in future videos.

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