LaGuardia Airport Crash | Pilots React Live

0:02 Good afternoon everyone.

0:04 Very welcome to this very special um

0:07 breaking news live stream here on Mentor Pilot.

0:09 I'm here together with Captain Ben Watts.

0:12 Hi everybody.

0:13 And uh what you can expect from this live stream is

0:16 just like the last couple of times where horrible accidents have happened.

0:20 We are going to go through what we know so far.

0:22 And we want to stress that what we know so far is not based on the NTSB.

0:26 they're just arriving to the scene in uh

0:29 in New York where this accident happened.

0:31 It is based on whatever witness reports we have, media outlets and so on.

0:37 So, it's likely that things are going to change.

0:39 But if you have seen our live streams before,

0:41 you know that we will not be speculating on cause

0:44 even though it looks um pretty clear at this point.

0:47 You more or less what has happened.

0:49 We are going to be talking about, you know, how do we avoid these kind of things

0:54 from happening from the pilot's point of view.

0:56 Since I have been an airport firefighter,

0:58 I can also speak from that view and then we will be covering air traffic

1:03 control and what can be done to make

1:06 sure something like this doesn't happen again.

1:08 So for those of you who are joining that is what we're going to talk about.

1:11 So, just to give a recap, um, yesterday on the 22nd of March around 11:40 p.m.

1:20 local time in New York, uh, an Air Canada flight 8646 that was flying

1:27 from Montreal in Canada over towards New York,

1:29 uh, was coming in for approach into runway 04 in Laguardi airport.

1:34 Um, now what they didn't know was that a couple of minutes

1:39 earlier a United Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 had rejected its

1:46 takeoff on runway 13 which is a slightly um well it's

1:51 not parallel but it's it's a different runway on the same airport.

1:54 Now they rejected that takeoff approximately at a at 95 knots or so which means

2:01 that it was a high-speed rejected takeoff requires

2:03 quite a lot of braking to do so.

2:06 So that went off without the any kind of problems.

2:09 The uh the max it just kind of turned off onto a taxiway and stopped there.

2:14 The problem was that the cabin crew in the back

2:17 of that United t uh United aircraft started complaining about

2:21 uh fumes about a nasty smell in the back

2:24 of the aircraft which can happen when you've had really heavy braking.

2:28 The the brakes will warm up and you can get

2:30 this kind of smell of rubber and stuff but they didn't

2:32 know what it was and they apparently called the pilots

2:34 and said that they did not want to stay on board.

2:37 Now the problem was that they didn't have a gate at the time.

2:40 So the pilots wanted to to get the passengers off either via

2:43 air stairs or via an evacuation if the fumes became too bad.

2:48 So they called air traffic control asking saying that this was their intention.

2:52 And once again this is all coming off of new stations now.

2:57 Um, and the air traffic controller that the offer sent a fire truck

3:03 their way to help with crowd control basically in case they would need

3:07 to evacuate or if they needed to to get air stairs there just

3:10 to keep track of all the passengers that might come out onto the pavement.

3:13 So that um fire truck left the fire station and started

3:18 moving towards where this aircraft had now rejected a takeoff.

3:21 Now, at the same time, um, Air Canada flight, um,

3:26 8646 was just about to touch down on runway 04.

3:31 And somewhere around here, the controller that was in the tower cleared the uh,

3:39 fire truck to cross runway 4 via taxay delta.

3:43 Let's see if if Navin can put it up.

3:44 So you see we've put it up in red down

3:47 there and in the left hand lower quadrant that's taxiway delta.

3:53 So they were going from left to right here while the flight was

3:59 coming in on runway 04 and the flight had been cleared to land.

4:04 The truck apparently had been cleared to cross.

4:08 The controller tried to stop the truck

4:10 when he realized what was about to happen.

4:12 the truck did not respond and within a couple of seconds they collided.

4:16 Now there are differing um information about what kind

4:20 of speed the aircraft was at when the collision happened.

4:24 But given that taxway delta is just outside of the touchdown zone from W 4,

4:29 they would have had pretty high speeds.

4:32 So if you look at ADSB data, the speed is indicated around 114 knots or so.

4:37 It's around 210 km/h.

4:39 So a very high speed.

4:42 Um this was strong enough to completely destroy the forward part

4:47 of the CRJ um the CRA 900 LR which is the aircraft

4:53 type that was being used and the aircraft then continued skidding

4:57 down to approximately taxiway echo where it came to a stop.

5:00 Um, there are pictures out there all over

5:04 social media now about how the aircraft looked,

5:06 how the fire truck that was turned over on the side look,

5:09 but uh we don't we don't want to show them here.

5:12 All right.

5:12 They're they're horrible horrible pictures.

5:14 The only thing that we can say for sure is

5:16 that apparently um the two pilots did not survive the the accident.

5:23 So, two pilots confirmed dead.

5:26 uh another 41 people injured out of which I think nine are

5:31 in serious condition and um and that's kind of where we are right now.

5:36 So a a horrible horrible um ground collision at the worst possible time.

5:44 And with that, Ben, do you have any any thoughts?

5:48 Yeah, good afternoon ladies and gents.

5:50 So, I think there's going to be a number of questions

5:52 on people's minds when they see this kind of news happening.

5:56 Firstly, how how is this allowed to happen?

5:58 How does it happen?

5:59 What needs to to break down in order for an incident like this to occur?

6:03 And then equally as important, what can be done to prevent this in the future?

6:07 Now, there's a different there's different perspectives we can look at here.

6:10 We can look at it from the flight crews perspective.

6:12 We can look at it from the ground crew

6:13 or the fire crews perspective and also the ATC perspective as well.

6:18 So if we start pedal with the flight crew, you know what?

6:22 Look, if we put ourselves and put the audience in the jet when we're coming

6:26 into land at night at a fairly busy airport and look at the the options,

6:30 the challenges and the threats that we face and what we

6:32 do to try and mitigate those as best as we can.

6:36 Yeah.

6:36 So what what I think people need to understand is that landing is one

6:40 of the most um one of the highest

6:42 workloads kind of stages that we have in flight.

6:47 And coming in at night especially,

6:48 you're looking down a runway which is you have your center line lights,

6:51 you have your your um runway edge lights and then there's loads

6:54 of lights potentially some lights in the far end coming into New York.

6:57 So it would have been a a cityscape in the far end.

6:59 So there's a lot of lights, right?

7:01 And as a a pilot that have been cleared to land,

7:05 you have to assume that that means that your runway is yours, right?

7:09 That there's not going to be any any

7:11 vehicles or any major obstacles on the runway.

7:14 can be the odd fox or rabbit or something that runs onto the runway,

7:18 but but nothing bigger than that.

7:20 So, as a pilot, I am focusing if I'm pilot flying,

7:23 I'm focusing on on getting the aircraft down safely on the mark

7:27 so that I can begin um to um reduce my speed,

7:32 braking, reverse thrust, and so on.

7:34 That's my focus.

7:36 And as as pilot monitoring you're verifying that that's

7:39 happening like the pilot that that we are still stable

7:42 that the approach is stabilized that we are aiming towards

7:45 the correct mark and as you touch down as pilot monitoring you

7:48 kind of change your gaze from outside to inside to verify

7:52 that you get things like the thrust reverses unlocked uh

7:55 that the speed is reducing as it should and then

7:57 calling down how much distance runway distance you have so on.

8:00 So that it's it's all a focus on just getting

8:02 the aircraft down where it's supposed to and initiate braking.

8:08 Right.

8:08 Now, there's some there's some interesting differences between the European

8:11 airspace that you and I fly in and and the states.

8:13 And I know from experience is that when you're in the UK Europe,

8:17 when you're coming into land,

8:18 when you are cleared to land, that runway is yours.

8:21 Nothing is allowed to enter that runway, cross it,

8:24 everything is holding short until you are clear.

8:27 Correct.

8:26 Either you're airborne or you're down and vacated.

8:29 In the States, the rules are slightly different in that you can be number two,

8:33 three, or four on the approach and be cleared to land in sequence.

8:36 So, the rules are slightly different.

8:38 For those of you in the states, obviously that will make more sense to you.

8:41 But for those of us listening in Europe going, "Okay,

8:43 how does that happen?" Well,

8:44 it's just a different set, different mindset, different rules.

8:46 So, it's probably worth mentioning that.

8:48 Um, but yeah, once we, you know, as from a pilot's perspective,

8:51 coming into land on a busy runway at night, there are is a sea of lights.

8:56 So, I know a lot of people have asked me, well,

8:58 how come the crew didn't see the fire crew coming onto the runway and so on?

9:02 Well, they may have done, but by the time they did,

9:04 it would have inevitably been too late.

9:06 And we'll talk about what too late means from our perspective.

9:10 But if you're strapped in that aircraft at night coming into land,

9:13 you are focused, as Peter said, on the landing itself.

9:15 And it is a sea of lights, lots of flashing lights, lots of different colors.

9:19 We're not looking to maneuver our aircraft away from a collision at that point.

9:22 That's not on our minds at that point.

9:24 um you know if we see something of course

9:25 we will react to it but that's very unusual.

9:28 So talking about avoiding ped what's the latest

9:31 point we can do something about that?

9:34 So we can do a go around all the way up until we we select our trust robusters.

9:40 So if we do a go around further out,

9:42 I mean I did a a short here on Metrop Pilot about

9:46 a um a close call in New York that happened last Thursday actually

9:50 where a a 737 Max went around just 250300 ft over a trip

9:56 7 that landed on a crossing runway is also a close call.

9:59 We'll get back to that.

10:00 But if you do a normal goaround, that's just another day at work.

10:04 It's just toga go around flap 15 set go around trust post rate gear

10:08 up 400 ft lnab and it it's just something that is ingrained in the bank.

10:13 It's it's a no.

10:14 I mean it doesn't happen very often but we are well trained for that.

10:18 Now you can also do something called a bulked

10:21 landing and that is a little bit different.

10:23 That's something that we don't do very often.

10:25 And so what's bulked landing?

10:27 So a bulked landing is a is a is it's a bit

10:30 like a goaround but it's typically after you've touched the ground.

10:34 So the difference primarily is where our speed

10:37 will be in relation to our approach speed.

10:39 So if we've touched down as we enter what we call the flare,

10:42 we bleed a little bit of speed off

10:43 the aircraft to touch down around our minimum,

10:46 our VREF, we call it our approach speed.

10:48 And as soon as we touched down, we can be below that approach, that speed.

10:51 So what we've got to be mindful of, if we

10:53 just advance the thrust levers and go into our standard goaround,

10:57 we're going to be retracting flaps.

10:58 Now, if we're retracting flaps and our speed is below our approach speed,

11:02 we get into a low speed regime.

11:04 We get closer to a stall than we would like to be.

11:07 So, we do a slightly different goaround

11:10 procedure in that we will still press toer.

11:12 We will still advance the thrust levers to go around thrust.

11:14 We will gently pitch the nose up to around 15°, maybe a little bit below that.

11:19 And then we wait for our speed to get above our VRF, our approach speed.

11:24 Once our speed's above the VREF,

11:25 we can then go into our standard goaround calls.

11:27 Flat 15, start retracting flaps, getting the gear up and climbing away.

11:31 So, it's more of a kind of a methodical process to ensure that our speed is

11:36 not too low before we start retracting flaps

11:38 and the aircraft is pointing in the right direction.

11:41 Yeah.

11:41 But that means that if even if you have touchdown on the runway,

11:44 you can still go around for that point

11:45 providing that you haven't selected the trust reverses.

11:48 Now, we select the trust reverses within seconds.

11:50 Literally, you have you have main gear touchdown.

11:53 Soon as you have main gear touchdown, you concentrate on landing the nose wheel,

11:56 but you're also selecting reverse thrust,

11:58 which is these little levers that are normally in front of the thrust levers,

12:03 kind of connected to the same levers, and you raise them up.

12:06 Now, what that does is that it initiates um a hydraulic

12:09 sequence that kind of locks the engines in idle power.

12:14 It starts opening the the reverse sleeves,

12:16 moving back in order to facilitate the reverse thrust.

12:19 And once that is done,

12:20 then you can start to pull the the reverse trust device up,

12:23 which will then give you reverse trust.

12:25 But that sequence takes a few seconds.

12:28 So if you've initiated that and then you need to get forward trust again to go

12:32 around that takes a lot of time and it's too much time to do a safe goound.

12:37 So we always teach people that once you have selected the trust of ourselves,

12:41 you are committed to that landing

12:44 and this is very likely what has happened here.

12:48 they would have touched down, taken the reverses before they realized

12:50 that this this fire truck was coming across the runway.

12:53 So, what's then, you know,

12:56 we would we've already gotten some questions about like can you not swerve?

13:01 Can you not move like if you're if you're a car,

13:03 you can swerve with your steering wheel like so so what would it be for us?

13:07 You can there is there's a very very limited ability for us to maneuver.

13:10 We have uh directional control on the ground of course

13:13 and and that's primarily by the use of our rudder pedals.

13:15 use our feet on the ground which controls the nose wheel

13:18 but at higher speeds where this crew was at the time

13:20 is also directly linked to the rudder right at the back

13:23 the vertical stabilizer and that creates a yoring effect on the aircraft.

13:27 Now of course we can control the aircraft direction

13:29 using that but there's other things to consider here.

13:31 A they may have only seen the aircraft infringing on the runway

13:35 very last minute in which case a collision is almost unavoidable.

13:39 B aircraft are wide.

13:40 I mean the aircraft eye flow has a it's a wingspan of 36 m.

13:44 It's big.

13:46 So just because if I swerve a little bit and I miss it like I might do in a car,

13:49 I've still got a huge wing and engine hanging out on my right

13:51 side that would still be a collision and that wing is full of fuel.

13:55 So the the other thing to bear in mind

13:58 is we have other aircraft holding adjacent to the runway.

14:02 A parallel taxiways that are very close to the runway.

14:04 So if we start swerving off a runway to avoid a firetruck,

14:07 obviously I don't know what was there on that day,

14:09 but there's likely other aircraft and vehicles around that could

14:12 be also equally if not more so a threat.

14:15 So it's not as simple as we would be in a in a car.

14:18 No, absolutely not.

14:20 In like a worst case scenario, the the what would actually cause less death

14:24 in a in something like this would probably be what happened here,

14:27 which is a head-on collision.

14:29 uh that does doesn't involve I mean the aircraft obviously

14:33 took up a lot of the um of the forces

14:35 here seems like the fire firefighters were injured

14:38 but okay and the vast majority of passengers were okay.

14:42 So as sad as it is, this was probably out

14:44 of all the bad outcomes that had come the the best outcome.

14:48 Um it from a collision because like if you would take the wing um

14:52 the there's also a high likelihood that the aircraft

14:55 can do what's called a ground roll,

14:56 which is when it just swobbles around and then

14:58 it can flip over and turn into a fireball,

15:01 which is also a really really bad outcome.

15:03 So these pilots probably had a split second and most likely no

15:09 way of avoiding it or choosing what was going to happen, right?

15:15 And and I want to really emphasize this.

15:16 Obviously, we're still waiting for a for for NTSB's full briefing on it,

15:22 but if these pilots came in and they

15:24 were clear to land and they heard nothing else, there was nothing they could do.

15:29 No.

15:29 So I think from a pilot's perspective that that kind of clears that up.

15:34 But Pedro, I know you've got experience

15:35 from a past life as a airport firefighter.

15:38 So maybe you can give an insight into into that mindset.

15:41 Yeah, absolutely.

15:41 So I was a airport firefighter for a couple of years uh during

15:44 my military service which means that it was a good 20 years ago now.

15:49 Um but what I can tell you is that there's

15:53 a a couple of things that you need to keep in mind here.

15:56 As a firefighter, I was completely and utterly focused on the task at hand.

16:01 So, if I got called out, a this was almost midnight,

16:05 so there's a high or a possibility at least that some of the crew were sleeping.

16:10 And if they were, this messed that they

16:12 would have been woken up by an alarm clock

16:14 and they then have 90 seconds to move from where

16:18 they are to the end of the runway, right?

16:20 That that's the rule.

16:21 90 seconds is what you have,

16:22 which means that you the amount of adrenaline that comes up is immense.

16:27 And you jump in, you have all of your your firefighting gear prepared for you.

16:30 So, you jump into your boots, you pull up your your pants,

16:33 you put on your jacket, you take your firefighting uh breathing apparatus,

16:37 if if you are one of the firefighters that's going to go into the aircraft,

16:40 or if you're a driver,

16:41 you just jump into the to the driver's seat and off you go.

16:45 Right now, what you can hear clearly

16:48 from the ground frequencies is that this this crew, the firefighting crew,

16:52 they asked, they said that they were approaching,

16:54 they asked if they could cross run with Z4.

16:57 They got clearance to cross runway with 04.

16:59 They read back that clearance.

17:01 So, they were completely they do they did exactly what they were supposed to.

17:06 They were attending to a something that was happening

17:09 on the on the other side of the field.

17:10 That's where their focus were.

17:12 So what happened here, if you're listening to the ATC tapes,

17:16 which will inevitably be in all social media now, is that the controller,

17:20 which by the way was the same controller

17:22 on the ground frequency and on the tower frequency.

17:26 That happens sometimes.

17:27 We're going to talk more about that when we talk about air traffic control,

17:29 but he initiated like he almost immediately

17:34 realized the mistake that had been made.

17:36 But there is a there's one really important thing.

17:39 If you listen to the tapes,

17:40 you'll hear that he clears the fire engine one to cross runway 04.

17:46 Then he says stop to a flight that is on the taxi way.

17:51 Then he says stop um fire engine one.

17:55 Now, the fact that he first contacted a flight

17:58 that another aircraft that was taxiing on the far taxiway,

18:03 that probably meant that whoever was holding the radio in the fire

18:07 truck wouldn't thought that he was talking still to that to that flight.

18:12 Like I would I would probably do.

18:14 And also, you have to remember that while we pilots are

18:17 really really focused on how dangerous a runway crossing can be,

18:21 like we we will only listen to air traffic control.

18:24 We know that this is a dangerous situation.

18:28 We do something called a two-phase call which

18:30 is where we ask for permission to cross.

18:34 We get permission to cross.

18:36 The pilot flying then asks the pilot monitoring confirm your clearance just

18:41 to hear that they have heard the same clearance as we have.

18:44 And then we do left clear, right clear and then we cross.

18:50 Right?

18:50 That's the procedure that every pilot do.

18:52 a fire engine, not so much.

18:55 Right?

18:56 You you would do make sure that you have your clearance to cross,

18:58 but once you have the clearance to cross,

19:00 your focus will probably be jumping back onto the task at hand.

19:04 You know, is there going to be injuries?

19:06 Am I going to have to do some firefighting?

19:08 Where I'm going to be positioning my truck.

19:10 These kind of things would come up because that's their job.

19:12 Remember, while our job as pilots is to get the aircraft safely from A to B,

19:16 their job is to to make sure that everyone

19:18 else is safe when something has already happened.

19:21 So they are likely going to be focusing on that.

19:25 So once they have a clearance,

19:27 I would say that there was just pedal to the metal

19:29 trying to get across that runway as quickly as possible.

19:32 When the air traffic controller told the other

19:34 flight to stop that was probably just stored ahead,

19:38 you know, stored somewhere in the back of of the driver's mind.

19:41 And when the controller then went back and said, "Engine one, stop.

19:44 Stop." It's very likely that they either didn't even

19:48 hear it or definitely didn't think it was for them.

19:51 So, you can see how these the Swiss cheese layers start one

19:57 by one to have these holes lining up one after the after the other

20:03 and it is just super super sad like from everyone involved

20:09 in this this is just a a tragedy through and through.

20:14 Yeah.

20:14 But but I know also that I because it was 20 years since I did this.

20:17 So I know you have a you have a custom that works in Heathrow.

20:21 Correct.

20:21 Yeah.

20:22 Yeah.

20:22 Had a good chat with one of my family members who's a firefighter at a major

20:27 London airport and it was really interesting to get

20:29 an insight into their SOPs and their procedures.

20:31 And obviously this is UK compared to the states different SOPs potentially

20:35 but um he gave me a really good insight into what their procedures are.

20:38 Now they're busy.

20:40 So interestingly, they were dealing with the opposite side.

20:44 I was thinking, you know, startle effect of the crew of the fire crew.

20:47 You know, adrenaline, they're surprised, they're sleepy.

20:51 He he was almost saying the opposite.

20:53 They get 1,600 callouts a year at this airport.

20:56 A lot of them are very very minor.

20:59 So they there's almost the opposite effect

21:00 where they've got to deal with complacency.

21:02 Yeah.

21:02 Yeah.

21:02 It's just another call out.

21:03 It's going to be minor.

21:04 It's fine.

21:05 So that that's one of their challenges, which is interesting.

21:08 But um yeah, they have very similar SOPs in fact

21:11 to what we use when we're flying with a few differences.

21:14 Now, whenever they're getting called out

21:16 and they're they're going they're not just freeranging,

21:17 but they're crossing runways.

21:18 They have a sterile cab uh protocol.

21:22 So, a bit like we have in the flight crew and that there

21:24 is no nonoperational chatter in the cab when they're crossing runways.

21:29 Um all crew should be listening to the clearance.

21:31 So, they have it on speaker because the the crew

21:33 the the trucks are obviously full of full of crew.

21:35 They should all be listening.

21:37 Um, and now there is I asked whether there was a a a deliberate

21:41 cross check once they've been cleared to to cross a runway.

21:43 The first one obviously is does the has the stop bar gone?

21:47 Because we have these red lights that basically like

21:49 traffic lights that are across the the taxi way

21:51 and they like cats eyes we have on a motorway

21:53 that are electronic but they are controlled by the tower.

21:57 So if you see a red line across the the uh taxi way in front of you,

22:01 even if you're clear to line up,

22:02 you do not cross that stop bar and that applies to them.

22:05 they will not cross that stop bar until it

22:08 has been taken away and the lights turn off.

22:10 That's one of them.

22:12 There is a a visual check.

22:13 They should check left and right,

22:15 but it's not so much of a a two-face call how we would do it.

22:19 It's a kind of a look and then they go.

22:22 Um, and this may be something that's implemented now where there

22:24 is a deliberate multi- crew involvement with this that's verbalized possibly.

22:29 Uh, who knows?

22:30 But that that's not done.

22:32 Um, but the interesting thing was like you said why

22:35 they didn't read back the stop and it's probably the human

22:37 factors where they heard the other aircraft first that made

22:40 the switch in their brain that the stop is for them.

22:42 The rest of it was ignored.

22:44 But there he did mention that in the states

22:46 he's aware that there are single crew fire trucks going

22:50 across the airport which may or may not have

22:53 been the case but in the UK it's not allowed.

22:57 Yeah.

22:56 I mean because I was thinking about something as well.

22:59 I remember from when when I was a firefighter that we had also internal coms

23:03 as in you you had um radio contact

23:06 with the tower obviously for crossing and getting access

23:09 to the maneuver area but but you also had contact with the other firefighters uh

23:14 with the other crew doing radio checks making

23:17 sure that you could communicate when you get there.

23:19 So there's a possibility that there was a lot

23:21 of things going on inside of these cars.

23:23 But again, these are kind of the things that we're waiting for the NTSB

23:26 report to to full because now luckily it looks like the firefighters were okay.

23:31 So they will be able to to give statements

23:33 about exactly what was going on inside of the car.

23:36 Now I'm seeing some some messages in the chat.

23:38 We are monitoring the chat by the way.

23:40 We are going to get to questions soon.

23:41 Um I'm seeing some of them talking about this being fog.

23:44 It was not fog from what I can see.

23:46 the it was a little bit rainy, but it was four statute miles of visibility.

23:50 So, it was it was not uh foggy and generally pretty okay like four statute miles

23:58 seems to be the the worst visibility that was um that was given on the day.

24:02 So, I don't think that that would have been a factor here.

24:05 But let's let's talk about air traffic control.

24:11 Yeah.

24:10 Um so, what what what's your things what's your thoughts here?

24:15 I I mean the first thought was what you mentioned right

24:17 at the beginning Ped where it was a single potentially a single controller.

24:21 We don't know that but as you said

24:23 the controller's voice was controlling the approach and the ground.

24:25 Now to put some context on this normally

24:28 the workload is spread amongst multiple controllers.

24:30 So on a busy day in a busy airport

24:32 you'd have one controller issuing clearances to the aircraft

24:35 which will be uh standard air traffic control

24:37 clearances which is why the aircraft are on stand.

24:40 So we when we going to a destination we have to get out airways clearance.

24:43 There'll be one controller for that.

24:45 Once you've uh get ready to push back and start engines,

24:48 you'll be transferred to ground.

24:49 They control everything that's moving on the ground.

24:52 Push back, start, taxi, taxi in, taxi out.

24:54 You'll speak to them.

24:55 Once you're approaching the runway to either cross a runway,

24:58 depart, uh or to depart, you'll be handed over to the tower,

25:01 which controls the runway and everything going in and out of that runway.

25:08 Now, it's not unusual to have one controller doing

25:11 all of that, but only when the workload is low.

25:13 So, if I call for my clearance and it's

25:15 5:00 in the morning with the first flight out,

25:18 there'll only be one controller on because there's nothing else is going on.

25:21 But if I if it was the middle of a rush hour and a busy airport in London,

25:24 you would not expect to hear one airport.

25:26 Now, I'm not saying this was rush hour.

25:28 I don't know what the I mean,

25:29 11:40 at night in a big base in the UK, that would be busy.

25:33 I don't know whether that's the same case in Laguad.

25:35 I don't know.

25:36 But what I do feel for this pilot, if if his workload was high,

25:40 bearing in mind that he's already dealing with an emergency now,

25:44 sorry, the controller, sorry, he's already dealing with a an emergency.

25:48 There's aircraft coming into land.

25:50 There's an aircraft that just rejected a takeoff.

25:51 There's fire crew calling them.

25:53 Human beings, we've got a a maximum capacity that we can deal with.

25:56 We have a limit.

25:57 And if you're put into a scenario where you shouldn't

25:59 be in because there should have been another staff member there,

26:03 I feel for that controller because they're going to be putting a lot

26:06 of blame on themselves when in fact if that is the case,

26:09 it's not entirely on them by any stretch of the imagination

26:12 because you shouldn't be in that scenario in the first place.

26:14 No.

26:14 And I think that is this is a really really important point.

26:18 First of all, um we don't know right now how many people were in the tower.

26:22 We don't know if he was alone.

26:23 We don't know anything really.

26:25 We we just know that the that he talked to both of these vehicles.

26:28 That that's that's all I know that he he gave the clearance to cross.

26:31 He there could have been a ground control as well,

26:33 but that he gave the clearance to cross to the fire truck.

26:36 We don't know, right?

26:37 So, this is one of the things that we're just going to have to wait

26:39 for the NTSB report and it's probably going

26:41 to come information pretty quickly in this case around this.

26:45 But the other thing that I really want to emphasize here

26:48 is that we as human beings have a tendency to want

26:50 to find scapegoats and want to find someone that we can

26:53 point a finger to saying you it's your fault that this happened.

26:57 But reality is much more complex than that.

27:00 And I think that once this com once the final report comes out,

27:04 which is going to be likely in a year or so from now,

27:08 it's going to point to all of the other things that are going on right now,

27:12 which is um we know that the FAA have had problem

27:15 staffing towers and and especially control centers, but towers as well.

27:19 So, we know that they're lacking personnel.

27:21 There's been some other closed calls and I've talked about

27:25 that on this channel and on mentor now several times saying that you

27:29 know these closed calls that are coming that you know it

27:33 was someone was called for a go around just last second like

27:36 what happened last Thursday there's only so many that can happen

27:39 before something happens right so we as an industry need to come

27:43 together and understand why are these things happening why is the safety

27:47 protocols that we have put in place you know being passed through?

27:51 Why are the barriers being passed through?

27:54 So I think that I would I would

27:56 at this point absolutely not blame a single like person.

28:00 Uh I would go in and think what is the system issue here?

28:06 What has allowed it to come to this point?

28:09 And I mean, we can already start drawing some parallels to the horrible

28:13 um inflight um midair collision that happened in DC was last year.

28:20 No, it was actually in December in 2024.

28:24 Um where we now have the final report and the final

28:27 report says that the the tower controller that was handling it

28:30 was handling both helicopter traffic and fixed wing traffic at the same

28:34 time and that that had an impact on their situational awareness.

28:38 Right?

28:38 So we we we have some precedents here for similar accident.

28:42 Now I'm not saying that there's a lot of parallels here,

28:45 but we have a traffic control involved in both cases.

28:48 So I I really feel for the air traffic controller.

28:52 I can't imagine how he's feeling right now.

28:56 Uh horrible.

28:58 It's a horrible, like I said,

28:58 it's a horrible horrible thing all through and true.

29:01 So basically what I want to do before we start getting into answering

29:05 questions here is talk a little bit about what we think could be

29:10 the solution here like what will be what what will be coming out

29:14 of this once we get the final report what will the recommendations likely be?

29:17 M well as I alluded to earlier possibly as multiple

29:23 areas to look at from a fire crews perspective.

29:25 I wouldn't be surprised if a more procedural

29:27 response to crossing runways is put in place universally,

29:30 not just airport to airport because

29:32 I know different airports have different procedures,

29:34 but it would be nice to see a standardized procedures

29:37 put in place where crossing a runway is a serious

29:40 scenario that needs to have the respect of everybody involved

29:44 and we don't cross runways until certain criteria have been met.

29:47 Whether that's they have to stop at the stop bar, they have to read it back.

29:51 More than one person has to listen to it,

29:53 there needs to be a visual confirmation

29:54 left and right followed by a verbal confirmation.

29:58 So everything is being done that's possible to ensure they're

30:01 not going to go into the path of an aircraft.

30:04 Yeah.

30:04 Particularly at nighttime,

30:05 particularly in low viz transponders on the ground equipment.

30:08 I'm sure that I know in the UK they have them.

30:10 I would would not be surprised if they do,

30:13 but that's probably going to be of little use on a runway crossing.

30:17 Yeah.

30:18 No, absolutely.

30:19 And I think there's going to be something like that because um like

30:22 a two-face call for the fire crews would be an easy thing to implement, right?

30:27 Because that that that would have been something

30:29 that would have even if they were clear to cross,

30:31 if they would have looked in this case to the right

30:33 and seen the the uh the landing lights from the CRJ,

30:36 that could have gotten them to stop.

30:38 But for one reason or another,

30:40 maybe because of the city lights in the background again,

30:43 um they didn't see it or they didn't look right.

30:46 So we something like that is likely going to come out of it.

30:48 But then I really think that we are going to see um so a lot of criticism

30:53 and potential changes being just aimed at the FA

30:57 and the staffing levels and the towers.

31:01 I'm I'm pretty sure that at the end of it it's

31:03 going to something like that is going to come out of it.

31:05 Um, yeah, because because like you said,

31:08 it's if you know this wouldn't have been at the very top of the workload either.

31:14 Like it was a high workload for the air traffic controller

31:16 because of what happened with the RTO on the other runway,

31:18 but it wouldn't have been that much traffic coming in.

31:21 Uh, having said that though, should how many should be in a tower cabin?

31:27 Like should there be an should be a one extra?

31:32 Yeah, who knows?

31:32 These are the kind of things that the NTSB and its

31:34 investigators is going to be looking at and coming with um

31:37 with their recommendations for which is why I I really

31:41 and thoroughly hope that you continue to to monitor the official channels.

31:47 Um there's going to be a lot of chatter as it always is.

31:50 This accident is less is more clearcut than for example

31:54 the area in the accident that we talked about.

31:56 Um I think was that our last live stream or did we do one?

31:59 No, we did the MD11.

32:00 We had an MD11 as well and they both

32:02 of those were like we have no idea what happened here

32:05 like there's something happened with the engine or something happened

32:09 with both engines in case of Air India in this case

32:12 we kind of see what happened like they were clear to cross they were

32:16 clear to land at the same time and they collided right so now it's it's

32:19 more about discussing what the background root

32:23 cause to that actually is and to make sure that there are safeguards being put

32:29 in place so that it doesn't happen again

32:32 because it's worth remembering that this is

32:33 not the first time this has happened.

32:35 This has happened before and if things don't change it will happen again

32:38 and the last time it happened I believe was in South America with the LATAM 320.

32:42 Yeah, correct.

32:43 That and that was just a year or so ago

32:46 that was it that during takeoff or landing in that case that was during takeoff.

32:50 Uh and it was I believe if my memory serves me correctly it was a a drill.

32:54 It wasn't even a real call out, but the fire crew uh yeah zoomed across

32:58 the runway in front of a oncoming aircraft.

33:01 Again, there were no procedures in place to cross

33:03 an active runway and that's what led to it.

33:05 So, something needs to change.

33:07 Yeah, absolutely.

33:08 And as you know, just to continue on from that, let's

33:12 go into the chat and see if anyone have any any questions.

33:17 Um so, we just got a super chat from Tucson Dancer.

33:20 Thank you very much.

33:21 It really really helps.

33:22 Thank you all by the way for supporting the channel and coming

33:25 here and watching us and when these kind of things happens.

33:28 But Tus dancer is saying I feel so sorry for the controller having

33:31 to live with the horror of this event is going to be extremely difficult.

33:34 Uh I hope he gets support.

33:35 Current USA situation contributes to the Swiss cheese.

33:38 I feel exactly the same.

33:40 I I I my heart goes out to of course the the families of the victims

33:45 and everyone that was involved in this flight

33:46 and all of the ones that were hurt,

33:48 but also to the controller that was involved because it

33:51 I can't like it's it's just it blows my it's horrible.

33:55 Yeah.

33:56 Yeah.

33:56 So, absolutely.

33:58 Did you see any interesting question then?

34:01 Uh I I saw some just coming so quickly,

34:03 but I saw some coming in about how come there were no stop bars.

34:06 Well, that's a good question.

34:07 But stop bars, if they were cleared to cross the runway,

34:08 the stop bars would have been taken down.

34:10 So, that would not have pre prevented this from happening.

34:14 So, uh would stop bars override a verbal clearance?

34:17 Yes, they would.

34:18 So, I had a scenario the other day, actually,

34:20 where I was cleared to line up on a runway.

34:22 Beautiful day, but stop bars were still red.

34:24 We stay put.

34:25 We confirmed, could they get rid of the stop bars, and they went, "Yeah,

34:28 I have." And I went, "No,

34:29 they haven't." And they they had to send out a ranger vehicle.

34:32 They wouldn't allow us or we wouldn't

34:33 cross the stop bar without without that going.

34:38 Yeah.

34:37 They wouldn't allow us to stop a crop cross bar without that going.

34:40 So what they did is they sent out a follow me like

34:41 a yellow ranger vehicle to go in front of us and marshall us across.

34:45 That's how strict these procedures are so that we don't fall

34:49 into a lull into a full sense of security with it.

34:52 Absolutely.

34:52 And it should be and like a stop part you just do not cross.

34:55 It's the it's the golden rule of of runway incursions that you

34:59 never do it no matter how much traffic control said, "Yeah, just fine."

35:02 Because it it that starts building complacency then and there's

35:05 going to be like the next time it's like, "Ah, I'm sure it was broken last time.

35:08 Let's just cross it." Yeah, exactly.

35:10 You can see it happening already.

35:12 And me who's reading hundreds of of accident reports per year, it just echoes

35:20 bad.

35:20 Yeah.

35:20 So, someone is asking here.

35:22 I'm guessing that ground vehicles don't have voice recorders.

35:24 And as far as I know, they don't.

35:26 At least when I was a firefighter, we didn't have any voice recorders in it.

35:30 Um, I mean, it would be a good idea to kind

35:33 of have not not only voice recorders in the cab,

35:36 but also the internal coms between firefighters

35:39 because I think that would be helpful.

35:42 But at the moment, as far as I know, it's not being recorded.

35:46 I don't know.

35:46 Nope.

35:48 Um, let's see if there's anything else here.

35:50 this you're very engaging.

35:52 I love that we try to stay clear of politics

35:54 in the comments please because it doesn't move us anywhere.

35:57 The only thing that we are here for is

35:58 root cause analysis and and trying to make aviation safer.

36:03 Um there's a lot of people saying that ATC is understaffed.

36:05 This is something that we've covered on mentor

36:07 now a lot you know and the reasons why

36:11 they're understaffed which is something that has nothing

36:13 to do with the current administration or the previous administration.

36:16 goes all the way back to I think the Reagan years

36:20 like the Reagan administration actually was the one

36:23 that kicked off the current agency controller crisis.

36:26 Yeah.

36:27 So if you want to learn more about that, go

36:28 and check out mentor now because it's a fascinating story.

36:31 But you know, lo and behold, things will have consequences.

36:36 If you, for example, fire all all air traffic controller at once

36:39 and then rehire new ones at a certain date, which is what happened,

36:43 you're going to have a wave of them retiring at the same time.

36:47 And you lo and behold, I saw a good question there, Peter,

36:50 about in the event that an aircraft you has

36:54 an an an scenario and the pilots are incapacitated,

36:57 who initiates the evacuation?

37:00 Say again.

37:01 So if there's a scenario where both pilots are uh incapacitated in any way,

37:06 who initiates the evacuation?

37:07 Because normally the pilots would initiate the evacuation.

37:09 They would give the command.

37:11 In the in the absence of that, how does that work?

37:13 Yeah.

37:14 So um the the cabin crew are allowed

37:17 to initiate the evacuation under a couple of strict circumstances

37:20 and those include for example that the aircraft is obviously

37:24 in a in a strange angle right which it was here.

37:27 So and by the way I want to cover that as well.

37:29 So since the the collision completely destroyed the front

37:32 of the aircraft the aircraft was initially pitching down.

37:36 It was lying on what was left the husk of the uh of the body.

37:40 So they would have a felt the impact badly and then it would have been smoke,

37:46 it would have been black, it would have been in a different position.

37:49 And in that kind of um condition, aircraft, sorry,

37:52 the uh flight cabin crew are allowed to initiate the evacuation.

37:57 But there's also things like when they see fire and flames, they can do it.

38:01 If you land on water, they can do it.

38:04 And sounds of the aircraft breaking up, which they would have heard.

38:08 Which they would have heard.

38:09 So the there are clear I mean basically the only

38:12 time that they won't initiate an evacuation by themselves

38:14 is if the aircraft just stops and they hear

38:17 nothing and there's nothing wrong then they will wait

38:20 and they will hold the passenger seated because maybe

38:23 the pilots are working through checklists and are too

38:25 busy to say something at that point but if

38:28 anything life-threatening is clearly seen the evacuation will be initiated.

38:32 Um but what I wanted to get to is that once this aircraft had

38:37 um had evacuated well then it pitched up and sat down on its back.

38:42 So the pictures that you see now floating through social media is

38:45 of the aircraft sitting on its back but it didn't do that during the evacuation.

38:49 Obviously it will do that when everyone is

38:52 off and the weight distribution now has no nose.

38:56 So nose is gone.

38:57 Then because of weight of the center of gravity normalness of the wing,

39:01 it now moves behind the wing

39:02 and the aircraft sits back and that's what happened.

39:07 Yeah.

39:09 Yeah.

39:08 Great.

39:09 Anything else?

39:10 Uh people are talking about the stench in the in the United

39:13 aircraft and why they would call for that.

39:15 That doesn't really matter.

39:17 like they are they are within their right if they've

39:20 done a rejected takeoff and they feel that there's fumes

39:22 or something on board they are well within their right

39:24 to u to ask for help and to initiate an evacuation

39:28 so in no way shape or form is this going

39:31 to come back to the um the United when you

39:35 start seeing how an accident happens it always initiates somewhere

39:39 right and the initiation point here was the rejected takeoff

39:43 and then all of the things that happened after that is just

39:48 serendipity and um and really really really bad luck in this case.

39:54 Yeah.

39:55 Yeah.

39:55 Anything else?

39:57 Um I'm seeing lots of why didn't they go around?

39:59 We kind of covered that why they didn't go around.

40:01 It was far too late.

40:02 Um similarly with transponders.

40:04 Could the transponders like some form of TAS have prevented this?

40:08 Not on the ground.

40:09 Um, and I think the issue with this we've got

40:12 to remember is it develops so rapidly from an aircraft

40:14 from the the fire truck being behind the stop

40:16 bar to being in front of an aircraft is seconds.

40:19 Seconds.

40:20 The pilots could have done nothing about that and very unlikely that the crew

40:23 could have done by the time they realized what they had done.

40:26 Um, so yeah, transponders not so good at this point.

40:31 No.

40:31 Okay.

40:32 What we're going to do now is I I don't think that there's like we've we've

40:36 told you what what we know so far

40:38 and what our thoughts initial thoughts are about it.

40:40 Obviously, this is developing story.

40:42 So, uh I have released a short that gives

40:45 a little bit of graphics about what happened.

40:47 It's on mental pilot right now.

40:48 We are going to be continuing to release shorts

40:50 if we find that there's new information coming out.

40:53 Uh until then, this will probably be an a full video

40:58 at some point in the future when we have the final report.

41:00 But as always, I encourage you to listen to official sources first

41:05 to avoid listening to whatever bots might be creating on various social media.

41:11 So, you know, sources like Reuters, for example,

41:13 is a good place to go to before the so

41:16 the the officials comes out because it's good journalism generally.

41:20 Um, but I we will be following up

41:24 and for those of you who are waiting for the mentor now release,

41:27 we're releasing it right after this live stream.

41:29 So, if you want to see,

41:31 it has nothing to do with what we're talking about today,

41:32 but there's a different Mentor now video coming out

41:34 now about a system that actually might make aviation safer.

41:38 It's it's quite interesting.

41:39 But for now, any ending words then?

41:42 No, not at all.

41:43 Um, yeah, it was thanks for all the questions everybody.

41:45 Hopefully, this has cleared up some of the questions you have and uh yeah,

41:49 better have a good rest of the day.

41:51 Yeah, everyone out there, thank you very much for interacting.

41:54 Have a nice continuation of the day and we'll see you next time.

41:57 Bye-bye.

41:57 Take care.