US troop withdrawal: A turning point for Europe? | To the Point

0:00 Fewer US troops and no tomahawks for Germany.

0:04 The American president is sending a clear message to Europe.

0:08 The trigger, it seems, was criticism from German Chancellor Fred Matz,

0:13 who accused Washington of lacking a strategy in the Iran war.

0:17 Matts tried to play down the planned troop withdrawal, saying is nothing new.

0:21 Others, however, are sounding the alarm,

0:23 especially without the promised cruise missiles.

0:27 Experts warn of a dangerous gap in Europe's defenses

0:30 at a moment it wants and needs to project strength.

0:33 Once again, the call is growing louder.

0:35 Europe must become more independent

0:38 from the United States militarily and economically.

0:42 But is that realistic?

0:43 Onto the point we ask, is the US troop withdrawal a turning point for Europe?

1:00 Welcome to To the Point.

1:02 I'm Nicole Freri in Berlin and I'm pleased to introduce today's panel.

1:06 I'm joined by Rachel Tausenfind a foreign policy

1:10 analyst with a German council on foreign relations.

1:13 Brendan Bourne is with us.

1:15 He's with Abatas Munchfung's Europe program where he focuses

1:18 on transatlantic trade and security

1:20 cooperation and military and security analyst.

1:23 Gustaf Kaso joins us via video link from Vienna.

1:27 We appreciate you all joining us today.

1:30 Rachel, I want to start with you.

1:32 How did we get here?

1:34 This isn't just about a remark the chancellor

1:38 made in a school in rural Germany, is it?

1:41 No.

1:41 I mean, the remark was not helpful.

1:43 Not only did he say the US has no strategy, he used the word humiliated,

1:46 which is not a word anyone likes to hear

1:48 and certainly not a word that Donald Trump likes to hear.

1:51 So, that was um not a good choice.

1:53 But the actual policy or the um decision to withdraw 5,000 troops,

1:58 this was probably something that has been planned.

2:01 Um there's been talk a long time for since this Trump administration

2:05 got started that you're going to see a reduction of troops in Europe.

2:08 5,000 is in the context of what might be possible, not that high of a number.

2:12 So, I think yes, this was in the in the planning and Trump is just now using

2:17 this as an excuse or as a kind of opportunity to make it look like a punishment.

2:22 Yeah.

2:22 I want to look at Trump's reaction here, though.

2:25 Do you think, Brandon, that Trump's eye in a way proves Matt's right?

2:30 Well, I mean, I think there's proves right in what way, may I ask?

2:35 that this is um an operation without a plan and that he is in a way

2:41 leaving the US in a position that it doesn't really want to be in in Iran.

2:44 Well, well, sure.

2:45 I mean, I think it's it's a little bit difficult to square the circle

2:48 that you know the uh the president is of course in a difficult position.

2:52 He's backed himself into a corner with Iran.

2:54 It's having extreme domestic political consequences

2:56 as well leading into the midterms this year.

2:59 But um from a European perspective, you know,

3:01 it's difficult to, you know, I think from the president's perspective,

3:04 understand how the Europeans have left the United States out to dry when

3:08 they were never um consulted in the first place before this conflict began.

3:13 Gustaf, for many, many decades,

3:16 the US has been a partnered and a protector for Europe.

3:20 Are those times now over?

3:22 Is that a thing of the past?

3:25 Well, under Donald Trump, it's certainly a thing of the past.

3:28 And I think the Greenland episode was the final nail to that coffin.

3:33 Uh however, that doesn't preclude that any future American president will have

3:38 a different opinion on Europe uh and might play a more constructive role.

3:44 Um, we also have to concede that the US

3:47 uh is struggling uh in a world where its relative

3:52 power is shrinking and that regardless of the president

3:57 and the policy um the China threat will grow uh

4:02 and that basically this development will command a self-sufficiency

4:08 from the Europeans in terms of security and defense u

4:12 and now Trump is basically speaking out the the hard

4:16 words and and giving a lot of insults to that.

4:20 Uh but it's a strategic trend that will not be revoked with a new president.

4:25 Uh it will just be a kinder process and a bit more structured and planned

4:31 process of of shifting burdens to the Europeans as compared to what Trump does,

4:36 but it's irrevocable.

4:39 Brandon, you just published a study

4:41 on the state of the transatlantic relationship.

4:44 How bad is it?

4:45 Yeah, just this morning.

4:46 Uh, so, you know, the data gives us a relatively clear picture.

4:49 Um, the actions of this administration over the last 18 months have had a have

4:54 had a severe negative implication for the rec

4:57 uh the reputation of the United States, especially among Europeans.

5:01 73% of Europeans say that although the United

5:03 States and Europe have cooperated for decades,

5:06 it's time that Europe goes its own way.

5:08 Clear majorities distrust the United States as a partner.

5:11 And while 18 months ago, 51% of Europeans, a majority,

5:15 found the United States to be the most valuable ally of the European Union,

5:19 that's dropped by 20 percentage points in that time.

5:23 Before we keep talking about what that means for Europe,

5:27 for Ukraine, for the transatlantic friendship,

5:30 I want to take a closer look at Trump's threats

5:32 here because they're about more than just moving troops around.

5:36 This is very much a discussion about trust,

5:39 deterrence, and the future of the American security umbrella.

5:42 Trump already flirted with reducing the number of American

5:45 army personnel in Germany during his first term,

5:48 but now he might actually make it happen.

5:51 The US air base at Rammstein is

5:54 the largest American military installation in Europe

5:57 and serves as a central hub for US operations in the Middle East.

6:01 President Trump intends to withdraw 5,000 soldiers from Germany,

6:06 apparently including some from another base,

6:08 Vilsec in Bavaria, home to the US Army's largest training area outside the US.

6:14 Of roughly 86,000 US soldiers stationed across Europe,

6:19 almost 39,000 serve in Germany.

6:22 Their presence has been a pillar of security in the post 1945 order.

6:27 The US also appears to be reconsidering its earlier plan to station

6:31 Tomahawk cruise missiles in Germany

6:33 this year to bolster defenses against Russia.

6:37 Trump announced the decision after speaking with Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin.

6:42 He also appears to be weighing further troop withdrawals from Europe.

6:46 Why shouldn't, you know, look, why shouldn't I?

6:49 Uh, Italy has not been of any help to us, and Spain has been horrible.

6:57 Trump complained that while the United States

6:59 had helped Europeans defend Ukraine against Russia,

7:03 they had not done the same for the US in its war with Iran.

7:07 withdrawal instead of deterrence.

7:10 Trump's invitation to Putin.

7:16 That is a question I'd like to extend to Gustaf.

7:19 What does all of this mean for, you know, Germany,

7:22 for Europe, for NATO faced with a persistent threat from Russia?

7:29 Well, this the second cavalary regiment, that's not that big of a deal.

7:34 Uh but of course the Tomok story is significant in in the view

7:40 that it fits into a line of um US contracts that haven't been fulfilled.

7:47 It's not only Germany not getting its typhoon launches and Tomas.

7:51 Um Estonia doesn't get ammunition uh for him.

7:55 Uh there's a shortage of Patriot missiles.

7:57 Also Europeans want to replenish uh their arsenals.

8:01 So there is a sense in Europe that um first of course

8:07 the Trump administration is unreliable

8:09 but also that the defense industrial potential

8:12 of the US is much more limited than Europeans thought it would

8:17 be and that America is not the arsenal of democracy it once was.

8:22 Um we have to see that some of the discussions

8:25 during the Biden administration about

8:26 supplying certain weapon systems to Ukraine.

8:30 Uh there were not so much discussed as a sort of the German

8:35 way uh this will be a nuclear escalation if Biden would deliver ATMs etc.

8:40 It was a shortage of missiles and long production times

8:43 of of replacement issue uh that hindered the Biden administration back then.

8:48 So again, Europeans have a sense that here the era of of relying on the US

8:56 as the key provider for ammunition and technology has to come to an end.

9:01 Anyway, Rachel, what's the greater impact on, you know,

9:04 the European security architecture here?

9:07 We're hearing one word over and over or a phrase

9:11 over and over these days, the deterrence gap.

9:14 How important and how dangerous could that become for Europe?

9:19 The deterrence gap is the bigger problem than the 5,000.

9:22 I mean, as Gustaf said, first of all,

9:24 the tomahawks and the other uh weapon systems or munitions

9:27 that were supposed to be delivered that are not being delivered.

9:29 This is a kind of, you know, nuts and bolts capability deterrence gap,

9:34 but you also have the larger deterrence gap,

9:36 which is um the unreli unreliability of this president

9:40 and this administration in its commitment to European security.

9:44 So this is a sort of fundamental deterrence gap.

9:47 Um that said, I mean right now Putin is busy with uh Ukraine.

9:52 Um so Europe has some time and we

9:55 don't know what will happen in the next administration,

9:57 but absolutely uh deterrence,

9:59 transatlantic deterrence for European security is is weakened right now.

10:03 It's weakened and it's something that is weighing heavily

10:07 on the relation with you know between the US and Europe.

10:12 What is Donald Trump's message here?

10:15 I know you can't read his mind, but maybe you can tell us who his audience is.

10:19 Well, there's certainly certainly a domestic political audience here as well.

10:23 Of course, this is something that's been a relatively clear trend since

10:26 even his first administration that Europeans

10:28 are taking advantage of the United States.

10:29 They're not there when we need them.

10:31 Um, but as as Rachel said, you know,

10:33 this is this is a major hit to the United States that, you know,

10:38 I had a conversation with a US official yesterday who said,

10:40 "We are shooting ourselves in the foot here."

10:42 Um, Germany, maybe aside from the Korean Peninsula and Japan,

10:45 it's the foremost location for US power

10:47 projection abroad with a look to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa.

10:51 Um and when a decision like this is made,

10:54 I mean a troop withdrawal is one thing,

10:56 but when a decision is made in such a punitive emotional way,

11:00 this clearly sends a message not only to allies but adversaries

11:03 like Russia that US reliability and credibility is is in question.

11:08 Yeah.

11:08 Gustaf, the Ramstein air base was crucial in the US's war in Iran.

11:14 From a military standpoint,

11:16 how unwise is it to lower the number of troops stationed there?

11:20 Is it true as Brendan is suggesting

11:24 that the US is shooting itself in the foot here?

11:28 Well, they are politically.

11:29 Uh so these soldiers will not be withdrawn from from Rammstein.

11:32 Uh they're withdrawn from Bavaria from close to Graham training ground.

11:38 Um and uh and the issue is I mean yeah

11:42 Germany is the whole sort of the NATO infrastructure inside Europe.

11:47 You have a good infrastructure.

11:48 Rammstein is a big air base.

11:50 uh it has a permanent uh uh fuel pipeline connection to the Netherlands.

11:54 So you can you can orchestrate very

11:57 large highpace air operations from these air bases.

12:01 Uh they are important not only for Europe but also for the Middle East.

12:04 And as we have seen Trump at least he cares for Israel uh

12:07 and and if if you want to supply that country uh you go via Europe.

12:12 It actually was the same route by Europe that Israel was

12:15 supplied for example during the keeper war in the past etc.

12:18 and that geography doesn't change.

12:21 Um the the the second thing is of course that uh Trump or or the US

12:26 they have contracts with European countries that allow

12:31 this infrastructure to be used very freely.

12:34 Uh and if you want to relocate uh this infrastructure,

12:38 you have to renegotiate uh contracts with new

12:41 countries uh to place them and to use them.

12:43 and what are the terms and conditions uh the US would

12:46 have then to use the infrastructure they want to create elsewhere uh

12:50 and I really doubt they would get any better deal uh than

12:54 uh than from European countries during the 50s when these uh when

12:57 these contracts were negotiated um so indeed rattling this architecture is

13:03 a stupid thing from a US point of view uh what but one

13:07 has to say um 5,000 troops this is a more of a symbolic

13:11 thing uh and the big the big infrastructure hasn't been touched.

13:15 Neither Trump has abandoned one base nor did Germany, for example,

13:19 try to renegotiate or block the US from using these bases.

13:24 And there's a kind of underlying understanding that there will be

13:27 a US president after Trump and it might be a more reasonable one.

13:31 Uh and so it's in a mutual interest

13:33 of both countries that this infrastructure remains in place.

13:37 Uh whether of course it has strategic value for the Europeans,

13:40 that will depend on the next president and not this one.

13:45 Rachel Gustaf says it's a stupid move.

13:47 Um some members of the Republican party agree with this.

13:52 There has been vocal criticism especially of Donald Trump hinting

13:55 at the fact that he might withdraw more troops even from Germany.

14:00 So how's all of this going down with the US security establishment?

14:03 So the sort of traditional security establishment are the people

14:06 who are saying this is shooting us in the foot.

14:08 We need these assets.

14:09 They're very strategically relevant for you know

14:11 what we want to do in the world.

14:12 The United States wants to do in the world.

14:14 But there's absolutely a faction within the MAGA coalition.

14:18 And frankly there's also a democratic version of this uh thinking as well which

14:23 would like to see the US withdraw from this global role that it has.

14:29 Um and that would be a really fundamental shift.

14:31 So not sort of taking 10,000 soldiers away or doing something like, you know,

14:35 move the base from Germany to Poland,

14:37 which would cost billions of dollars and be really hard to explain,

14:40 but genuinely, you know, have a much smaller US army,

14:44 a much smaller global presence,

14:46 and invest all that money at home, for example, or lower taxes maybe.

14:50 So that faction is real.

14:52 Um, we might see that uh in a future US president.

14:56 I'm not sure.

14:56 I mean, it's possible.

14:58 Um, but that's then a really big shift, not 5,000.

15:00 and also not 20,000 soldiers.

15:03 Uh Brennan, we haven't talked about one player here and that is Ukraine.

15:09 What does, you know, even the discussion of a reduced US presence in Europe

15:15 mean for a country that is currently fighting a war,

15:19 a bitter war against Russia?

15:22 Well, I think the timing of this withdrawal also being around when

15:26 Trump had a 90-minute conversation with Putin is certainly not a good look.

15:29 And that's uh I don't I don't think that conversation

15:32 and the decisions that were made even though you know

15:34 they were likely in a shlada in the in the in a file

15:38 somewhere the German coming out of me

15:41 um you know the decision to actually implement that decision

15:44 was was likely connected to the to Chancellor Merit's statements.

15:49 So, you know, from a deterrence perspective,

15:51 this is this is a bad day for Ukraine.

15:53 And of course, the president's uh attention is elsewhere,

15:57 looking to a, you know,

15:58 conflict over 60 days in with Iran that shows no signs of abating.

16:04 All this goes to show that Washington is not the partner it once was.

16:09 That Europe needs to start standing on its own two feet militarily,

16:12 economically, and technologically.

16:14 And frantic efforts to get there are underway.

16:16 But stepping out of the US's enormous shadow is easier said than done.

16:22 Germany is spending more on defense than it has in decades.

16:26 In 2025, military spending was nearly 25% higher than in 2024.

16:33 According to the peace research institute,

16:35 Cypri that puts Germany fourth worldwide behind the US, China, and Russia.

16:42 Europe as a whole is also investing much more up 14%.

16:47 We have to step up our military capabilities

16:49 to be able to defend and protect ourselves.

16:53 There is a vast amount of money available for the investment.

16:58 But joint armament projects are stalling.

17:01 The FCA air combat system even risks

17:04 collapsing over disputes between Germany and France.

17:08 Europe also aims for greater economic self-reliance

17:12 as President Trump again threatens higher tariffs.

17:16 In response, Europe is pursuing free trade deals

17:18 with Latin American countries and for example, India.

17:25 How prepared are Europeans for a future without the US?

17:32 Rachel, life without the US is still a worst case scenario,

17:37 but no longer unthinkable.

17:40 Are the Europeans on the same page when it comes

17:42 to their idea of what independence has to look like?

17:48 I think they're at the beginning of the same page.

17:50 They're making some important steps.

17:52 I don't think there's a total unity about what

17:54 that looks like or how quickly one should get there.

17:56 But, um, you know, was just mentioned the trade deals.

17:59 These are really important deals that have been in the works for, you know,

18:02 many, many years that were politically very controversial in Europe.

18:06 And it really did take um I think the pressure of this um

18:10 conflict with the United States to to overcome the final hurdles.

18:14 So Europe is is looking for new partners, is looking for new markets,

18:19 um is looking to widen its base of friends

18:22 in this uh lonely world without the United States.

18:26 Yeah.

18:27 Let's zoom in on this trade spat.

18:28 the latest one because Donald Trump says that the EU

18:31 is not making good on its part of the deal,

18:34 one I think he called the greatest deal of all times.

18:38 Um, is that really true or is he just

18:41 misunderstanding how the EU and its huge bureaucratic apparatus works?

18:48 Well, I think, you know, going back to the Turnberry deal that was, you know,

18:51 met initially in July of last year,

18:53 there's been a lot of uh twists and turns in this trade agreement already.

18:58 I mean, it's not been so long ago

19:00 that the administration considered applying tariffs on Europe

19:04 for not giving uh the United States the ability

19:06 to annex Greenland from a fellow NATO member.

19:08 So, there's been a lot of twists and turns here.

19:11 And if if if anyone has uh not been a good

19:14 a reliant partner in the context of this trade relationship,

19:17 it's been the United States.

19:19 One thing that I would want to mention is this data that we uh received earlier.

19:24 Um it it fits in line really well with what Rachel said,

19:27 that 31% I mentioned, that huge drop.

19:30 31% is still a relative majority.

19:32 So still one in three Europeans consider

19:34 the United States to be the most important ally

19:36 of the United uh of the European Union after

19:40 everything that Europe has experienced over these last 18 months.

19:43 Majority still find NATO um uh important and they want to work

19:47 with the United States in relation to challenges posed by China.

19:51 So the relationship is is fundamentally changing.

19:53 It's not dead.

19:54 It can't afford to be.

19:55 But it also can't afford to be the same as it once was

19:58 where where there was this blind reliance on American leadership in the world.

20:04 Yeah.

20:04 Fondeline, the head of the European Commission,

20:06 um it came out in response of what Donald Trump

20:08 said on Truth Social and said, "A deal is a deal.

20:11 We're honoring our end of it and we are prepared

20:15 for any scenario." Is that really the case right now?

20:20 Is the EU prepared for anything that the US president might throw at them?

20:25 they're pretty prepared.

20:26 So there is this um mechanism,

20:29 the anti-coercion mechanism that they basically set up um

20:33 at the European level in response to the first

20:35 Trump term um which would allow for kind

20:38 of really aggressive um counter tariffs and other measures.

20:42 Um plus we know that the commission has prepared lists of sort

20:45 of politically sensitive um goods that they would target for tariffs.

20:50 So, if the EU decided to, and I think they would this time,

20:53 they could push back uh pretty forcefully.

20:56 Plus, let's not forget that actually the uh Supreme Court also told

20:59 Trump that the way he's been doing tariffs is not actually legal.

21:03 So, he's domestically facing some challenges also

21:06 for his kind of favorite um tool of of tariffs.

21:10 Yeah, Gustaf, I want to come back to the military

21:13 aspect because when it comes to defense in Europe,

21:16 we have competing industries, we have competing systems.

21:20 Will, you know, nationalism and fragmentation stand in the way

21:24 of meaningful advances toward more independence when it comes to defense?

21:32 U yes, it already does.

21:34 Um, we have a quite inefficient uh procurement market in Europe.

21:39 The European Commission tries to mitigate that but of course there's a big

21:44 resistance uh on the way towards a common European uh defense market.

21:50 Uh but also uh we have to say we will see a conceptional shift in Europe.

21:57 Um right now or until now uh

22:01 European armies uh basically adopted American standards,

22:06 American industrial standards.

22:08 uh because the prime goal of every NATO army was to fight alongside the US.

22:14 Uh that is under revision now as fighting like the Americans.

22:21 Um I mean US doctrine evolves from the US role as a global

22:26 power and their projection of power and their ability to fight

22:30 not only for example Russia uh but also the people's republic of China

22:34 or North Korea or Iran whoever um Europeans want to deter Russia.

22:39 That's a much more specific task.

22:41 uh and now that the US is uh not a reliable partner,

22:45 they rethink that like well if if the mission is to deter Russia,

22:50 we'll first conceptualize the mission uh and then see

22:55 the tools we actually need to them and then we need

22:57 to build the tools our ourselves and that that is

23:00 a very slow process in in in coming into being.

23:05 uh but it will have over the next years

23:08 consequences for the defense industrial cooperation between European enterprises

23:12 and American ones as well as for procurement

23:15 and I think the biggest shifts are about to come

23:18 they're not yet there because to be frank

23:21 our procurement systems they're also quite slow um and sort

23:25 of procurement is still living in 2023 2024 uh

23:30 and and these shifts will will be factored in NATO

23:35 Brandon is Europe and specifically the EU with all this bureaucracy that we used

23:41 to talk about um are they in a position to rise to the occasion?

23:47 Well, I think you know as Gustaf mentioned earlier the Greenland debacle in many

23:51 ways I think um garnered a certain

23:54 collective European response to the administration.

23:56 And I think that was really a turning point.

23:59 Um, and you know, it and it worked at that time.

24:02 That push back.

24:03 You have certain interlocators that working together are able

24:05 to talk the president back in in that context.

24:08 I think that's the key moving forward

24:10 that a collective European response is is necessary

24:13 and the data tells us from this report

24:16 that there's public backing for greater European self-reliance.

24:20 This is a this is a must uh moving forward.

24:23 Rachel, if the rift between Europe and the US grows, whose stands to gain?

24:30 Well, initially, uh, Russia, um, when it comes to Ukraine and European missile,

24:35 but China is China is watching all of this chaos that the, um,

24:38 Trump administration is creating, um,

24:41 and standing back and positioning itself as the kind of calm,

24:45 stable, uh, global power, right?

24:48 um in in a world where these are the two um biggest powers,

24:51 one of them looks steadier and more reliable than the other at the moment.

24:54 And this is great for China and bad

24:56 for the US and bad for the US traditional allies.

25:00 Yeah.

25:00 And Gustaf, last question to you.

25:01 Will Europe be able to seize the opportunity

25:04 this situation has kind of tossed at them?

25:09 Well, they have to.

25:10 Um there is no going back to the transatlantic relationship we had in the 1990s.

25:16 Uh the world has changed.

25:18 um the US uh politics, the domestic politics,

25:21 the political culture of the United States

25:25 or in the United States has fundamentally changed.

25:28 Trump is a symptom of that.

25:30 It's of course one of the most uh radical symptoms,

25:33 but we will be confronted by these trends in the future.

25:37 Um I just hope the US will will elect a president who can

25:41 manage uh that that process what more wisely uh than the current bond does.

25:46 And that's all the time we have today.

25:48 Thank you so much to all our panelists for helping

25:51 us get to the point and all of you watching.

25:53 Bye-bye.