Sun Tzu - The Art of War Documentary
The People Profiles
0:03 The man known to history as Sun Tzu is traditionally believed to have been
0:09 born in the State of Qi in eastern China in the late sixth century BC.
0:15 Sun Tzu is an honorific name meaning ‘Master Sun’,
0:19 and his original name was Sun Wu.
0:23 Although he is known as the author of the Sun
0:27 Zi Bing Fa or Master Sun’s Art of War,
0:30 one of the most influential military treatises in world history,
0:35 Sun Tzu remains an elusive figure,
0:38 and his biographical details are vague and quite contested.
0:42 Based on the content of The Art of War,
0:46 some historians believe that he actually lived
0:49 no earlier than the fourth century BC.
0:51 There are even scholars who believe that Sun Tzu was not a historical
0:57 figure at all and was instead invented by later generations of Chinese writers
1:02 who wanted to show that the author of The Art of War was
1:06 a successful military leader who was able to put his ideas into practice.
1:11 What follows presents some of the main theories about
1:15 who Sun Tzu was and also what is contained
1:18 in the famous text which this elusive figure of ancient
1:23 China is most keenly associated with, The Art of War.
1:28 The earliest mention of Sun Tzu can be found
1:32 in the Shiji or Records of the Grand Historian,
1:35 the monumental history of early imperial China written by Sima Qian,
1:41 the Han dynasty historian regarded as the father of Chinese history,
1:46 in the late second century BC and early first century BC.
1:51 The Shiji is largely comprised
1:53 of biographical accounts of eminent Chinese figures,
1:56 of which Sun Tzu was just one.
1:59 In the Shiji, Sun Tzu’s biography is paired with that of Wu Zi or Master Wu,
2:06 another military theorist known for writing a famous book on the art of warfare.
2:12 On closer examination, the Shiji’s biography of Sun Tzu contains only a single
2:18 paragraph about the author of the Sun Zi Bing Fa,
2:22 with the remaining section covering episodes
2:24 from the life of his descendant Sun Bin,
2:27 a general and military strategist from the 4th century BC who was
2:32 also known as ‘Master Sun’ and who too wrote a long-lost military treatise,
2:38 now known as Sun Bin’s Art of War.
2:42 This has led some scholars to believe that the two
2:46 ‘Master Suns’ are in fact the same person,
2:48 and that Sun Bin was the author of the famous Art of War,
2:53 though the fragments of Sun Bin’s Art
2:55 of War uncovered at the Yinqueshan tombs in Shandong
3:00 province in 1972 suggest that Sun Tzu and Sun
3:04 Bin were different people who wrote different texts.
3:08 A more extensive account of Sun Tzu’s military career can be found
3:13 in the Wuyue Chunqiu or Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yue,
3:19 a historical chronicle of questionable reliability dating to the 1st
3:24 century AD attributed to the scholar Zhao Ye.
3:28 Thus, we have two ancient Chinese accounts which
3:31 purport to relate details of Sun Tzu’s life,
3:35 though both were nevertheless written centuries
3:38 after the military tactician’s alleged lifetime.
3:42 While the Shiji claims that Sun Tzu was born
3:45 in the State of Qi in modern-day Shandong province,
3:49 the Wuyue Chunqiu states that he was a native of the State of Wu,
3:54 which occupied the Yangtze River delta
3:57 in eastern China around modern-day Shanghai.
4:00 Both sources agree that his given name was Sun Wu,
4:04 which rather appropriately means ‘martial’
4:06 or ‘military,’ while the familiar ‘Sun Tzu’
4:09 would have been bestowed upon him by followers who admired his work.
4:13 Neither source gives any details about his parentage or his year of birth,
4:19 but the Shiji claims that he had already written The Art of War when
4:23 he entered the service of King Helü of Wu in or around 512 BC.
4:29 If this is accurate,
4:30 then Sun Tzu would have been born in the middle of the sixth century BC,
4:37 during the late Spring and Autumn period of Chinese history.
4:41 During the Spring and Autumn period,
4:44 China was a patchwork of feudal states which paid homage
4:48 to the King of Zhou at his capital in Luoyang in Henan province.
4:53 The Zhou had gained control over the Central Plain of China
4:58 in the eleventh century BC after
5:00 overthrowing its predecessor, the Shang dynasty.
5:03 The kings of Zhou had their capital in Fenghao
5:06 in Shaanxi province until the eighth century BC,
5:10 when they were driven out by the Quanrong
5:12 barbarians from the west and northwest in 770 BC.
5:16 The surviving members of the royal family relocated the capital to Luoyang,
5:22 marking the beginning of the Later or Eastern Zhou dynasty.
5:27 The Eastern Zhou is further subdivided into the Spring
5:31 and Autumn period between the eighth and fifth centuries BC,
5:35 and the Warring States period between the fifth and third centuries BC.
5:40 The Eastern Zhou was characterised
5:42 by weakened central authority and the emergence
5:46 of de-facto independent states that nominally acknowledged
5:50 the sovereignty of the king of Luoyang.
5:54 Many of these feudal states had been founded in the eleventh
5:58 century by Zhou princes and influential generals and statesmen
6:01 who were granted dukedoms throughout the Central Plain in recognition
6:06 for their contribution to the founding of the dynasty.
6:10 Over several generations,
6:11 these dukes established their own independent power bases
6:14 and began to take less notice of the king,
6:17 though they continued to consider the king of Zhou their nominal sovereign.
6:22 By the time the Zhou court moved to Luoyang,
6:26 the king’s power had severely diminished and he could do little to prevent
6:31 his hundreds of vassals from fighting among
6:33 each other to expand their own territories.
6:36 Hence, China’s history in ancient times is
6:39 a tale of a relatively powerful polity emerging
6:43 as early as the second millennium BC in the shape of the Kingdom of Zhou,
6:48 but then followed by a period
6:51 of royal decline and political fragmentation before
6:54 a new imperial power would eventually emerge and unite China under Qin rule.
6:59 All of this ensured that China was dominated by warfare and conflict
7:05 for many centuries and Sun Tzu apparently lived in the midst of this.
7:10 Surely it was this instability that led figures like him in ancient China
7:15 to consider The Art of War and how conflicts should be won and lost.
7:22 In order to understand the background to Sun Tzu’s alleged government service,
7:27 and how he was immersed in the high politics of late sixth-century BC China,
7:32 we need to understand some of the political
7:35 intrigue and machinations of the time.
7:38 During the Spring and Autumn period,
7:40 and despite the broad political fragmentation of China at the time,
7:44 the Zhou kings still retained considerable moral
7:47 and spiritual authority over the Central Plain of China.
7:51 For this reason, a series of powerful rulers
7:54 who achieved leadership status among the feudal states
7:57 either by war or diplomacy were granted
8:00 the title ba or ‘protector’ by the Zhou king,
8:04 though the term is usually translated into English
8:07 as ‘hegemon.’ While several ancient sources including
8:10 the Shiji refer to the ‘five hegemons,’ no
8:14 two sources share the same list of five.
8:17 The earlier hegemons were from dukedoms within the Yellow
8:21 River valley who swore allegiance to the Zhou,
8:24 including Duke Huan of Qi in the east in the middle of the seventh century BC,
8:30 and Duke Wen of Jin in the north in the 630s BC.
8:35 By the beginning of the sixth century BC,
8:38 political entities from outside the Yellow River
8:40 basin began to challenge the Zhou feudal system.
8:43 The first of these was the State of Chu south of the Yangtze River,
8:48 whose rulers began calling themselves kings at the beginning
8:52 of the seventh century BC as a challenge to the Zhou.
8:56 Over the next decades these different powers, the Zhou, Chu, Wu,
9:01 Jin and others would continue to intrigue and make war on one another.
9:06 If Sima Qian’s account is true then this is around
9:10 the time that Sun Tzu was born and grew up.
9:15 His experiences were ones of war and political chaos.
9:19 It would only become more chaotic in the years
9:22 ahead and soon Sun Tzu would be personally involved.
9:26 In the spring of 514 BC, forces of the Kingdom of Wu invaded Chu in an attempt
9:33 to take advantage of the death of the ruler there,
9:37 King Ping, the previous winter.
9:39 The Wu armies were commanded by Prince Gaiyu and Zhuyong,
9:43 both of whom were brothers of King Liao.
9:46 Prince Guang, a cousin of the king,
9:49 now seized the opportunity of the princes’ absence waging war on Chu
9:54 to assassinate King Liao and take the throne of Wu for himself.
9:59 He invited the king to his house for dinner,
10:02 where, despite the presence of the royal guards,
10:05 the assassin managed to stab the king with a dagger
10:08 that had been hidden inside a grilled fish, his favourite dish.
10:12 King Liao died instantly, and Prince Guang led a body of armed
10:17 men to overpower the late king’s bodyguards.
10:20 Prince Guang duly established himself as King Helü of Wu.
10:25 Upon hearing the news of the usurpation,
10:28 the late king’s brothers defected to Chu.
10:32 In his biography of Sun Tzu in the Shiji,
10:36 Sima Qian states that Sun Tzu entered the service of this King
10:41 Helü in the third year of his reign, around 512 BC.
10:46 The Wuyue Chunqiu gives further context for the appointment,
10:50 which is once again credited to Wu Zixu.
10:54 By that time, King Helü had advanced his plans
10:58 to launch a campaign against Prince Gaiyu and Prince Zhuyong,
11:03 the two Wu princes who had defected to Chu after
11:06 their brother was killed and his throne was usurped by King Helü.
11:11 Our sources, sporadic as they are, suggest that Sun Tzu was introduced
11:16 to the king around this time with the intention
11:19 that he might lead the campaign against
11:22 Prince Gaiyu and Prince Zhuyong and their followers.
11:26 According to the Wuyue Chunqiu,
11:29 Sun Tzu was an expert in military affairs from Wu who
11:33 lived in seclusion because his talents were not appreciated by others,
11:37 and it was only when emissaries arrived from the Kingdom of Wu to implore
11:42 him to take command of the armies that Sun Tzu’s abilities were recognised.
11:47 During their first meeting,
11:49 King Helü asked Sun Tzu several questions about military
11:53 strategy and was impressed with the perceptiveness of each answer.
11:57 After he was satisfied with Sun Tzu’s knowledge,
12:01 he asked him to demonstrate that he could put his ideas into practice.
12:06 The Shiji offers a simpler explanation,
12:08 namely that King Helü had read The Art of War and invited Sun Tzu
12:14 as its author to his court to offer a practical demonstration of his methods,
12:19 while the Wuyue Chunqiu does not mention The Art of War at all.
12:24 Although Sun Tzu’s Art of War has become
12:27 the most influential military treatise from ancient China,
12:30 many scholars from different philosophical
12:33 traditions wrote extensively about military affairs
12:35 during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in ancient China.
12:40 It is worth reflecting on the text itself here,
12:44 before exploring the limited details of Sun Tzu’s life further.
12:49 The standard text of Sun Tzu’s Art of War is divided into thirteen chapters,
12:55 each of which opens with the formula,
12:58 “Master Sun says.” While the modern text is based on a compilation
13:02 dating to the eleventh century AD during the Song dynasty,
13:07 Sima Qian quoted King Helü telling Sun Tzu that he
13:12 had read all thirteen chapters of his military treatise.
13:16 Furthermore, fragments of The Art of War written
13:19 on bamboo strips uncovered during excavations at Yinqueshan in 1972
13:24 indicate that the text was already divided into its
13:28 current thirteen chapters in the second century BC.
13:32 Although there are a few references to specific wars,
13:36 such as the rivalry between Wu and Yue,
13:39 or the exploits of the legendary Yellow Emperor,
13:42 the content of The Art of War primarily consists of high-level principles
13:47 that a military commander ought to follow if he is to achieve success in war.
13:52 As such, there is a frustrating lack of internal evidence
13:56 within the text itself which would allow us to accurately
13:59 date it or that could make clear when Sun
14:03 Tzu was writing and what experiences he was drawing upon.
14:08 The book opens with a statement concerning the importance of warfare.
14:13 In modern translation this reads: “War is a vital matter of state.
14:17 It is the field on which life or death is
14:21 determined and the road that leads to either survival or ruin,
14:26 and must be examined with the greatest care.”
14:29 The first chapter then goes on to list
14:31 a set of five criteria to determine the chances of victory for each side.
14:36 The first is the dao, or the way, referring to the ability of a military leader
14:42 to persuade his subordinates that his cause is just; the second is climate,
14:48 pertaining to weather conditions and changing seasons;
14:51 the third is terrain and how it facilitates or restricts
14:56 the deployment of troops or the supply lines for the army;
15:00 the fourth is command,
15:02 relating to how a leader can motivate and discipline the troops;
15:06 and the fifth is regulation, referring to the organisation of the army,
15:11 its logistics and lines of communication,
15:14 and the structure of the chain of command.
15:17 Sun Tzu argues that by assessing each of these factors,
15:21 it is possible to provide an assessment of the likelihood
15:25 of victory before the start of a campaign.
15:29 In the second and third chapters,
15:32 Sun Tzu discusses the conduct and planning of campaigns.
15:36 He places great importance on the need
15:38 to keep the army well-supplied on campaign,
15:41 advising that it is best to keep campaigns brief
15:44 so that the army does not run out of supplies,
15:47 adding that it is better to fight on foreign territory
15:51 and live off the land than to rely on long supply lines.
15:54 In Chapter 3, Sun Tzu goes even further,
15:58 famously stating that it is best for a commander
16:02 to achieve victory over the enemy without fighting at all.
16:06 Accordingly, a state’s best options are
16:08 to undermine the enemy’s strategy and its diplomacy,
16:11 and only resort to employing military force when there is no other choice.
16:16 While Sun Tzu’s emphasis on avoiding war has become one
16:20 of his most influential concepts outlined in The Art of War,
16:24 he did recognise that there are times when the state
16:28 has no choice but to mobilise its armies and fight.
16:32 Sun Tzu goes on to offer several rules of thumb for how
16:36 to deal with the enemy depending on the size of each army,
16:40 also stressing the importance of knowing the enemy’s strengths
16:43 and weaknesses and acting accordingly in line with these.
16:47 In Chapters 4 to 6, Sun Tzu discusses how
16:51 a commander can recognise and exploit strategic positions and formations,
16:55 and how to manoeuvre to gain strategic advantages from the enemy,
17:01 forcing them to either fight a battle against
17:04 the odds or to abandon their campaign entirely.
17:07 Chapter 7 is about confronting the enemy in action and ensuring
17:10 that enemy troops are in a poor state to fight,
17:14 while Chapter 8 deals with adapting
17:17 to changing circumstances and being prepared for contingencies.
17:21 Chapters 9 to 11 concern the deployment of troops and the use of terrain,
17:27 Chapter 12 covers the use of incendiary weapons,
17:31 and Chapter 13 is on the handling of spies.
17:35 Whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level,
17:38 Sun Tzu throughout emphasises how to wrong
17:42 foot one’s enemy or enemies through deception.
17:45 While the core text of The Art of War consists of these thirteen chapters,
17:52 the Yinqueshan excavations of 1972,
17:55 uncovered fragments of five hitherto unknown chapters which could have comprised
18:00 a set of ‘outer chapters’ that expanded on the core text.
18:05 These chapters were written out on bamboo slips
18:08 and were found in a Han Dynasty tomb.
18:11 They may have been written by Sun Tzu himself
18:14 or later writers to offer greater clarity to the original text.
18:18 The five chapters in question are structured as dialogues
18:22 between Sun Tzu and the King of Wu.
18:25 Sun Tzu’s first interview with the king of Wu sets
18:28 the scene for one of the most famous anecdotes in Chinese history,
18:32 mentioned in both the Shiji and the Wuyue Chunqiu.
18:36 At King Helü’s request, Sun Tzu used the palace women to demonstrate his methods
18:42 for training and drilling an army in front of the king.
18:46 The Shiji states that 180 women were summoned for the demonstration,
18:51 while the Wuyue Chunqiu gives a figure of 300.
18:55 After the women were equipped with helmets, armour, swords, and shields,
19:00 the group was divided into two companies,
19:03 each commanded by one of the king’s favourite concubines.
19:06 Sun Tzu began by beating the drum signals for advance, right turn, left turn,
19:13 and retreat, repeating the demonstration several times
19:16 to ensure that the instructions were understood.
19:19 However, when Sun Tzu beat the signal for right turn,
19:23 the women collapsed into laughter.
19:26 Recognising that his instructions may not have been clear enough,
19:30 Sun Tzu clarified them and once again repeated them several times.
19:34 When he beat the signal for left turn,
19:38 the women still responded with hysterical laughter.
19:40 The infuriated general then explained that while the failure to follow orders
19:46 on the first occasion may have been down to the general’s commands,
19:50 now that the orders were clear,
19:52 it was the soldiers and officers who were at fault.
19:56 Sun Tzu then gave orders to execute the two company leaders.
20:02 An alarmed King Helü, who was watching proceedings from a terrace,
20:07 climbed down and begged Sun Tzu not to carry out the execution,
20:11 telling him that if the two women were killed he
20:15 would be so distraught that his food would become tasteless.
20:18 Sun Tzu told the king that he had been appointed general,
20:23 and while leading an army on campaign the general had full military
20:28 authority and was not bound to follow the king’s orders on military matters.
20:33 The two women were duly executed
20:35 and replaced as company commanders by two others.
20:38 When Sun Tzu beat the drum on this occasion,
20:41 the women executed their orders to perfection
20:44 without turning their heads or making any sounds,
20:47 marching left and right, advancing and retreating in perfect order.
20:52 Sun Tzu invited the king to inspect the army,
20:56 informing him that it was now ready for war
20:59 and could march through fire and water on his commands.
21:02 The grieving king replied that he had no interest in inspecting
21:07 the troops and advised Sun Tzu to retire to his quarters.
21:11 At this, the general admonished the king
21:14 for only praising military strategies on paper,
21:17 but being unwilling to put them into practice.
21:21 The story was intended to show how Sun
21:24 Tzu’s precepts needed to be put into practice fully,
21:27 not just viewed as theories, even when the implications were brutal.
21:33 According to the Shiji, this rebuke persuaded King Helü that Sun
21:38 Tzu was truly an expert in military affairs,
21:42 though the Wuyue Chunqiu once again claims that another
21:46 official intervened and told the king that he
21:49 could not expect to achieve his ambitions of becoming
21:53 hegemon without employing Sun Tzu to lead the armies.
21:56 Thus, Sun Tzu was picked to lead the campaign against Chu.
22:01 The ensuing campaign was enormously successful
22:04 and the Wu army killed the exiled princes, Gaiyu and Zhuyong, in battle.
22:09 It was just the first of many campaigns which
22:12 Sun Tzu allegedly led on behalf of the king.
22:16 In 511 BC he led another invasion of Chu and conquered two cities.
22:21 The following year, Wu invaded Yue on the pretext
22:25 that the latter did not join Wu in its campaigns against Chu.
22:29 The Wu armies were victorious and captured Zuili in modern Zhejiang province.
22:35 In 509 BC, King Zhao of Chu sent
22:38 an army under his prime minister Zichang to attack Wu,
22:42 prompting Helü to send Sun Tzu to counterattack and besiege Yuzhang,
22:48 modern-day Nanchang in Jiangxi province,
22:51 with orders to advance on the Chu capital at Ying.
22:54 While the Wu armies successfully captured Yuzhang,
22:58 the Wu commanders once again stopped short of attacking the Chu capital.
23:03 Three years later, in 506 BC, Helü once again suggested a campaign targeting
23:09 the Chu capital and asked Sun Tzu for advice.
23:13 He argued that it was too risky for the Kingdom of Wu to launch such
23:18 a campaign on its own and suggested seeking
23:21 alliances with the states of Tang and Cai.
23:24 After the alliance was formed,
23:26 the coalition army assembled at Yuzhang and defeated Zichang
23:29 in three battles on the eastern bank of the Han River.
23:34 In late 506 BC, the opposing armies met once again at the Battle of Boju.
23:39 The king’s brother Prince Fugai proposed attacking the enemy straight away,
23:44 arguing that Zichang was a poor leader and his soldiers
23:48 would not be willing to fight hard for him.
23:51 Although the king denied Fugai’s request,
23:54 the latter disobeyed orders and led a column
23:57 of 5,000 men to attack Zichang’s division,
24:00 routing them and forcing their commander to escape
24:03 to the State of Zheng in central China.
24:06 The Wu army took advantage of the chaos in the Chu camp to launch a pursuit,
24:11 surprising the Chu army while they were eating.
24:14 The Wu army went on to win another battle
24:17 at Yongxi near the city of Jingshan in Hubei province, opening the road to Ying.
24:22 By the time the Wu armies reached the city,
24:25 King Zhao of Chu had already fled from his capital.
24:29 In the aftermath of the clash, the Wu commanders, including Sun Tzu,
24:34 also carried away the wives of the senior Chu generals as a further humiliation.
24:41 Wu’s victory over Chu in the Boju campaign helped King Helü establish
24:46 himself as the unofficial hegemon over the states of the Central Plain.
24:51 However, the desecration of King Ping’s tomb during
24:54 the campaign prompted a Chu official named Shen
24:58 Baoxu to request an alliance from the powerful
25:01 State of Qin in the west to attack Wu.
25:04 Despite some initial reservations, the ruler of Qin agreed to the alliance,
25:09 as Qin foreign policy looked to Chu as a counterweight against Jin,
25:14 its rival in northern China.
25:16 In 505 BC, while Qin was preparing to send an army to invade Wu,
25:22 the king of Yue took advantage of the fact that most
25:26 of the Wu army was occupying Chu and launched a surprise attack.
25:30 Not long after, Qin forces joined up
25:33 with the Chu army and defeated Fugai in battle, compelling him to return to Wu.
25:39 The Qin then attacked Helü’s main army while
25:42 a Chu detachment conquered Wu’s ally, the State of Tang.
25:46 A couple of months later, with King Helü still fighting the Qin and Chu armies,
25:53 Fugai usurped the throne and proclaimed himself the king.
25:57 Helü was compelled to return to Gusu and retake the throne,
26:02 forcing Fugai to seek refuge with Chu.
26:05 Although Sun Tzu and his fellow commanders remained
26:08 in Chu and managed to defeat the Chu army,
26:11 they were defeated in turn by the Qin.
26:14 After discussing the issue among themselves,
26:17 the Wu commanders decided to abandon the campaign and return home,
26:22 enabling the king of Chu to return to his capital.
26:26 The Kingdom of Wu appears to have recovered quickly following the defeat to Qin.
26:31 Two years later a Wu army commanded by Prince Fuchai, Helü’s son and heir,
26:37 invaded Chu and once again occupied Ying,
26:40 forcing King Zhao to flee his capital once again.
26:44 Fuchai’s victory enabled Helü to maintain
26:47 his hegemony for the remainder of his reign.
26:51 In 496 BC, King Helü invaded Yue but was
26:55 mortally wounded during the campaign and was succeeded by Fuchai.
26:59 The following year, Fuchai conquered Yue
27:02 and made King Goujian of Yue his prisoner.
27:05 Fuchai’s success sowed the seeds of his undoing,
27:09 as Goujian pretended to declare his allegiance to Fuchai and won his trust,
27:15 enabling him to return home to Yue after three years in captivity.
27:20 In the meantime, Yue paid the Wu general Bo Pi a large bribe,
27:25 and the latter advised his king to end his campaign against
27:30 Yue and turn his attention north towards the State of Qi.
27:35 Neither the Shiji nor the Wuyue Chunqiu
27:39 mention Sun Tzu during King Fuchai’s reign,
27:42 although a brief remark in Sun Tzu’s biography
27:45 in the Shiji credits him with the strategies
27:48 that led to the victories over Qi and Jin
27:51 without indicating that he was present in those campaigns.
27:54 The author of the famous The Art of War therefore disappears
27:59 from history without a trace at the end of King Helü’s reign.
28:04 Despite Sima Qian’s reference to Sun Tzu’s contributions
28:07 to the strategy that led to Fuchai’s short-lived hegemony,
28:11 the implication is that Wu would not have
28:14 fallen to Yue had Sun Tzu still been around.
28:18 Since Sun Tzu is commonly mentioned alongside Wu
28:21 Zixu in both the Wuyue Chunqiu and the Shiji,
28:26 it is possible that he was either purged alongside his colleague,
28:30 or he left the Wu court and retreated back into obscurity in protest
28:35 at Fuchai’s tendency to listen to bad advisors and execute good advisors.
28:40 In any case, the sources are silent about how and when Sun Tzu died.
28:48 The biographical details of Sun Tzu from the Shiji
28:52 and the Wuyue Chunqiu are regrettably brief,
28:56 but this is the best picture available
28:58 of Sun Tzu from the earliest Chinese sources.
29:01 He was either born in Qi or Wu around the mid-sixth century BC.
29:06 He was invited to the Wu court in around 512 BC,
29:10 either on the recommendation of Wu Zixu,
29:13 or because the ambitious King Helü had been impressed by his military treatise.
29:18 After demonstrating the effectiveness of his disciplinary
29:22 methods with the palace women, Sun Tzu entered Helü’s service.
29:26 During the Spring and Autumn period, there were no specific military ranks,
29:32 and high officials often served concurrently in civil and military roles,
29:37 so Sun Tzu’s role in King Helü’s establishment is unclear.
29:42 Sima Qian states that he served as jiang,
29:46 a term that means ‘general’ or ‘commander’
29:49 rather than military advisor or strategist,
29:51 but such appointments were not permanent and typically
29:55 held for a single campaign or war.
29:57 His presence on the field of battle is
30:00 implied in several of Helü’s campaigns against Chu,
30:04 in particular the Boju campaign and the occupation of Ying in 506 BC.
30:10 While the methods of training and organisation
30:13 that Sun Tzu introduced to the Wu army
30:16 may have contributed to Wu’s continued military
30:19 success in the early part of Fuchai’s reign,
30:22 Sun Tzu himself appears to have left the scene by this point.
30:28 The details of Sun Tzu’s life are frustratingly unclear in places,
30:32 but there is no doubt that The Art of War
30:36 reflected the experiences of a veteran commander of the kind which
30:40 Sun Tzu appears to have become in service to the Kingdom
30:43 of Wu during these events between 512 BC and 506 BC.
30:47 Every stage of leadership and warcraft is laid out in a text
30:52 which in most modern editions comes in at about 10,000 words.
30:58 For instance, Sun Tzu recognised that preparation
31:01 was the key to victory in all instances.
31:04 He who managed the terrain best,
31:07 prepared his forces well and ensured that everything was meticulously
31:11 prepared for would always stand the best chance of victory.
31:15 The varied landscape of China that Sun
31:18 Tzu would have campaigned through in service to the Kingdom of Wu is reflected
31:23 in his discussion of the different types of terrain.
31:27 Equally, the torturous politics of the warring Chinese kingdoms
31:30 and states in the sixth and fifth centuries BC is reflected
31:35 in his perennial statements about the necessity of gathering lots
31:39 of intelligence and maintaining a core of spies to do so.
31:43 The Art of War is a product of its time,
31:47 yet Sun Tzu left the text vague and unspecific
31:51 enough that its precepts could be applied widely, not just to ancient China,
31:56 but any state or region, and not just to warfare,
31:59 but to any sphere of activity which requires shrewd
32:04 leadership and careful planning in order to achieve victory.
32:08 The patchy details about Sun Tzu’s life have
32:12 inspired a scholarly debate about whether the Sun
32:15 Tzu of the Shiji and the Wuyue Chunqiu was a real historical figure or a person
32:22 invented by later generations as both the author of the Art of War and one
32:27 of the contributors to the Kingdom of Wu’s
32:30 ascendancy in the late Warring States period.
32:33 One of the main arguments that Sun Tzu was not a historical figure is that he is
32:39 first mentioned in Sima Qian’s work more than
32:42 four centuries after he is said to have lived.
32:46 As Sima Qian is usually considered a reliable historian,
32:50 it is possible that he used earlier sources about
32:53 the life of Sun Tzu which are now lost.
32:56 It is not uncommon for biographical details of Chinese
32:59 historical figures from this period to be incomplete.
33:02 Furthermore, the biographies in the Shiji are not intended
33:07 to be detailed accounts of individuals from birth to death,
33:11 Sima Qian instead chose a few episodes from an individual’s
33:15 life to illustrate their character and moral values,
33:19 although it is unlikely that Sima Qian would have only chosen
33:24 only a single anecdote from Sun Tzu’s life if others were available.
33:29 Interpretations of Sun Tzu’s biographical details are further
33:33 complicated by the actions of some ancient Chinese rulers.
33:38 For instance, in 213 BC, Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor of China,
33:44 infamously ordered the destruction of many classic Chinese texts that challenged
33:49 the Legalist doctrines he was trying to introduce at the time across China.
33:54 While copies of The Art of War were retained by the imperial library,
33:59 these were destroyed when the rebel leader Xiang Yu sacked the Qin
34:04 capital of Xianyang in 208 BC following the First Emperor’s death.
34:10 These developments were deeply lamented by Sima Qian
34:13 and undermined his efforts to write a comprehensive history.
34:17 Nevertheless, Sun Tzu sceptics point out that the Zuo Zhuan,
34:22 an influential set of commentaries to the Spring
34:26 and Autumn Annals dating to the mid-fourth century BC,
34:29 has a lengthy description of some of the campaigns
34:33 which King Helu oversaw in the late sixth century BC,
34:37 but does not mention Sun Tzu or Sun Wu at all.
34:42 Another common argument deployed against Sima Qian’s Sun Wu
34:46 or Sun Tzu is that the text of The Art
34:50 of War refers to several developments in military organisation and technology
34:54 that did not take place until the Warring States era.
34:58 While The Art of War refers to armies of 100,000 men,
35:03 it is unlikely that armies of this size could be
35:06 deployed by the states of the Spring and Autumn period.
35:10 For these reasons, the American general Samuel B.
35:13 Griffith, who translated Sun Tzu’s The Art of War in 1963,
35:19 rejected Sima Qian’s depiction of Sun Wu or Sun Tzu
35:23 and argued that the text dates from the fourth century BC.
35:28 The American historian Mark Edward Lewis
35:31 suggests in the Cambridge History of Ancient
35:33 China that the biography of Sun Tzu that appears in the Shiji,
35:38 namely the anecdote about training the palace women,
35:41 is a parable that underlines the essential
35:44 principles of military command in Chinese warfare,
35:47 and that the identity of any single individual historical
35:50 figure behind the writing The Art of War is, quote,
35:54 “lost beyond recovery.” This is not to say that Sima
35:58 Qian’s Sun Tzu was invented out of thin air,
36:02 as the bamboo strips at the Yinqueshan tombs indicate that a tradition
36:07 associating Sun Tzu with the Kingdom of Wu existed prior to Sima Qian,
36:13 although the five dialogues with the king of Wu refer to the collapse of Jin,
36:18 a hundred years after Sima Qian’s chronology.
36:21 It may be possible to consider the Sun Tzu of the Shiji and the Wuyue
36:27 Chunqiu as a composite figure based
36:30 on the lives of other documented historical figures.
36:34 It is worth assessing Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
36:38 alongside the career of another ancient Chinese military writer, Sun Bin,
36:43 whom Sima Qian claims to be a descendant of Sun Tzu,
36:47 not least because some scholars argue that they were possibly the same person.
36:53 While Sun Bin’s life is better documented,
36:56 there are still several gaps in his biography.
36:59 He was born in the fourth century BC in the middle of the Warring
37:03 States period and came from an old aristocratic family in the State of Qi,
37:08 which Sima Qian also claims as Sun Tzu’s native state.
37:13 His birth name is unknown,
37:15 and he acquired the nickname Bin to describe a physical
37:19 deformity that was inflicted on him later in life.
37:22 As a young man, Sun Bin studied with the Daoist
37:27 sage Guiguzi and was recognised as an outstanding student.
37:31 He was given no such recognition by the authorities in his native Qi state,
37:36 and he was compelled to seek employment at the rival state of Wei,
37:41 one of the three states that emerged after the collapse of Jin in 403 BC.
37:47 Following his arrival in Wei,
37:49 Sun Bin had an interview with the Wei commander Pang Juan,
37:54 who had studied alongside him.
37:55 When Pang Juan quickly realised that the new
37:58 arrival’s knowledge of military strategy was far superior
38:01 to his own and was afraid that he
38:04 might be replaced as commander of the Wei army,
38:07 he falsely implicated him in a crime which
38:10 resulted in Sun Bin having his kneecaps removed, permanently crippling him.
38:14 After seeking assistance from a Qi diplomat who recognised his military genius,
38:20 Sun Bin managed to escape captivity and return to Qi.
38:26 After returning to his homeland,
38:28 Sun Bin was presented at court and won the admiration
38:31 of both King Wei and his general Tian Ji.
38:35 The king offered Sun Bin the supreme command,
38:38 but the latter declined due to his disability and was
38:43 instead appointed military advisor and deputy commander to Tian Ji.
38:47 In 354 BC, a Wei army led by Pang Juan attached
38:52 the state of Zhao and laid siege to its capital of Handan.
38:57 Zhao was Qi’s ally, but rather than march to Handan to relieve the siege,
39:03 Sun Bin proposed an invasion of Wei to rescue Zhao,
39:06 which may have been part of a cynical move to exhaust
39:11 both parties to prevent them from reuniting the former Jin territories.
39:16 Although the Qi forces were outnumbered,
39:18 Sun Bin divided his army into three detachments.
39:22 He sent the first into the midst of the enemy troops,
39:25 where they were promptly massacred.
39:27 Having given Pang Juan the impression that he had no clue what he was doing,
39:32 Sun Bin sent a detachment of light troops to the important Wei city of Daliang.
39:38 An overconfident Pang Juan left his heavy infantry behind
39:42 at Handan and hurried to deal with the threat,
39:45 stringing out his army in the process.
39:48 With the third detachment, Sun Bin established a fortified position at Guiling
39:53 on the road between Handan and Daliang.
39:56 When Pang Juan blundered into the trap,
39:59 the Qi army sallied out and routed the enemy,
40:03 capturing the Wei commander in the process.
40:07 Pang Juan was eventually allowed to return
40:09 to Wei and resume command of the army,
40:13 and in 341 BC he invaded the small state of Han in central China.
40:18 In response to Han’s pleas for aid,
40:21 Qi adopted the same strategy as the Guiling campaign
40:24 and Sun Bin and Tian Ji marched on Daliang.
40:28 According to Sima Qian,
40:30 Sun Bin gave the impression that the Qi army was falling apart
40:34 by ordering the men to light 100,000 campfires on the first night,
40:39 50,000 on the second night, and 30,000 on the third.
40:43 Pang Juan repeated his mistake of thirteen years earlier
40:47 and hurried from Han to confront the Qi force.
40:51 Sun Bin laid an ambush at the narrow valley of Maling,
40:55 where he expected Pang Juan to arrive at dusk.
40:59 After hiding 10,000 crossbowmen on both sides of the road
41:03 with orders to shoot once they saw a light,
41:06 Sun Bin carved a message onto a nearby tree and awaited the enemy.
41:11 As Sun Bin had predicted, Pang Juan arrived as darkness fell
41:15 and noticed strange markings on the tree trunk.
41:19 He lit a torch to take a closer look,
41:22 and while he read the words “Pang Juan will
41:26 die under this tree,” 10,000 crossbow bolts flew towards him.
41:30 Although he somehow survived the initial barrage,
41:34 Pang Juan saw he was completely surrounded and cut
41:38 his throat to avoid falling into captivity again.
41:41 Sun Bin’s and Tian Ji’s victories enabled Qi
41:44 to become the leading power in eastern China, but the weakening of Zhao, Wei,
41:50 and Han strengthened Qin in the west,
41:53 eventually leading to the Qin conquest and unification
41:57 of China in the late third century BC.
42:01 Like his reputed ancestor Sun Tzu, Sun Bin was known in antiquity for writing
42:06 a military treatise called The Art of War, which ran to 89 chapters.
42:12 While Sun Bin departs from the historical record after the Battle of Maling,
42:17 the fragments of Sun Bin’s Art of War uncovered in 1972 refer
42:21 to battles fought by Qi armies at the end of the fourth century BC,
42:27 implying he may have lived up to 40 years after his triumph at Maling.
42:32 Both his text and that of Sun Tzu are
42:36 clearly part of the same tradition of military thought,
42:40 placing emphasis on identifying and exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses,
42:44 using deception and espionage to undermine the enemy on and off the battlefield,
42:50 and achieving quick victories on campaign.
42:53 Compared to Sun Tzu, Sun Bin is much better documented as a historical
42:58 figure and there has been a debate about
43:01 whether Sun Bin was even responsible for writing
43:05 the thirteen chapter Art of War attributed to Sun Tzu.
43:09 The rediscovery of part of the Sun Bin
43:12 Art of War at Yinqueshan undermines this theory,
43:16 and the Canadian Sinologist Roger Ames notes
43:19 that ancient Chinese authors distinguished between two ‘Master
43:23 Suns,’ and that the two military treatises
43:26 by Sun Tzu and Sun Bin were different texts.
43:30 Despite this, the ancient military historian
43:33 Chris Peers speculates that Sun Bin could
43:37 have written the Sun Zi Bing Fa outlining the general principles of war,
43:42 attributing it to a mythical ancestor who came from Qi but served Wu,
43:47 before writing the lengthier treatise that bears his name
43:51 as a more practical guide based on his own experiences on campaign.
43:57 Although both treatises are part of the same cultural
44:00 format and come from the same milieu of ancient China,
44:04 a comparison between the two Arts of War uncovers important differences
44:09 that suggest they were written at different times by different people.
44:13 One major difference is that while Sun Tzu’s
44:17 Art of War advises against besieging walled cities,
44:21 Sun Bin considers siege warfare a more legitimate method of waging
44:25 war and gives advice on how to conduct siege operations.
44:29 This would seem to indicate that Sun Tzu was writing
44:33 during an earlier period in history when chariots dominated the battlefield,
44:38 while by the time of Sun Bin the development of military technology
44:43 meant that it was easier for armies to successfully besiege and plunder cities.
44:48 The American scholar Ralph Sawyer, an expert in Chinese warfare,
44:53 argues that Sima Qian’s Sun Wu was a real historical figure who was
44:58 responsible for writing most of the thirteen chapters of Sun Tzu’s Art of War,
45:04 but that subsequent additions were made by later
45:07 generations which became part of the core text.
45:10 Roger Ames holds a similar view,
45:12 but argues that Sun Tzu’s teachings might have been
45:16 passed orally to his followers and descendants including Sun Bin,
45:20 who then compiled the text and added their own commentaries.
45:24 Sun Bin’s Art of War may have initially been part of this corpus before being
45:30 regarded as an independent text given Sun Bin’s
45:34 own subsequent reputation as a talented military strategist.
45:39 While it is unlikely that there will ever be a satisfactory or conclusive
45:44 answer to the question of the authorship of The Art of War,
45:48 and just exactly who its author was and how he
45:51 came to know so much about the nature of military leadership,
45:54 the influence of the text is undeniable.
45:58 According to ancient Chinese scholar, Roger Ames,
46:01 several Chinese classics from the third century BC
46:05 display an intimate knowledge of Sun Tzu’s writings.
46:08 By that time the study of warfare had become especially important
46:13 among Chinese scholars and officials serving the seven major warring states
46:18 which were fighting each other for dominance of the Central Plain
46:22 in the decades prior to the Qin Dynasty’s rise to imperial power.
46:26 The eminent Legalist scholar of that time, Han Fei,
46:29 who lived during the mid-third century BC,
46:32 wrote, “Everyone in the realm discusses military affairs,
46:36 and every family keeps a copy of the Wu
46:40 Zi and the Sun Zi.” According to the traditional histories,
46:44 the First Emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang,
46:47 relied on The Art of War when planning his conquest of the warring states.
46:52 The Shiji’s descriptions of the Qin conquests regularly mention battles
46:57 and campaigns in which Qin armies only managed to achieve victory after
47:02 prolonged stalemates by sending agents into the enemy capital and undermining
47:08 the enemy command structure in ways which Sun Tzu had recommended.
47:14 In spite of his great influence, Sun Tzu’s ideas did not fit neatly
47:18 into the major Chinese philosophical traditions and had many critics.
47:23 Although his invocation of the dao or “way”
47:27 appears to endorse a Daoist view of the world,
47:31 his view that warfare is an undeniable fact
47:34 of life distances himself from the more pacifist Daoists.
47:39 Confucians criticised Sun Tzu’s emphasis on deception
47:42 and assassination as the key to military victory,
47:46 while Legalists such as Han Fei criticised Sun
47:50 Tzu’s humanitarian instincts and his desire to avoid war.
47:54 The Han dynasty cavalry general Huo Qubing,
47:57 who led devastating raids against the Xiongnu
48:01 tribal confederation in the northern steppes,
48:03 dismissed Sun Tzu by saying, quote,
48:06 “the only thing that matters is how one’s own strategies are going to work.
48:11 There is no need to study the old-fashioned rules of warfare!” Nevertheless,
48:15 The Art of War retained its key position in the Chinese literary canon,
48:21 and the statesman Cao Cao, who conquered northern China at the beginning
48:25 of the Three Kingdoms period in the third century AD,
48:30 left behind extensive commentaries on Sun Tzu’s work.
48:35 By the Song dynasty in the eleventh century AD,
48:38 the Sun Zi Bing Fa became one of the Seven Military Classics,
48:42 a compilation of seven texts which became required
48:46 reading for aspiring army officers in imperial China.
48:50 More speculatively, Sun Tzu’s ideas could also have been familiar to Genghis
48:56 Khan even before the Mongol conquest of China in the thirteenth century.
49:01 The Mongols certainly used swift manoeuvre and deception of the kind
49:06 advocated for by Sun Tzu to great effect in their conquests.
49:10 Despite the reverence shown to The Art
49:13 of War in China over the following centuries, in the late seventeenth century,
49:18 the Qing Dynasty emperor Kangxi echoed Huo Qubing
49:22 by criticising Sun Tzu in the following way:
49:26 “In war it’s experience of action that matters.
49:29 The so-called Seven Military Classics are full of nonsense about water and fire,
49:35 lucky omens and advice on the weather,
49:38 all at random and contradicting each other.
49:41 I told my officials once that if you followed these books,
49:46 you’d never win a battle.” Sun Tzu first came
49:51 to the attention of the Western world in 1772,
49:54 when the Jesuit missionary Jean Joseph Marie Amiot
49:58 published a translation of The Art of War.
50:01 Napoleon Bonaparte, who trained as an artillery officer
50:04 at several French military academies in the 1780s,
50:08 is likely to have read Amiot’s translation as a young man.
50:13 Napoleon’s own campaigns reflect several of Sun Tzu’s principles such as taking
50:17 calculated risks based on an assessment of the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses,
50:22 fighting on enemy territory to shorten supply lines,
50:26 seeking a quick decisive confrontation with the enemy
50:29 on the field of battle rather than resort to long sieges.
50:34 Napoleon’s ability to take advantage of his army’s marching speed
50:37 to surround the unfortunate Austrian general Karl Mack at Ulm
50:42 in October 1805 encapsulates Sun Tzu’s doctrine of exploiting military advantage
50:48 to defeat the enemy with as little actual engagement as possible.
50:53 His use of deception a few weeks later at the Battle of Austerlitz,
50:58 ahead of which he evacuated the high ground,
51:01 left his right flank deliberately weak, and gave the impression to enemy envoys
51:06 that his army was in no condition to fight,
51:09 is reminiscent of Sun Bin’s campaigns against Pang Juan.
51:13 The Napoleonic era inspired the two most
51:16 influential military treatises in the Western canon,
51:20 Antoine Henri-Jomini’s The Art of War and Carl von Clausewitz’s On War.
51:26 Both writers describe a new era of warfare characterised
51:30 by full mobilisation of a state’s resources for war,
51:34 and Clausewitz appears to reject Sun Tzu’s desire to, quote,
51:39 “defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed” by stating that “war is such
51:45 a dangerous business that the mistakes that come
51:48 from kindness are the very worst.” Nevertheless,
51:51 Clausewitz’s famous observation that war is a continuation of policy
51:57 by other means is reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s declaration
52:00 that war is an important matter of state and a state
52:05 can achieve its objectives through both political and military means,
52:10 though it is still a matter of debate whether
52:13 Clausewitz had read a translation of Sun Tzu or not.
52:18 The British soldier and military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart,
52:21 a veteran of the First World War,
52:24 developed the concept of the ‘indirect approach,’ arguing
52:28 that it was more effective to strike indirectly and rapidly
52:32 at an army’s nerve centre than to rely on the costly
52:37 frontal against fortified enemy positions of the Great War.
52:41 After being introduced to an English translation of The Art of War in 1927,
52:47 Liddell-Hart was astonished to find that many
52:50 of Sun Tzu’s ideas coincided with his own.
52:53 During the following years, Liddell-Hart further developed his indirect
52:58 approach theory and wrote several influential
53:00 books on how tanks could be used as a rapid strike force.
53:05 In his foreword to General Samuel Griffith’s 1963 translation of The Art of War,
53:11 Liddell-Hart describes a meeting in 1942
53:14 with the military attaché of the Chinese Nationalist government,
53:18 who informed him that his writings were among
53:21 the principal texts of the Chinese military academy.
53:25 When Liddell-Hart asked about Sun Tzu,
53:27 he was informed that the younger officers considered The Art
53:31 of War out of date in an era of mechanised warfare.
53:35 Liddell-Hart advised the Chinese officers to return to Sun Tzu,
53:40 whose thirteen chapters were what he called, quote,
53:43 “the best short introduction to the study of warfare,
53:47 and no less valuable for constant reference in extending
53:51 study of the subject.” Unlike the young Chinese Nationalist officers,
53:56 the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong was an admirer of Sun Tzu
54:01 and used The Art of War to develop his theories on guerilla warfare.
54:06 In more recent history, General Norman Schwarzkopf was one of the leading
54:11 proponents of Sun Tzu in the US Army,
54:14 and put many of his principles into practice
54:18 during the Gulf War in 1990 to 1991, using his tanks to roll over the Iraqi army
54:25 from the west while threatening an amphibious invasion from the east,
54:30 securing a quick and decisive victory at the cost of minimal casualties.
54:36 Finally, while The Art of War was not well-known
54:39 to the English-speaking world until after the Second World War,
54:43 its influence as a guidebook for strategy
54:46 and leadership now extends far beyond the military sphere.
54:50 Brazilian football manager Luiz Felipe Scolari quoted Sun Tzu in team talks
54:56 to inspire Brazil’s national team to victory in the 2002 World Cup,
55:02 while New England Patriots general manager Bill Belichick has cited
55:06 Sun Tzu as a major inspiration in his coaching philosophy.
55:11 The writer and consultant Mark McNeilly,
55:14 a former officer in the US National Guard,
55:17 has written books adapting Sun Tzu’s theories
55:19 to military and business leadership in the modern age.
55:22 The Art of War is considered essential
55:25 reading for aspiring business leaders and may
55:28 be found in the business and management
55:30 sections of bookshops as well as military history.
55:34 American interest in The Art of War is partly inspired by the rise
55:40 of China as a competitor to American
55:43 global hegemony in the early twenty-first century.
55:46 Any assessment of Sun Tzu must conclude by accepting
55:50 that we know very little about him as a historical character.
55:54 Indeed, there is still a debate as to whether or not he ever existed,
55:59 with some scholars arguing that he was simply an invented
56:03 figure who The Art of War was attributed to.
56:06 This latter argument probably goes too far.
56:09 What we can say, is that Sun Tzu was a military
56:14 tactician and scholar who lived in the highly unstable political
56:18 and military environment of the Spring and Autumn Period in ancient
56:23 Chinese history or perhaps the Seven Warring Kingdoms Period that followed.
56:27 What is clear is that the text had emerged as an important
56:32 piece of ancient Chinese literature by at least the third century BC.
56:37 Out of Sun Tzu’s observations on the utter instability
56:40 and chaos of his time came this short little guidebook.
56:44 On the surface of it,
56:46 The Art of War reads like a straight-forward text on military strategy,
56:51 and there is quite a bit on that topic within its pages,
56:56 but more than this, it is a reflection on leadership and knowing
57:00 how to lead and when to choose to fight one’s battles.
57:04 It is this latter feature that has made it a timeless text,
57:08 one which is cherished as much by business
57:12 leaders today as it is by military generals.
57:15 All in all, it is something
57:17 of a shame that, barring some great archaeological discovery,
57:21 we will probably never learn more about the mysterious Sun
57:25 Tzu who compiled it two and a half millennia ago.
57:30 What do you think of Sun Tzu and The Art of War?
57:35 Does the identity of the historical figure behind The Art of War even matter,
57:40 or should we focus more on the ideas
57:43 and principles contained within its thirteen chapters?
57:46 Is the Art of War out of date in the age of satellites and drones or does
57:52 Sun Tzu continue to offer valuable insights
57:55 into the art of leadership in the modern age?
57:59 Please let us know in the comment section and in the meantime,
58:17 thank you very much for watching.