Trump-Xi meeting: Is Taiwan at risk of getting a raw deal? | DW News

Trump-Xi meeting: Is Taiwan at risk of getting a raw deal? | DW News

DW News

0:00 Donald Trump, Xihinping, and Taiwan.

0:03 The leaders of two huge economies are meeting this week in Beijing.

0:08 And one of the things they're going to be

0:10 talking about is the tiny yet powerful for its size,

0:14 Taiwan, which lies off mainland China's coast.

0:17 So, I'm thinking, what could go wrong of its meeting for Taiwan?

0:21 a democracy that has long relied on the US for its security,

0:25 but is claimed by Beijing as part of China's territory.

0:30 Taiwan's number one fear has always been that it's going

0:32 to be relegated to the back burner on Washington's policy makers mind.

0:37 And um more specifically,

0:39 there's always this latent fear that US and China might somehow one day decide

0:44 to strike a quote unquote grand bargain uh

0:47 under which US perhaps make concessions on Taiwan,

0:52 maybe potentially abandoning Taiwan uh strategically in exchange

0:57 for major Chinese uh purchase orders of more American soybeans.

1:03 That is Wenty Sun.

1:04 He knows lots about Taiwan China dynamics

1:07 and I'll be talking with him in a minute.

1:10 Now, Taiwan is hoping to hear Mr.

1:13 Trump offer continued, if purposefully ambiguous, support,

1:18 ambiguous because of the decades old tightroppe of diplomatic speak known

1:23 as strategic ambiguity that has maintained

1:27 Taiwan's autonomy without outwardly declaring its independence.

1:31 But Donald Trump has never been an ambiguous person.

1:35 So, could he mess things up while

1:37 in the company of a powerful authoritarian leader this week?

1:41 But it looks like it's just a disease that we've had.

1:46 Wenti Sunung is a non-resident fellow

1:47 at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub.

1:50 He works on the trilateral relationship between the US, China, and Taiwan,

1:55 which makes him the perfect person to talk to right now.

1:59 Thank you so much for joining us.

2:01 With so many major issues for Trump and she to talk about this week,

2:06 we've got the war in Iran, trade and tariffs, AI, the list goes on.

2:10 Just clarify for us, why is Taiwan going to be such an important

2:14 talking point in this meeting between the two leaders?

2:19 Yeah, I mean Taiwan, of course, as we all know,

2:22 uh is one of the most major potential flash points

2:26 in that relationship between the world's two leading superpowers, US and China.

2:30 And we know that for China,

2:32 China has always claimed Taiwan to be the crown jewel in China's quest

2:38 to uh towards what they call a great rejuvenation of a Chinese nation.

2:44 And for us on the other hand,

2:46 Taiwan has been a major success story in terms of democratization,

2:50 in terms of sharing liberal democratic

2:52 values as was democratic development and uh

2:55 so in that sense Taiwan is an indispensable part to the narrative

3:00 for the both uh leading superpowers of the world and that's

3:03 why it's such a major point of contention between the two sides.

3:07 Now the last time Trump and she met that was October 2025 in South Korea.

3:12 what are the main differences in the dynamic between the two um from then

3:19 to now and and and how could that sort of shifting dynamic affect Taiwan?

3:26 I think if I were to compare late last year to now mid 2026,

3:31 the main thing is that um the Iran war has happened.

3:34 Of course, in addition to the Venezuela decapitation strike,

3:37 but the Iran war is a one major issue here because

3:40 US is once again finding itself stuck in the Middle Eastern quagmire

3:45 that divert a lot of American resources and political attention as diplomatic

3:50 capital away from the Indo-Pacific theater

3:54 and towards the Middle Eastern theater.

3:56 And what that means is that um uh US is finding

3:59 itself to be a somewhat more tentative position going into this meeting

4:04 with China and China is finding itself to be enjoying Hong Kong

4:08 advantage now that the meeting is going to happen in Beijing as well.

4:12 So presumably Beijing also gets to set more uh gets to have a more

4:17 influence on setting agenda for the discussion

4:19 item as well as other logistical arrangements.

4:22 So in this sense uh China's feeling a bit more confident

4:25 this time around compared with late last year in their Korea meeting.

4:30 We the Iran war is obviously a major aspect of this meeting.

4:33 We will talk about that a little bit uh later in our conversation.

4:37 Can I ask you though what shifts in language or policy

4:41 she wants to get from Trump um in this meeting about Taiwan?

4:48 Yes.

4:48 So on Taiwan, one major thing that China has been trying to get

4:53 is to get America to make a different pronouncement about USS policy on Taiwan.

4:59 Currently the US position is that US does not support Taiwan independence.

5:04 And what Beijing want is to get Trump

5:06 to say instead that US opposes independence for Taiwan.

5:12 Now that may seem like a minor shift in semantic.

5:14 Of course, the gold does not support towards actively oppose.

5:19 But if China gets it, China would view it as a major win.

5:22 And China would definitely frame that slight shift in US rhetoric

5:26 as a sign that US is shifting towards a new president on Taiwan.

5:30 And China will frame it domestically as a major win uh for Chinese

5:34 leadership towards the Chinese people and internationally

5:37 they will use it of course

5:38 to pressure other party countries in the world to say hey if US

5:43 is softening on their posture on Taiwan maybe you guys should as well.

5:47 So that's one major thing that China has uh on its crosshair this time around.

5:52 I just wanted to ask you about the term strategic ambiguity.

5:56 That's what we hear, isn't it,

5:57 about um sort of the attitude, the policy uh towards Taiwan.

6:02 Can you just explain what that means and why that term is used?

6:08 Yeah.

6:09 So strategic ambiguity basically means that um US keep it

6:14 unclear keep it ambiguous that should China launch an invasion against

6:19 Taiwan will the US military will come to Taiwan's aid

6:23 or not that's the ambiguity when it comes this to this major

6:27 strategic issue of potential conflict between US and China

6:32 and by extension US China Taiwan and so US historically has

6:36 usually kept to a position of ambiguity that says US

6:41 may or may not come to Taiwan's aid and that has

6:45 the effect of what we call dual deterrence namely

6:48 that first it deter China from uh invading Taiwan because China

6:53 is going to be thinking what happened if US decide

6:56 to intervene that's going to make things so much more complicated

6:59 that's one deterrence and there's the second deterrence and that's

7:02 against Taiwan namely uh US lack of clarity on whether US

7:07 support Taiwan in a military showdown keeps Taiwan policy maker

7:11 from going too fast on moving towards more independence as well.

7:16 So this slows both sides down and that also kill initiative on the US side.

7:22 Let's talk about sort of specifics about Taiwan, what makes it so significant.

7:27 First of all, it's its geographical um position.

7:31 What what is it about where Taiwan is that makes it such a flash point?

7:37 Yes.

7:37 So language we often use is first island

7:40 chain namely that from American geopolitical planners perspective

7:45 in order to ensure that US enjoys continue

7:49 preeminence around the world's major geopolitical chalk points.

7:52 US will want to limit Chinese military spear action towards

7:57 uh the Indo-Pacific and not beyond the first island chain.

8:00 First island chains are a collection of states

8:04 uh along China's eastern and southeastern maritime periphery.

8:09 So we're talking about Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,

8:13 down to Philippines and by extension uh Malaysia and Singapore.

8:18 Uh these are the maritime states that are along

8:21 China's military on the eastern and southern end of China.

8:24 And so long these states remain

8:26 largely friendly towards the American side militarily,

8:30 it's going to make it very hard for China

8:32 to project military power beyond uh its immediate shores.

8:35 And hence that's why keeping Taiwan in the US friendly side

8:39 of the column is so important to America's military planners for sure.

8:44 And so that's one major part of first island chain.

8:46 I suspect you may have other questions come after this as well.

8:50 Mhm.

8:51 Talking about sort of economic issues,

8:54 I mean it's a it's a huge factor, isn't it?

8:56 But Taiwan produces 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors.

9:01 I mean, how does that influence the situation?

9:06 Yeah.

9:06 So Taiwanese talk about this concept of the silicon

9:09 shield or high-tech shield which is basically saying that given

9:13 that Taiwan produces something in the 90 plus% of the world's

9:17 most advanced semiconductor chips and more than half of semiconductor

9:21 chips in general if Taiwan ever falls a the war

9:25 is going to so decimate global production capacity for high-end

9:29 semiconductor chips in general making the world's technology and innovation

9:34 have the economy grinding to will hold number one.

9:37 So that hurts everybody in general.

9:39 Now uh if let's say a invasion does happen uh between China

9:43 and Taiwan and China somehow takes over

9:46 Taiwan high-tech industries that's going to mean

9:49 that a major s of technology power in the world is going

9:53 to move from a more USfriendly camp towards more China friendly camp as well.

9:58 And that's going to have major implications in terms of America's

10:02 continued predominance in the global high-tech supply chain as well

10:07 if a major choke point uh that is Taiwan falls

10:10 toward uh falls into a Chinese column rather USfriendly column.

10:15 Okay.

10:15 So you're making very clear what the global

10:18 implications political and economic of this are.

10:22 Let's talk about now the two personalities in this meeting this week.

10:26 Trump and she.

10:27 Now, Trump is known, isn't he, for his transactional attitude,

10:31 his ability to zigzag, to reverse course.

10:34 What is the thing that Taiwan is going to be most worried about

10:39 this week uh uh as this uh this meeting is about to happen?

10:46 Yeah.

10:46 I mean Taiwan being a relatively smaller

10:49 power in this US China Taiwan trilateral relationship.

10:53 Taiwan's number one fear has always been that it's going

10:55 to be relegated to the back burner on Washington's policy makers mind.

11:00 And um more specifically,

11:02 there's always this latent fear that US and China might somehow one day decide

11:07 to strike a quote unquote grand bargain uh

11:10 under which US perhaps make concessions on Taiwan,

11:15 maybe potentially abandoning Taiwan uh strategically in exchange

11:20 for major Chinese uh purchase orders of more American soybeans,

11:25 more American agricultural produce or let's say

11:29 Boing uh aerospace and other major heavy industry

11:33 from the American side that is trade

11:35 for Taiwan essentially that's a fear on many Taiwanese

11:39 uh policy analyst mind as well now knowing

11:43 Trump knowing the current situation we're in I

11:47 think some Taiwan policy makers find some

11:50 solace in this particular timing of this US

11:53 China summit and that it may bode well for Taiwan in a sense that yes

11:59 President President Trump might be a transaction president

12:01 when it comes to diplomatic style but also

12:05 yes US is currently stuck in the whole

12:08 Iran conflict significantly which as we mentioned

12:12 earlier puts US in a less favorable

12:15 position when it comes to negotiating with China.

12:18 So even if Trump administration were trying to think about selling Taiwan out

12:23 uh it will want to sell Taiwan out uh when the pricing is high.

12:28 But now given the Iran quadma US find itself

12:32 in it would be harder than usual for US to sell out Taiwan at a high enough

12:37 price for it to be worth President Trump's while.

12:41 So I think there is definitely Taiwanese society

12:44 and Taiwanese uh policy community watching this Trump Z summit

12:48 with a wary eye but they find some reassurance

12:52 that timing may on the whole be on Taiwan's side.

12:56 Okay, let's talk about this more.

12:58 I mean as you said the war in Iran has essentially drained US munitions,

13:02 weapons uh stockpiles, shifted military resources away from East East Asia.

13:08 Those are the facts now.

13:10 So, you're saying that this is going to impact

13:12 America's um ability to to to support Taiwan's autonomy.

13:17 I'm curious though, I mean,

13:19 with China watching what is going on, what is it going to be

13:23 taking from the way the US is conducting its war against Iran?

13:32 Yeah.

13:32 So uh a couple of things I think first of all uh China is going to be

13:36 looking at Iran conflict and realize the continual

13:40 might and military superiority of the American military.

13:42 I think that's number one.

13:43 The fact that US has been able to launch effective decapitation strikes

13:48 against top level leaderships not just

13:50 once against Iran but twice against Venezuela.

13:53 So in that sense China's kind of look at it and feeling

13:56 a sense of humility uh in terms of military balance between the two sides.

14:01 Number one, not to mention that China

14:03 has been undergoing its own military purges over the last year or so when

14:07 we see China's top level military decision-making body,

14:10 the central military commission having a clearing house when the usually seven

14:15 member CMC uh now is down to essentially two well three members.

14:20 So that's one thing uh that is going to inject some level of humility

14:24 back into a Chinese leadership's uh mind when it come to military balance.

14:29 Number two of course is the depletion American stockpile

14:32 uh that um China is going to find that hey

14:36 America's defense industrial complex however mighty it might be

14:40 its resources its production capacity is not unlimited and they

14:44 were hearing um report analysis from more Washington based

14:48 policy community side that um US find itself significantly

14:53 overstretched when it comes to military supply mutation and what

14:56 have you especially uh with in the interpacific theater.

15:00 So put these two together, China may be looking at this Iran conflict

15:04 and think that a uh in terms of military quality,

15:08 US still enjoys significant edge over China,

15:12 but also b uh we are seeing some level

15:15 change in the armor in terms of US different industrial

15:18 compass capacity to keep up with so many commitments

15:21 and so many campaigns that US has militarily around the world.

15:25 So maybe if China just shows slightly more strategic patience at some point,

15:31 China's greater scale, China's defense industrial complex,

15:35 greater production capacity may be able to turn a tie

15:39 if not in quality than at least in quantity.

15:41 So that's one more reason why China may want to wait

15:44 just a bit more when it comes to doing anything drastic.

15:47 So Wy, in summary, I'm going to ask you to look into your crystal ball.

15:51 What do you think is going to happen?

15:52 What will we see this week when Trump and she meet?

15:59 Well, that's a million-dollar question, isn't it?

16:01 Uh, I think I'm going to expect that Trump

16:04 and Z are going to have a uh a pleasant

16:09 uh bilateral exchange that's going to create a kind

16:12 of positive visual atmospherics that's going to calm the water somewhat.

16:17 I think we're going to expect more um resumption

16:21 of cultural and people-to-people level exchanges between the two sides.

16:26 We given that um President Trump is reportedly bring a lot of American

16:32 um tycoons and business leaders to China for part of his delegation.

16:37 We're going to see China side issuing a lot

16:40 of business purchase deals uh internal buying American soybeans, aerospace,

16:45 maybe other major US businesses as well as a way

16:48 to create a good vibe between the two sides.

16:51 On uh Taiwan side, I don't expect major uh drastic

16:57 changes this time around when it comes to highly symbolic act.

17:01 What we might see is President Trump saying something that's going

17:05 to in his mind calm the water somewhat and lower temperature.

17:09 something perhaps to the effect of uh US will not find

17:13 it to be in American interest to see any major unilateral changes

17:18 uh from either side and that um nonetheless US will continue

17:23 to do uh US Taiwan bilateral relation in ways that US sees fit.

17:30 keep it something in the very ambiguous uh language territory so

17:36 that both sides Beijing and Taipei will find something that they like.

17:40 Taipei will find it to be hey US still sees

17:44 its own interest to be a priority and maybe US

17:47 Taiwan continue cooperation is something that's in US interest especially

17:51 thinking about how Taiwan just passed something like 25 26 billion

17:56 US dollars worth of defense purchases budget uh that's going

18:00 to be a bring a rainfall for American defense uh sector

18:04 China will also find something like enough from that kind

18:07 of loose ambiguous language as well China is going to Hey,

18:11 uh, President Trump continue to be happy, uh, continue to, rather,

18:16 President Trump continue to discourage any

18:19 major drastic changes from both sides, specifically from not specifically,

18:25 but China's going to interpret it to mean

18:27 that Trump is hinting at the Taiwan side.

18:30 And so both sack had enough potential ambiguity,

18:34 one would argue constructive ambiguity to work

18:38 with for their own domestic audience that maybe on the whole

18:42 we're going to see peacemail shift from from President

18:45 Trump that leaves all holders enough to work with.

18:51 Wenty Sun with the Atlantic Council Council's Global China Hub.

18:54 Thank you so much for your insights.

18:56 It's been really great talking to you.

18:59 Thank you.

19:02 Do you agree with Wenty Sunung?

19:04 Is China hoping for or even expecting

19:07 a policy shift from Donald Trump on Taiwan?

19:10 Or will Taiwan remain the first island chain to contain Chinese ambitions?

19:16 Let us know in the comments.

19:18 And if you haven't already, don't forget to subscribe.

19:20 I'm Manny Cooper McKinnon.

19:22 Thank you for watching.

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